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ABSTRACT 
Repetition seems to increase the truth-value of information, generating the illusion that 
repeated statements are more valid than things we never heard or read before – the illusion of 
truth effect. The present thesis aims at providing further and clearer understanding of “why” 
and “how” we base the important decision of something we hear being true rather than false 
on repetition. We review the literature evidencing repetition’s impact on judgments of truth 
and the major cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to explain it. The first studies 
investigating the mechanisms underlying the effect show that subjective familiarity is more 
important than actual frequency of exposure. These approaches further suggested that the 
automatic memory component of Familiarity has a rather involuntary impact in truth 
judgments, and is the one supporting illusions of truth when the controlled Recollection 
process is impaired. A next approach showed that processing fluency experiences promoted 
by factors unrelated to previous exposure and memory are sufficient to generate illusions of 
truth. The first accounts suggesting processing fluency to be the process underlying the truth 
effect maintained the idea that the feelings of familiarity mediate fluency effects on judged 
truth. However, a more recent approach argues that fluency is an ecologically valid cue for 
truth, and thus fluency per se directly influences truth judgments, with no need for memory 
attributions. Drawing from this previous body of knowledge, we pose the question of whether 
there is something special in the relation repetition has with truth. Some evidence in the 
literature may suggest so, for example, the fact that illusions of truth have a higher magnitude 
when they are induced by repetition than when other fluency sources are used. Additionally, 
repetition has the unique characteristic of aggregating both perceptual and conceptual fluency, 
which may add an “extra” layer to the association with truth. Exploring these questions, we 
present three independent papers exploring the differences that may exist between repetition 
and other factors also able to impact truth judgments, and the relevance that repetition’s 
unique characteristics may have in the shaping of the truth effect. In the first paper we 
demonstrate that the association of repetition with truth is more difficult to reverse than when 
pure perceptual fluency (e.g., color contrast) is manipulated, and that the confounds between 
the processing experiences and resulting effects on truth judgments the two variables promote 
can be dissociated. In the second and third papers, we isolate the conceptual and perceptual 
components involved in repetition, showing that conceptual overlap (a match in the content 
and meaning) takes precedence over the sharing of perceptual features in the generation of 
illusions of truth. Only when individuals no longer can access the specific meaning of what 
was previously presented do perceptual fluency effects emerge. We discuss how our findings 
integrate and expand what was previously known about judgments of truth, addressing the 
contributions and clarifications they bring to the main cognitive mechanisms that have been 
proposed to explain the effect. 
 
Keywords: Illusion of truth; repetition; familiarity; processing fluency. 
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Section I 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
“It's no wonder that truth is stranger than fiction.  
Fiction has to make sense.” 
Mark Twain (1835-1910) 
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“The Truth is Never Pure and Rarely Simple” 
 
Deciding about the validity of the information we come across is at the core of many 
of our daily activities – choosing a software for the statistical analyses we need to do for 
work, voting for or against the implementation of a new public policy that has been under 
discussion, start buying that dieting product everyone is talking about, or forcing our kids to 
eat liver because everybody says it’s highly nutritive. And because this is such a ubiquitous 
decision in our life, understanding the process by which we come to it is integral to 
understanding of why we hold the attitudes we hold, why we make the choices we make, and 
even why we behave the way we do. But, as Oscar Wilde so elegantly put it on The 
Importance of Being Earnest (1895/2000), “The truth is never pure and rarely simple”. There 
is not only one road for truth, nor are the paths to it so straightforward as we may think.  
So, how do we decide that a given statement about reality is true or false? What leads 
us to believe the tour guide in a local Insect’s Museum, when he tells us “It takes 20 days for 
a housefly to become a great-grandmother”?	  Well, for one thing, it could actually be that we 
know a thing or two about houseflies’ sexual life habits, and then use that knowledge to infer 
that maybe less than a month is really enough for them to have a big family already (an 
inferential process such as syllogistic reasoning, Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Or maybe 
we are specialists on insects’ biology and can thus directly ascribe the truthfulness of the 
information the guide is giving us.  
But what about the occasions when we lack knowledge about the topics that we hear 
about? Can we still decide whether a statement is true or false in those situations? Of course 
we can! But instead of knowledge, we use other types of information to help us make that 
decision. For example, when we hear the tour guide we may think, “well, if he is giving the 
tour he should know what he is talking about” (we use the person’s expertise as a cue to infer 
he is giving correct information about reality, e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Hovland & 
Weiss, 1951; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Even without making that inference, we might believe 
this person also because all the other people in the group are nodding to what the guide says, 
or because we hear all the other guides we pass by in the museum saying the same (we often 
use social consensus to help us come to a judgment, and we tend to comply with the behavior 
and/or opinions expressed by a majority; e.g., Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1954; Goldstein, 
Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  
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But besides using relevant knowledge and/or the clues available in the social environment, it 
seems also that we tend to simply believe a statement as we hear or read it, pretty much as we 
accept that an object exists in the moment we see or touch it. That is, understanding an 
assertion about reality seems to implicate accepting it as true (Spinoza, 1677/1982). And 
while this acceptance is rather effortless, following automatically from understanding the 
claim, categorizing information as false entails an extra step, which consumes our time and 
(cognitive) energy (e.g., Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). So why not just 
believe that trivial fact about the domestic houseflies? But surprisingly, we may also believe a 
statement just because it is something we heard before, because it is a story that we have 
encountered repeatedly in our lives (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977).  
Repetition seems to increase the truth-value of information, generating the illusion that 
repeated statements are more valid than things we never heard or read before. Hasher and 
colleagues (1977) were the first to empirically demonstrate this illusion of truth effect, and 
since then a considerable body of evidence about this effect has been growing in the literature 
(see the meta-analytic review by Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). Because 
“repetition is an illogical basis for truth” (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992, p. 446), as simply 
repeating a claim does not bring further or less factual support for it, many authors became 
interested in understanding why repetition informs us about the validity of information; what 
processes lye behind this effect? 
The present thesis aims at providing further and clearer understanding of “why” and 
“how” we base the important decision of something we hear being true rather than false on 
repetition. For that, we review the literature evidencing repetition’s impact on judgments of 
truth and the major cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to explain it. Drawing 
from this previous body of knowledge, we present three independent papers exploring the 
differences that may exist between repetition and other factors also able to impact truth 
judgments, and the relevance that repetition’s unique characteristics may have in the shaping 
of the truth effect. Finally, we will discuss how our findings integrate and expand what was 
previously known about judgments of truth, addressing the contributions and clarifications 
they bring to the main cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to explain the effect.  
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Chapter I: The Illusion of Truth Effect 
 
 Repetition affects many of our judgments and decisions about reality. The most 
obvious and direct ones are memory judgments. Ebbinghaus’ (1885/1913) seminal 
experiments about the rate of learning and forgetting of information already clearly showed 
that the more times we practice a list of items (in his experiments he used nonsense syllables) 
in one day, the less repetitions we need to perfectly recall it on the following day. This was 
the first demonstration of a memory retention curve, and since then the effects of repetition on 
memory have been studied and extended to memory judgments beyond recall or recognition, 
which directly probe memory for the previous presentation of a target stimulus. For example, 
repetition positive impact on memory performance has also been evidenced in indirect, 
implicit memory tests such as word fragment completion (e.g., Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 
1982; these tests are called indirect because instead of asking participants to complete the 
fragment with a word that was presented in a list they studied before, they they ask them to 
complete it with the first word that pops in their minds). Thus, even in situations when the 
effects of repetition cannot be traced in direct memory queries, they may manifest in indirect 
measures. 
Previous presentation also impacts “non-related to memory1” judgments. For example, 
simply being exposed to a set of neutral and ambiguous stimuli, like Chinese ideographs that 
we have no idea regarding what they mean, will make us prefer them over equivalent stimuli 
that we have not seen before (the mere exposure effect, e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). 
Repetition of persuasive arguments also leads us to agree more with the attitudinal position 
they stand for, specially when the persuasive messages are not processed profoundly (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2009).  
And repetition impacts our judgments regarding the truth-value of a statement about 
reality (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg, et al., 1992; Hasher, et al., 1977). The impact of repetition 
on the perceived truth of a statement became known as the illusion of truth effect, or simply 
truth effect. The truth effect shows repeated statements are considered more valid and 
believed more than new ones and independently of their original truth status (e.g., 
Bacon, 1979; Begg, et al., 1992; Hasher, et al., 1977).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For some authors, these judgments are indirect measures of memory. See for example Seamon et al. (1995) for 
evidence of explicit vs. implicit memory dissociations in the mere exposure effect. 
 
   
   
6 
Illusions of truth were originally identified by Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino (1977), 
and their empirical approach set the basis of the experimental paradigm that is still used 
nowadays to understand the underlying processes. Their interpretation of the effect, based on 
frequency of occurrence serving as a criterion for truth, also set the tone for the following 
theoretical accounts of the mechanisms involved in judgments of truth. Because of the 
relevance of that first study for the forthcoming approaches, we begin this chapter by 
carefully examining Hasher and colleagues’ original experiment. We then attest the reliability 
of the truth effect by showing the many replications that have been accomplished in different 
laboratories while trying to explain the processes involved.  
 
The Pioneer Study and the Establishment of the Basic Experimental Paradigm 
 Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino (1977) were the first to empirically demonstrate the 
truth effect. With this pioneer experiment, the authors wanted to understand how individuals 
judge the truth-value of statements when they have no actual knowledge about the facts being 
claimed. They proposed that frequency of occurrence could be the criterion people use in such 
situations, as there was wide evidence in the literature that repetition influenced memory 
measures such as recall and recognition (e.g., Underwood, Zimmerman, & Freund, 1971), and 
also that people are relatively good at judging the frequency of occurrence of events in an 
experiment (e.g., Hintzman, 1969), as well as of events in the real world (e.g., pairs of letters, 
Underwood, 1971). 
In order to test this hypothesis, they presented college students with a set of 60 
statements at three different occasions, each separated by an interval of two weeks. Half of 
the statements in the list were true and half were false, and they were about a variety of topics 
(e.g., sports, politics, arts). The statements were all plausible, but it was rather improbable that 
most college students had knowledge regarding their truth status. Participants’ task was to 
hear each of the statements and rate how sure they were that it was true or false in a 7-point 
rating scale (1 – Definitely False; 2 – Probably False; 3 – Possibly False; 4 – Unsure; 5 – 
Possibly True; 6 – Probably True; 7 – Definitely True). Twenty of the statements were 
randomly selected to appear in all of the three experimental sessions (i.e., they were presented 
in the first session, and then repeated in the second and in the third sessions), together with 
other 40, always new, statements. The results of this experiment showed evidence of an 
increase in perceived validity with repetition in two ways: (1) repeated statements tended to 
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be evaluated as more probably true after each repetition, and (2) repeated affirmations were 
systematically considered truer than the new ones. These findings, which were obtained both 
for factually true as for factually false items, led the authors to conclude that indeed frequency 
of occurrence “served as a criterion of certitude” (p.112) that a statement was true. 
Besides presenting the first empirical demonstration of the effect of repetition on 
judged truth and the first theoretical account for it, this experiment laid the fundamental 
characteristics of the experimental paradigm that is used to study illusions of truth. The basic 
routine of a truth effect experiment encompasses two different, subsequent phases: the 
exposure phase and the truth evaluation phase. The goal of the exposure phase is to 
familiarize participants with part of the statements that they will subsequently judge for truth, 
that is, the statements that will be repeated later in the evaluation phase of the experiment. In 
this first phase, participants are presented with a set of statements that are ambiguous 
regarding their truth status, that is, statements that have an equal probability of being 
considered true as of being considered false. It is necessary to use such type of material so to 
isolate repetition effects from other variables know to affect truth judgments, and also to 
guarantee that the stimuli are vulnerable to repetition effects (e.g., if individuals have factual 
knowledge about the claims, then they will answer on the basis of that knowledge and their 
responses become immune to the impact of repetition, Dechêne, et al., 2010; Unkelbach, 
2007). Another reason to use ambiguous, trivial statements lays in the fact that personally 
relevant stimulus might also not be susceptible to the effects of repetition (Bacon, 1979). In 
order to reduce guessing in participants’ responses (which is highly probable due to the 
ambiguity of statements), the instructions that are given in this phase usually stress that half 
of the statements are true and half are false (e.g., Bacon, 1975; Hasher, et al., 1977; 
Unkelbach, 2007), although this is less relevant if a high number of statements are presented 
(e.g., Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). To justify this first exposure to the statements, it is common to 
ask participants to perform a simple and unrelated to truth task, such as rating how interesting 
are the topics covered by the statements (e.g., Begg, et al., 1992), or how comprehensible are 
the sentences (Hawkins, Hoch, & Meyers-Levy, 2001). But, just like in the seminal 
experiment (Hasher et al., 1977), authors may ask for truth ratings immediately in the 
exposure phase (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009). 
The truth evaluation phase is the moment when the perceived validity of the 
statements is measured, in order to assess the effects of repetition. To do this, participants are 
asked to evaluate statements that were presented in the exposure phase (i.e., repeated 
 
   
   
8 
statements) mixed with totally new ones. These evaluations can be done either in rating scales 
similar to the one used in Hasher’s (1977) study (e.g., Bacon, 1979, used the same scale but 
inverted its direction, while Brown & Nix, 1996, and Parks & Toth, 2006, used a 6-point 
rating scale), or using simple dichotomic measures in which participants have to decide 
whether each statement is either true or false (e.g., Unkelbach, 2007). In this phase of the 
experiment, evaluation of the statements can occur in one of two different contexts: a 
heterogeneous context and a homogenous context. In the heterogeneous context, the more 
commonly used, participants evaluate a mixed list of repeated and new statements (e.g., 
Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; Hasher et al., 1977; Bacon, 1979; Begg, et al., 1992; 
Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011), and thus the truth effect is analyzed in a 
comparison between the truth ratings given to repeated items and to new items – a between-
items criterion (Dechêne et al., 2010). In the homogeneous context, participants decide about 
the truth-value of the same set of statements; they evaluate only repeated items (e.g., Dechêne 
et al., 2009; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Schwartz, 1982). Here, the truth effect is analyzed in the 
comparisons of the first truth ratings given to the statements with the subsequent ones – a 
within-items criterion (Dechêne et al., 2010). 
 
Reliability and Validity of the Illusion of Truth Effect 
 In their recent meta-analysis, Dechêne and her colleagues (2010) reviewed the many 
different conditions under which illusions of truth have been observed, showing it to be a 
medium-sized effect both when it is measured by between-items (d = .49, 95% CI: [.45 – 
.55]) or within-items comparisons (d = .39, 95% CI: [.32 – .47]). 
Attesting to its reliability, the truth effect truth is observed not only with trivial facts 
about reality but also with marketing messages (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2001), claims about 
products (e.g., Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005), or messages representing an 
individual’s opinion (e.g., Arkes et al., 1989), and both in and outside controlled laboratory 
contexts (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1984). The effect is robust enough to emerge even when the time 
participants have to read the statements for the first time is constrained to as little as 1 s (e.g., 
Unkelbach, 2007), and also when the delay that exists between the exposure and the truth 
evaluation phases is as long as 1 or 2 weeks (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et 
al., 1977; Henkel & Mattson, 2011), or even 1 to 3 months (e.g., Brown & Nix, 1996). The 
reliability of repetition’s effect is further ascertained by the lack of specificity of illusions of 
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truth to a modality of presentation – that is, repetition increases perceived validity both when 
items are presented auditorily (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977) or visually (e.g., 
Arkes et al., 1989; Begg et al., 1992; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992), and when there’s a mixture 
between the two (i.e., the exposure phase is auditory and the evaluation phase is visual; e.g., 
Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009).  
In summary, the illusion of truth effect seems to be quite reliable and robust to the 
variations that are introduced in the basic experimental paradigm. The fact that it has been 
shown under such a diversity of conditions evidences how pervasive this effect of repetition 
is.  
However, the relevance of the different conditions under which the effect was tested 
goes much beyond simply stating its reliability and pervasiveness. The changes that were 
progressively introduced in the experimental paradigm were created to test different 
explanations for the phenomenon. Since the first demonstrations of the effect that researchers 
have tried to understand why and how a statement that is repeated shines as more valid and 
true than something we hear or read for the first time. Being an effect that arises with 
repetition, memory processes were soon proposed as the mechanisms responsible for it. In the 
next chapter we review the most important points of such accounts. 
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Chapter II: Illusions of Truth as Memory Phenomena  
 
 Since the initial study documenting the truth effect (Hasher et al., 1977) that memory 
processes have been advanced as the mechanisms underlying illusions of truth. Remember 
that Hasher and colleagues (1977) suggested that memory for frequency of occurrence was 
the mechanism that led participants to consider repeated statements more valid than new ones. 
However, except for the effect of repetition itself, the authors did not present evidence that 
could directly and without doubts support such claim. But the challenge was made, and not 
long after the group of researchers self-presented as Bacon (1979, which was led by Ian Begg) 
carried out a study that would definitely establish the relation of the truth effect with memory, 
focusing on attributions to memory and the subjective feeling of familiarity. 
 
The Memory Account and Subjective Familiarity 
Just as Hasher and colleagues (1977) proposed, Bacon (1979) also believed that a 
memory attribution was the cause behind repeated statements’ ring of truth. However, they 
disagreed from the previous approach, in that they proposed that the simple recognition of a 
statement from a previous occasion would be sufficient for the effect to emerge. That is, they 
hypothesized that the criterion of certitude that Hasher and colleagues talked about came 
directly from the “subject's memory judgment concerning the test statement being rated, 
without the mediated and redundant process of estimating the frequency with which the 
statement has occurred” (p. 242). Simply acknowledging that a statement was repeated served 
as an assurance that it was true. 
To test this hypothesis, Bacon (1979) asked participants to give truth ratings of 
repeated and new statements in two different occasions separated by 3 weeks. They added to 
the original design a condition in which participants made recognition judgments about the 
statements (i.e., decide if they were repeated from the previous session or if they were new) 
before rating them for truth. This condition was added to set apart Bacon’s recognition-based 
account from Hasher’s frequency of occurrence explanation. If Bacon was right and truth is 
inferred from recognition decisions, then statements judged as old should be considered more 
valid than statements judged as new, independently of their actual frequency of occurrence in 
the experiment. And that was exactly what happened: statements that were recognized as 
being repeated were rated as truer than statements that were judged as new, and this occurred 
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independently of the statements’ real repetition status. That is, ratings of truth were more 
sensitive to subjective familiarity than to objective repetition (or frequency of occurrence). 
This means that even new statements were considered more probably true if they were 
wrongly recognized as being repeated from the previous session.  
These results suggested that individuals believe the things they remember (even if it’s 
only falsely remembered), the things that they believe to match the content they have in the 
memory trace. It means that individuals have what Bacon (1979) described as “a bias toward 
believing the information that they possess” (p. 248), or simply deem to possess. Being so, if 
individuals are presented with statements that contradict previous ones, they should judge 
them as false. This hypothesis was tested in a second experiment (Bacon, 1979, Experiment 
2), in which participants rated for truth a list containing new statements, repeated statements, 
and statements that were contradictions of previously presented ones. Importantly, in this 
experiment, before giving their truth ratings participants had to classify the items either as 
new, repeated or changed statements. Supporting the thesis that individuals believe what they 
remember, repeated statements were given higher truth-value than new statements, 
while contradictory statements were given less truth-value than new ones. But even 
more, truth ratings depended more on the classification that participants made of the 
statements than on their real status as new, repeated or changed. So, again, participants 
believed what they remembered (even if incorrectly), and considered false what 
contradicted the information they had (or thought they had) in memory. In summary, 
this first evidence regarding memory role on illusions of truth suggests that besides the 
matching between the information that is presented and the information that is activated in 
memory (“real” memory), also only believing that the information is in our memory trace 
increases the truth-value of statements. 
Begg, Armour and Kerr (1985) gathered further support for the memory account, 
suggesting that the perceived validity of a statement depends on any relationship between the 
information it presents and the information that it activates in memory. For their first 
experiment, Begg and colleagues (1985) found inspiration in evidence showing that we tend 
to remember the general meaning or topic of a message more than its details (e.g., Bartlett, 
1932; Begg & Wickelgren, 1974; Sachs, 1967). This led the authors to question whether 
memory of only the topic of a statement would be enough to promote illusions of truth. Their 
specific hypothesis was that if the truth-value of a target statement depends on the extent to 
which the content of that statement matches with information we have in memory (e.g., 
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Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981), then statements with familiar topics should be considered 
truer than statements with unfamiliar topics. They tested this idea by asking participants to 
study a list of topics (e.g., “A hen’s body temperature”, or “The Statue of Liberty”) in the 
exposure phase. Afterwards, participants rated for truth a list of statements, half of which 
were facts about the familiar topics (e.g., “The temperature of a hen’s body is about 104 
degrees Fahrenheit”, or “The extended right arm of the Statue of Liberty is 42 feet long”), and 
half were facts about unstudied topics. And as expected, statements regarding familiar 
topics were indeed evaluated as more probably true than statements about new topics. 
However, this effect was smaller than the one obtained in a condition where the entire 
statements were repeated instead of only their topics. The authors attributed this result to the 
fact that a literal repetition of a statement renders it more familiar, because besides repetition 
of the topic there’s also repetition of the factual details that were provided in the first 
encounter with the statement. That is, there is a larger overlap between the information that is 
presented at test and the information that is activated and accessed in memory.  
To test that prediction, Begg and colleagues (1985) designed a second experiment in 
which participants first had to answer (with yes or no) a list of questions that where either 
relevant or irrelevant questions about the facts they would later judge for truth. For example, 
for the statement “The extended right arm of the Statue of Liberty is 42 feet long”, the 
relevant question would be “Do you have any idea how long the extended right arm of the 
Statue of Liberty is?” and the irrelevant question would be “Do you have any idea how long 
the Statue of Liberty has been in New York?”. The rational for this manipulation was that 
relevant questions provided almost all the same information as test statements. Thus, 
statements with relevant questions should be considered truer than test statements about 
which irrelevant questions had been asked, because there was more overlapping with memory 
content. By the same token, new statements (i.e., about which no questions had been asked) 
would have the lowest truth-value of all. Results were perfectly aligned with the authors’ 
hypothesis – statements associated with a question providing almost all the information 
they contained were considered truer than statements associated with questions that did 
not provide such overlap of information. These, in turn, were considered truer than totally 
new statements, providing more support that the truth-value of information depends on how 
much it agrees with what we have stored in memory. 
The impact of the overlap between a statement’s content and the information that is 
activated in memory on judgments of truth was tested in a different way in two other 
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experiments (Begg’s et al., 1985, experiments 3 and 4). Bacon (1969) showed that the 
information we have in memory (or believe we have in memory) is held as true – remember 
that in his experiment statements that were considered as contradictions of previously 
presented ones were judged as less true than even new statements. So Begg and collaborators 
(1985) hypothesized that information that is presented with a tag casting doubt about its 
veracity should be encoded to a lesser degree than information with a tag that inspires 
confidence in its truthfulness. This should result in “doubtful” statements being considered 
less true than “trusting” statements when encountered a second time, supposedly because 
there is less information being accessed in memory, and hence less information matching the 
target statements’ details. However, statements that had been presented with the doubtful tag 
should still be considered more valid than totally new statements. This is because these items 
create some level of familiarity (at least with the topic), while there was no overlap 
whatsoever between the information presented by a new statement and what is activated in 
memory. To test this hypothesis, in the exposure phase of the experiments, statements were 
preceded either by a positive (e.g., “It is frequently said that”; “It is commonly believed that”) 
or a negative (e.g., “It is rarely said that”; “Few people believe that”) biasing comment. Then, 
participants evaluated the truth of new and repeated statements (without the biasing 
introductions), and also indicated if they recognized each statement from the previous phase 
(yes/no decision, made for each statement immediately after its truth evaluation). The key 
results showed that, although participants were able to discriminate old from new statements 
equally well for positively and negatively biased statements, they considered positively 
biased statements truer than negatively biased ones, which in turn were considered 
truer than new items. With this, the authors concluded that even though the familiarity with 
the topic was enough to set apart repeated statements from new ones, a positive vs. negative 
bias affected the extent to which the details of the information were encoded. Thus, according 
to the authors, the truth ratings were based on memory for the facts and not on the biasing 
comment that accompanied repeated statements, otherwise the negative biased statements 
would be considered the falsest of all (and not the new statements). These results were 
interpreted as strengthening the thesis that the more information we remember about a 
statement, the more we will consider it valid and true. It is worth to notice, however, that the 
premises on which this conclusion was built – that the details of information pre-tagged as 
untrustworthy are not deeply encoded, cannot be directly tested or assessed in the data of this 
experiment, and so there is no support for them. 
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Begg and Armour (1991) looked for further evidence concerning the effect of biasing 
comments in determining how much is learned about a particular statement, and its 
consequence for truth judgments. They focused on the refutation of an alternative 
interpretation for their previous results – that the biasing comments were themselves 
remembered by participants, thus leading positively biased statements ring as truer. The 
results of their three experiments disconfirmed that alternative interpretation, showing that 
indeed participants did not remember the biases introduced in the statements, particularly the 
negative ones. However, although the nature of the positive vs. negative biasing 
comments associated with a statement was not remembered, negatively biased 
statements were considered less valid than positively biased ones. For this, the authors 
concluded that the previous interpretation of their results was valid, and the reason why 
negatively biased statements were considered less true than positively biased ones had to be 
the smaller degree of matching between the tested statements and how much of them had 
been encoded. However, there was also evidence of the strong association between 
recognition and the inference of truth that Bacon’s (1979) work had already suggested. 
Statements that participants judged to be repetitions were the ones judged as more 
probably true; statements judged to be contradictions of previous ones were the 
statements considered as more probably false; and the statements judged to be new were 
in between the other two. And like Bacon (1979) had found, this association between 
recognition and judged truth was independent of the statements real repetition status. So, 
although the existence of an objective match between judged statements and memory content 
generates illusions of truth, it does not seem to be a necessary condition for the effect. These 
results stress again the importance of subjective familiarity with the statements in detriment of 
objective prior exposure to them. The agreement between the information presented in the 
tested statements and the information that is remembered does not need to be real, but only 
perceived. 
The relevance of subjective familiarity for illusions of truth was also shown by Arkes, 
Hackett and Boehm (1989). In the first experiment of this paper, statements believed to be 
repetitions were rated truer than those believed to be new. This happened independently of 
statements’ actual repetition status, and even for statements that were initially endorsed as 
false in a previous pre-test of the material. In this experiment, the authors also demonstrated 
that perceived repetition increased evaluations of truth of statements representing opinions 
about topics in which individuals are usually interested and have strong feelings about (e.g., 
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death penalty, abortion). This means that the effect of repetition and perceived familiarity in 
truth judgments is so general and broad that it affects not only neutral and ambiguous 
statements, but also claims that we don’t consider true accounts of reality, and even opinions 
about matters that we feel strongly about.  
In a second experiment more support was gathered for the role memory plays in the 
truth effect, by testing yet another implication of the memory account. The logic followed 
from studies showing that people who are highly knowledgeable about a topic remember 
much more from a text passage about that topic than do less knowledgeable individuals (e.g., 
Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979). These findings are very much in line with the mechanism 
proposed by Begg and his collaborators (Begg et al., 1985; Begg & Armour, 1991) just 
outlined above. So, in this experiment, Arkes and collaborators (1989, Experiment 2) asked 
participants to rank the knowledge they had regarding the topics covered by sentences they 
would later rate for truth. They predicted that topics about which participants had less 
knowledge would be less well remembered, and therefore repetition would be less able to 
increase the truth-value of those statements. Accordingly, results showed that the effect of 
repetition did not emerge for topics about which participants declared to have less 
knowledge. Only for statements that participants considered themselves to be highly or 
moderately familiar with (i.e., topics they had high or moderate knowledge about) did 
repetition increase ratings of perceived truth. These results were backed-up by Boehm (1994, 
Experiment 3), who used a more objective measure of participants’ knowledge level. Instead 
of using individuals’ self-reports, Boehm (1994) used participants’ expertise area (i.e., 
participants were university students, so their study field was used to operationalize 
expertise). Despite this change, results replicated what had been found before: repetition 
impacted positively ratings of truth only for those participants who were experts in the 
topics of the statements. Both authors interpreted these effects as evidence that knowledge 
increases detailed memory for a topic. As there is a high overlap between the information we 
have stored and the content of a statement pertaining to a topic we know a lot about, its truth-
value increases. However the authors never tested if the overlap really occurred or if it was 
only a subjective belief that it did, which would fit the previous results offering an alternative 
explanation based on perceived familiarity instead of real memory activation. 
The empirical evidence reviewed here shows in a clear way that memory plays a role 
in illusions of truth, either when its content is truly activated or when memories are false. In 
 
   
   
17 
this second case, a subjective feeling of familiarity (rather than objective pre-exposure to the 
statements) seems to support truth evaluations.  
Memory as a heuristic. In the view of both Arkes and colleagues (1989) and Begg 
and Armour (1991), the use of memory as basis for the decision about a statement’s validity 
works as a heuristic. That is, a mental shortcut, or rule-of-thumb that allows individuals to 
make quick judgments and decisions about the stimuli they face under uncertainty (Newell, 
Shaw, & Simon, 1959; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, when judging the 
probability of events, individuals rely on the ease with which examples of those events come 
to mind – if we can easily remember many examples, the probability of those events 
occurring must be high (availability heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Thus, when 
judging the truth-value of ambiguous statements we rely on how familiar they are to us to 
make that decision, because apparently we believe that the information we hold in memory is 
true (Bacon, 1979). 
The hypothesis that memory is used as a heuristic assumes even “imperfect memory” 
can affect truth judgments. Why do we rely so much in our “imperfect memory”. This 
inspired a branch of research focusing on the role that different memory mechanisms may 
play in the truth effect. 
 
Familiarity: The Automatic Memory Component Affecting Judged Truth 
When we encounter a statement, two different routes from memory can be taken to 
inform us about its past occurrence and, consequently, its validity (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 
1973; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980). Those two routes are Recollection and Familiarity, 
which anchor in a dualistic approach to cognitive processing. According to this dual-process 
perspective, we can deal with information and come to our decisions about it via two distinct 
systems: System 1 and System 2.2 Many theories have been put forward regarding the way 
these systems (or information processing modes) operate, and their descriptions of the two 
overlap in many characteristics. System 1 is described as a fast, automatic system, and which 
occurs pre-consciously (i.e., it needs only the individual to notice the stimulus in his context, 
and no deliberate goal or intention, Bargh, 1994). It’s largely independent of the availability 
of cognitive resources and motivation to process, drawing on well-learned associations and an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Different authors have used different names to refer to the two systems; here we use the terms introduced by 
Stanovich (1999). 
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implicit use of knowledge. System 2, on the other hand, is characterized as a slow, analytic 
process, being rule-based and conscious of the steps that are taken during the processing of 
the information. To be put in motion, this system requires that individuals have both cognitive 
capacity and motivation to analyze information (for comprehensive reviews, see Evans, 2003, 
2008; Sloman, 1996, 2002; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
In what respects to memory, these two systems are reflected in the recollection and 
familiarity components of recognition memory (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980). 
Recollection is the controlled memory component, based on system 2’s type of operations. It 
is the mechanism involved in the explicitly recall of having heard a statement before, in the 
retrieval of the details of the information stored in memory, depending on participants’ 
capacity and motivation to embark on that effort. On the other end, there’s the experience 
associated with processing a stimulus that we have encountered in the past can originate a 
feeling of familiarity. This is a more automatic memory component, free from the need of 
cognitive resources and motivation, and the one present when we feel that we have read that 
statement before, although we can’t exactly recall it (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review on the 
two memory components).  
Begg and colleagues (1992) tested how these two independent memory components 
contribute to our evaluations of truth. Applying the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) 
introduced earlier by Jacoby (1991; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonleinas, 1993) in the context of 
recognition memory, the authors separated the controlled influence of recollection of 
information about the reliability of a source from the automatic impact of familiarity rising 
from the previous exposure to a statement. The authors showed that illusions of truth anchor 
in the unintentional effect of familiarity, being independent of explicit memory processes. To 
be able to estimate the controlled and automatic components of processing, they created 
inclusion and exclusion testing conditions for the truth ratings task. To do this, statements in 
the exposure phase were paired either with a true or false source. An inclusion condition is the 
one in which recollection and familiarity have the same effect on the judgment, they lead to 
the same decision. So, when a statement is originated by a credible, truthful source, both 
recollection of that source information and the familiarity with the repeated statement will 
lead to the evaluation that the statement is true. By opposition, exclusion conditions pair 
statements with unreliable, distrustful sources, leading to different recollection and familiarity 
decisions. In these conditions, a statement will only be considered true if familiarity’s bias for 
truth is not opposed by the recollection that the source is not credible. Said in another way, 
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old statements from true sources can be judged true based both on their higher familiarity 
level and on the correct recollection of the source. On the other hand, old statements from 
false sources can only be considered true if participants can’t recollect the source that 
presented them and the judgment is solely based on familiarity. Thus, when controlled 
processing is not impaired and recollection can be used, statements of the true source should 
be judged truer than statements from the false source, with the difference between the two 
ratings reflecting source recollection. If controlled processing is impaired, that difference is 
expected to decrease because participants will base their evaluations on familiarity, and as 
both sources’ statements are repeated they are equally familiar. Impairment of the control 
component should also lead to a greater difference between the ratings of old false statements 
and new ones, as source recollection is not available and judgments are made solely on the 
basis of familiarity, which is less for new items.  
Begg and colleagues (1992) tested these predictions by impairing participants’ 
controlled processing during the exposure phase of the experiments, and therefore reducing 
the probability that information about the credibility of the sources was properly encoded and 
stored in memory. In one of the experiments (Experiment 3), they did this by presenting the 
source credibility information (association of a male vs. female source with truth vs. 
falseness) only after the statements and respective sources had been studied in the exposure 
phase. As the authors expected, participants’ ability to discriminate statements from true and 
false sources was greatly reduced in this condition as compared to a condition in which 
information about the source was given together with the statements. This was visible both in 
the lack of difference between the truth ratings to true and false statements (which were both 
considered truer than new statements), and in the memory-for-source test in which 
participants’ performance was only at chance level. Furthermore, after computing the 
recollection and familiarity components of participants’ judgments, they found that only 
recollection was affected by the manipulation – that is, only recollection was significantly 
decrease when the source credibility information was delayed, as compared to when it was 
presented immediately with the statements. This result regarding the estimation of the two 
memory components is clear evidence of the unintentional nature of familiarity’s impact on 
rated truth, as it remained constant across different processing conditions. These general 
results were replicated in another experiment (Begg et al., 1992, Experiment 4). Here, the 
authors used a different procedure to strengthen memory for the sources, and controlled 
processing was impaired by asking participants perform an arithmetic task at the same time 
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they studied the statements (cognitive overload condition). As in the previous experiment, old 
true and old false items were judged equally true in the overload condition, because 
participants were unable to recollect the source of the statements. Plus, the magnitude of 
the truth effect (i.e., the difference between the ratings given to old and new statements) 
even increased compared to the condition where participants had full capacity, making clear 
familiarity’s strong impact. The results regarding recollection and familiarity’s estimates were 
also congruent with the previous experiment, as again only the controlled component of the 
judgments was affected by divided attention, while the automatic component suffered no 
impact.  
The study by Begg and colleagues (1992) was paramount in showing that previous 
exposure has an unintentional impact in our truth assessments. Even more, it suggests that the 
feeling of familiarity is the component supporting illusions of truth, and that recollection is the 
component that can prevent them from arising (as when participants’ processing was not 
impaired, false source statements were not considered as valid as true source items were).  
Several other studies explored the relationship between the automatic component of 
memory and truth judgments by asking for evaluations of truth in experimental settings 
designed to affect controlled memory processes. One example is the study by Hawkins and 
Hoch (1992), investigating how participants’ level of processing affects the magnitude of 
repetition’s effect on perceived truth. In one experiment, they put participants either in a high-
involvement condition (performing truth ratings) or a low-involvement condition (rating how 
difficult statements were to understand) during the exposure phase. The rational behind this 
manipulation was that individuals under low-involvement conditions are less susceptible to 
think deeply about the statements they are reading and less prone to generate their own 
thoughts about it. Thus, these participants should be more affected by the mere feelings of 
familiarity in the later truth evaluation task. In that phase, participants were also asked to 
provide recognition judgments for each statement in order to investigate memory’s mediating 
role in the effect. The results showed that participants in the low-involvement condition 
presented poorer recognition performance, but a greater truth effect, suggesting that the 
higher truth ratings found for these individuals were promoted by the automatic 
familiarity component (otherwise, participants would have been able to correctly recollect 
the statements they had been exposed to). In fact, these results are close to what Begg and 
collaborators (1985) found in one of their experiments (Experiment 4) – meaningful 
processing of the items in the exposure phase led to better recognition performance, but it did 
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not change de size of repetition’s effect as compared to lower processing levels. 
 Adopting a dual-process perspective similar to Begg’s and colleagues (1992), Garcia-
Marques and Silva (2014) have also tested the impact that conditions favoring a deeper vs. 
more superficial processing mode have on the truth effect, expecting superficial processing 
conditions to be more favorable for the occurrence of illusions of truth. They manipulated 
both capacity and motivation to process information accurately (conditions which, as we saw 
above, constrain the engagement in System 2’s type of deeper processing operations). 
However, differently from previous studies (e.g., Begg et al., 1992), those manipulations were 
implemented only in the truth ratings phase, so to clarify that the effect anchors on a retrieval 
mechanism. Thus, no constrains to processing were made during the first encoding of the 
statements. Their results show that although repeated statements were perceived as truer than 
new ones in all experimental conditions, the magnitude of the effect was significantly reduced 
when participants had both high capacity and high motivation to process information carefully 
and could engage in system 2 type of analytic processing. This evidence again suggests that 
an unintentional influence of familiarity contributes greatly to the truth effect, and that deep, 
controlled processing conditions lead individuals to reduce its relative impact. 
The increased reliance on feelings of familiarity as a result of the impairment of 
resources in the retrieval phase (i.e., the truth ratings phase) was also evidenced in Brown and 
Nix’s (1996) experiments. The authors varied the interval between the exposure and the truth 
evaluation phases from one week to three months, to understand how the increased vs. 
reduced capacity for recollecting a statement’s true-false status would interfere with 
familiarity automatic impact on judged truth. Contrary to Begg and colleagues (1985) who 
used ambiguous biasing comments (as they only said things like “the majority of people does 
not believe that”, thus not stating clearly whether a claim was true or false), Brown and Nix 
(1996) provided clear and unmistakable feedback about the truth status of each statement that 
was presented to participants. The manipulation of the interval between exposure and truth 
evaluation was a crucial characteristic of the study, because the passage of time degrades the 
memory trait and reduces the probability that the details about the statements, such as their 
tags as true or false, are recollected (sentences’ wording details seem to be forgotten at faster 
time rates than their general meaning; e.g., Kintsch, Welsch, Schmalhofer, & Zimny, 1990).  
Consequently, results showed that old false statements were considered less true than new 
false statements at short intervals (one week), but equally true (in Experiment 2) or even truer 
(in Experiment 1) than new false statements at longer delays (three and one months, 
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respectively). Thus, when recollection of statements’ status as true or false was impaired 
due to the passage of time, participants’ judgments were made on the basis of the 
familiarity felt with the items, leading to the higher perceived validity ratings of old false 
items after the long delay. 
In a similar way, Skurnik and colleagues (2005) also investigated the impact of longer 
vs. shorter delays between the exposure and truth ratings phases on the recollection 
component, and its consequence for truth evaluations. The authors eliminated the illusion of 
truth elicited by repetition just by warning participants which of the product claims they were 
going to read in a study list were false and which were true. However, this was only possible 
to do when the truth evaluations were made after a short delay (30 minutes) of reading the 
statements. When the delay between the exposure and the truth evaluation phases was 
increased to three days, impairing Recollection of the details about the statements, 
participants exhibited a bias towards truth and misremembered and wrongly 
categorized false repeated statements as true. These authors furnished further evidence 
regarding the role of familiarity as the component underlying illusions of truth by 
investigating the impact of number of repetitions and age of individuals on truth ratings. 
Repeating the product claims three times (vs. only once) eliminated the illusion of truth that 
had been observed in the 3-days delay condition, supposedly because more repetitions helped 
participants to accurately recollect which statements were true and which were false. 
However, this was true only for the younger adults in the study. The older adults continued to 
show a bias towards truth in the long-delay condition, even if the product claims and their 
false/true tag were repeated three times. This later result is in accord with evidence showing 
that with age, deficits in recollection increase, while familiarity is left practically unaffected 
(e.g., Light, Prull, LaVoie, & Healy, 2000; Luo & Craik, 2009; Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 
2010). 
In sum, a considerable amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis that truth 
judgments anchor in an automatic component of memory relying on feelings of familiarity.  
This impact of familiarity is evident in the situations when system 2 controlled processing is 
restricted, due to the lack of cognitive resources or/and motivation (e.g., Garcia-Marques & 
Silva, 2014), which prevents, for example, the recollection of detailed source information 
(e.g., Begg et al., 1992; Skurnik et al., 2005). 
A memory-based misattribution process. The use of memory as a heuristic for 
decisions about the truth-value of propositions (e.g., Begg & Armour, 1991) seems to anchor 
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in an automatic component of memory, familiarity. Feelings of familiarity seem to originate 
in the processing experiences associated with stimuli (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989). 
Research in the memory field showed that repeated stimuli are easier to process: repetition 
leads to better performance in the perceptual identification of words presented for very brief 
periods of time (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), and it facilitates the identification of masked 
words that become progressively more visible (e.g., Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983). This 
processing fluency is at the root of feelings of familiarity (Jacoby et al.,, 1989), a relation that 
is evident in studies showing false recognition of new words just because they are preceded 
by a related concept that facilitates their understanding (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), 
and that predictions regarding the memorability of information are influenced by how easily 
items are processed (e.g., Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989). Jacoby and 
colleagues (1989) proposed that the attribution that is made regarding the experience of ease 
associated with a repeated stimulus is highly influenced by the processing goals individuals 
set and by context cues. In their words: “If their goal is remembering, subjects will correctly 
attribute fluency to the past. If their goal is judging temporal duration, the difficulty of a 
problem, or the flow of a paper, fluency resulting from the past is likely to be misattributed to 
goal-relevant aspects of the situation” (Jacoby et al., 1989, p. 399).  
This impact of the judgmental-context characteristics is very well illustrated in a study 
by Whittlesea, Jacoby and Girard (1990), in which fluency was induced by means of 
repetition and the perceptual clarity of the stimuli. In their experiments, participants that were 
aware of the repetition factor but did not know that stimulus-clarity was also being 
manipulated judged the perceptually clearer items as more familiar. By the same token, those 
participants that knew about the clarity manipulation but ignored that some items were 
repeated presented the opposite attribution, judging repeated items as physically clearer. 
Congruently, when an individual’s goal is to evaluate the truth-value of a statement, then the 
feelings of familiarity are misattributed to truth. 
Begg and collaborators (1989; Begg et al., 1992) also proposed that the fluency 
associated with processing a stimulus promotes illusions of memory when the real source of 
fluency experience is not acknowledged. Feelings of familiarity can be caused by a variety of 
factors, and although we usually can separate them, we sometimes fail to do so. Our 
impressions about a stimulus do not automatically identify their sources, and so we fail to 
discount their influence and misattribute it to memory. Begg et al (1992) thus integrate this 
view with the perspective of memory as an attribution (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989), suggesting 
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truth judgments to be an implicit memory measure which can capture the misattribution of 
fluency to truth via familiarity. 
 
Source Dissociation Hypothesis 
The proposal that illusions of truth result of an attribution process suggests that if we 
understand the correct source of our feelings of familiarity we may prevent their 
misattribution to truth. A similar hypothesis is suggested by Arkes and his collaborators 
(Arkes et al., 1989; Arkes Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Boehm, 1994). These authors proposed that 
when participants recognize a statement they might dissociate its repetition from a previous 
phase of the experimental context, misattributing it to an external source (e.g., hearing it from 
a friend, in the media, etc.). For these authors, it is not familiarity by itself that affects truth 
judgments; it is the perception that the statement has multiple sources (i.e., the present 
experimental context and an external source) that awards it validity. That is, individuals may 
interpret the familiarity they feel with the statement as a sign of convergent validity, which 
increases its perceived truth. Arkes et al., (1989) provided support for this hypothesis by 
demonstrating that statements were rated as more probably true when participants (falsely) 
“recognized” them from a context outside of the experiment (a misattribution) than when they 
attributed the repetition to the experimental setting (the true source). Although they found that 
source dissociation was not necessary for the truth effect to emerge (consistent with 
Bacon’s, 1979, findings that if participants recognized a statement as being repeated from the 
previous sessions its truth-value would increase), source dissociation made the truth effect a 
lot stronger. A second experiment developed by, Arkes et al., (1991) suggested that source 
dissociation may have both a direct and an indirect impact on rated truth, by strongly 
influencing familiarity perceptions that then impact truth ratings. However, a set of 
experiments by Boehm (1994) showed that although source dissociation occurred, it was not 
necessary for illusions of truth to appear, nor did it impact their magnitude. This author’s 
results only showed that familiarity was the relevant mediator between repetition and the 
inference of truth. 
Thus, in general these findings suggest that source dissociation is not a necessary 
condition for the truth effect, and it also does not impact the magnitude of the effect in a 
consistent manner. 
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Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we presented the first evidence of the illusion of the truth effect, 
showing that repeated statements are considered more valid and believed more than new 
ones (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg, et al., 1992; Hasher, et al., 1977). We revisited the first 
theoretical explanations for the effect, which explored the role memory processes play in 
repetition-based illusions of truth. The experiment testing these explanations showed that: 
∗ Only believing that the information is in our memory increases the truth-value of 
statements (e.g., Bacon, 1979); 
∗ Participants believed what they remembered (even if incorrectly), and considered 
false what contradicted the information they had (or thought they had) in memory 
(e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991); 
∗  Statements regarding familiar topics were evaluated as more probably true than 
statements about new topics (e.g., Begg et al., 1985); 
∗ Statements associated with a question that provide almost all the information truer 
than statements associated with questions that do not provide such overlap of 
information (e.g., Begg et al., 1985); 
∗ Although the nature of the positive vs. negative biasing comments associated with a 
statement was not remembered, negatively biased statements were considered less 
valid than positively biased ones, even though participants could not remember 
which statements had positive and which had negative bias (Begg & Armour, 
1991); 
∗ The effect of repetition did not emerge for topics about which participants declared 
to have less knowledge (e.g., Arkes et al., 1989); 
∗ In overload conditions, old true and old false items were judged equally true in the, 
because participants were unable to recollect the source of the statements (e.g., 
Begg, 1992); 
∗ Participants in the low-involvement condition presented poorer recognition 
performance, but a greater truth effect, suggesting that the higher truth ratings found 
for these individuals were promoted by the automatic familiarity component 
(Hawkins & Hoch, 1992); 
 
   
   
26 
∗ After a long delay, old false items were considered truer than new false statements, 
because recollection of the statements’ true vs. false status is hindered by the 
passage of time (e.g., Brown & Nix; Skurnik, et al., 2005); 
∗ Source dissociation is not a necessary condition for the truth effect, and it also does 
not impact the magnitude of the effect in a consistent manner (e.g., Arkes et al., 
1989; Boehm, 1994). 
From this set of results it is clear that subjective familiarity is more important than 
actual frequency of exposure, (e.g., Arkes, et al., 1989; Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991). 
The fact that there is no logical reason to believe more in something just because it is repeated 
led the authors to dig deeply into the question of why does it happen and what processes 
underlie the effect. That question was answered by Begg and colleagues (1992), who showed 
that the automatic memory component of Familiarity has a rather involuntary impact in truth 
judgments, and is the one supporting illusions of truth when the controlled Recollection 
process is impaired. 
At this point, the use of familiarity as a base for validity assessments was seen as a 
misattribution process, in which there is an “attribution of truth to statements that feel familiar 
(Begg, et al., 1992; p. 457). This attribution process is analogous to the one leading 
individuals to judge words that are presented with more clarity as being repeated, and to judge 
words that are repeated as being presented with more clarity (Whittlesea et al., 1990). People 
use the experience elicited by the stimuli according to the goals they have, and often fail to 
discount the real cause (see Jacoby et al., 1989). 
As previous research had shown, repeated information seems to be easier do process 
(e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), and the effect of familiarity on judged truth was therefore 
placed in the same class of effects caused by factors that turn stimuli easier to process – that 
is, in the class of processing fluency effects (Begg et al., 1992). In the next chapter, we 
discuss the fluency account of the illusion of truth effect, focusing on the concept of 
processing fluency and its relation with repetition and validity judgments. 
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Chapter III: Processing Fluency, a Challenge to the Memory Account? 
 
 Processing fluency can be defined as the subjective experience of ease that 
accompanies the processing of a stimulus. Fluency can be elicited by several factors or 
attributes of the stimulus, such as its conceptual or perceptual features (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Jacoby et al., 1989; Whittlesea, 1993). The experience of fluency generated at the 
conceptual level is related with how easy it is to activate and extract a stimulus’ meaning, 
occurring at high-level stages of processing involved in the categorization and relation of that 
stimulus in the structures of semantic knowledge. Therefore, conceptual fluency is influenced 
by variables such as semantic priming (presenting the word doctor facilitates the identification 
of the word nurse; e.g., Lupker, 1984), semantic predictability (i.e., presenting the target word 
in a sentence that creates a general expectation for its appearance; e.g., Whittlesea, 1993) or 
context congruity (i.e., consistency between the target stimulus and the context where it is 
presented; e.g., Palmer, 1975). Differently, the experience of fluency elicited at the perceptual 
level is associated with how easy it is to capture the physical and structural attributes of the 
stimuli, occurring at low-level stages of processing involved in the identification of the 
stimulus' physical identity. Perceptual fluency is affected by factors such as a word’s color 
contrast against the background (which can make the stimulus easier or more difficult to 
perceive) or the stimulus’ exposure duration (the longer a stimulus remains in our visual field 
the more information we can extract from it; for a review on conceptual and perceptual 
fluency see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).  
Although there are different levels at which fluency can be experience, the great 
diversity of fluency manipulations that can be found in the literature seem to promote very 
similar effects on judgments (for a review, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). For example, 
judgments of liking are increased by presenting the stimuli in high color-contrast or for longer 
durations (e.g., Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998), as well as when stimuli are easily 
retrieved from memory (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992) or are preceded by a 
conceptually related prime (e.g., Lee & Labroo, 2004). Memory judgments are also affected 
by a variety of fluency manipulations – words seem more familiar when written in an easy-to-
read font (e.g., Reber & Zupanek, 2002), when they are presented with more clarity (e.g., 
Wittlesea et al., 1990), and when they are primed by a related concept (e.g., Whittlesea, 
1993). The case is the same with confidence judgments, with statements written in an easy-to-
read font inspiring more confidence (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007), or 
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answers to trivia questions seeming more correct when they are semantically primed or easily 
retrieved from memory (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). Additionally, it seems that different 
manipulations of perceptual fluency result in very similar judgments regarding the subjective 
experience of fluency itself, even though they objectively affect different stages of the 
perceptual process (i.e., contrast with the background affects reaction times in detection tasks, 
while letter font affects reaction times in discrimination tasks; Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 
2004; Wurtz, Reber, & Zimmermann, 2008). Thus, there is relative consensus around the idea 
that fluency is a unitary experience, with convergent effects on judgments independently of 
the how it is generated (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
Repetition is in itself a source of processing fluency. Repeated information is simply 
easier to process. Evidence of this can be found, for example, in the fact that repetition leads 
facilitates the identification of words presented for very brief periods of time (e.g., Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981), and the identification of masked words that become progressively more visible 
(e.g., Feustel et al., 1983). Repetition also speeds the “word – non word” lexical decision task 
(e.g., Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977), and the reading time of sentences (e.g., 
Kolers & Ostry, 1974). And it seems that processing a repeated stimulus is associated with a 
decrease of neural activity in the brain (see Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006), which 
helps make the case that indeed repeated stimuli are easy to deal with. But repetition can be a 
special source of fluency, as in comparison to other fluency manipulations repetition has the 
unique characteristic of aggregating different levels of the fluency experience. In fact, when 
processing a repeated statement, for example, we not only re-access its physical form and 
features (i.e., its wording and grammatical structure), what increases perceptual fluency, but 
also its semantic content and meaning, increasing conceptual fluency. 
In the previous chapter it became clear that the experience of fluency that supports the 
automatic memory component Familiarity is associated with the truth effect. In those 
conceptualizations of repetition effects on judged truth it was assumed that the effect was 
rooted in memory attributions, and that relation to memory made it informative of truth (e.g., 
Begg et al., 1985; Begg, et al., 1992). However, researchers started to question whether the 
relation to memory was indeed necessary. Soon, this hypothesis started to be explored, and 
the experience of processing fluency per se, independent of associations to memory, was 
presented as the process underlying illusions of truth (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; 
Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). 
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Processing Fluency and Truth 
Reber and Schwarz (1999) were the first to directly test the hypothesis that the reason 
why familiar statements (vs. new ones) have a higher truth-value is because they are 
processed more fluently. In a single exposure paradigm, the authors manipulated processing 
fluency through color contrast of the stimuli against the background, and found that 
statements presented in high visual contrast were judged true more frequently than 
statements presented in low color contrast. This finding led the authors to argue that any 
variable that increases processing fluency will impact truth judgments positively. This 
happens supposedly because “statements that are easy to process are experienced as familiar 
(e.g., Whittlesea et al., 1990), thus leading participants to feel that they have heard or seen this 
before, suggesting that it is probably true” (p. 342). 
Besides this direct evidence that the fluency induced only by a perceptual 
characteristic of the statements, such as color contrast, is sufficient to elicit illusions of truth, 
other fluency manipulations unrelated to repetition or familiarity have been shown to affect 
validity judgments. For example, it has been found that aphorisms that rhyme are considered 
more accurate than aphorisms that don’t rhyme (e.g., “Birds of a feather flock together” vs. 
Birds of a feather flock conjointly”; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000); semantically primed 
words (i.e., words that are preceded by related concepts) are judged as better answers to trivia 
questions than words that are not primed (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993); and easy-to-read letter 
fonts also lead to increased evaluations of truth than less readable fonts (Parks & Toth, 2006). 
Adding to this evidence, the recent account of the “Aha-experience” (i.e., insights) proposed 
by Topolinski and Reber (2010) also states that suddenly occurring processing fluency results 
in the conviction that we have found the true solution for a problem. As all this evidence 
makes clear, processing fluency impacts the perceived validity of statements, and this is 
the case for experiences of fluency anchored in repetition but also in color contrast, 
letter font, rhyming or semantic priming. 
Yet, it seems that it is not merely feeling fluency with a statement that enhances its 
truth-value. That is, the experience of fluency on an absolute level does not seem to be 
enlightening. Rather, it seems that for fluency to be informative there must exist a discrepancy 
between the expectations individuals have regarding the level of fluency they will feel and the 
fluency they actually experience. 
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The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. The importance of the discrepancy between 
expected and actual fluency was first demonstrated in recognition memory judgments by 
Whittlesea (e.g., Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000). In one of 
his studies (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998), participants studied a list of words, regular non-
words (i.e. easy to read/pronounce) and irregular non-words (hard to read/pronounce). Then, 
they received a second list with new and repeated words, regular and irregular non-words and 
had to perform a recognition test. According to the fluency impact on recognition judgments, 
it was expected that words presented the higher false recognition rate (i.e. false alarm), 
followed by regular non-words and finally by irregular non-words, mirroring the 
correspondent fluency level of each word category from the highest to the lowest. However, 
what the authors found was that regular non-words were the stimuli with the highest false 
alarm rate, supposedly because these stimuli were surprisingly more fluent than participants 
expected (both the enhanced fluency experienced with words and the lack of fluency 
experienced with non-words could be expected by participants, and thus discounted). This 
finding shows that feelings of familiarity were more dependent on the discrepancy felt 
with a comparison standard of fluency than on objective fluency (see also Westerman, 
2008). 
In order to understand whether the discrepant-fluency plays a role on the truth effect, 
Hansen and colleagues (2008) varied the perceptual fluency of statements via color contrast in 
a single exposure paradigm similar to Reber and Schwarz’s (1999). They also manipulated 
whether there was a change (vs. no change) in the fluency level of a given statement in 
relation to the previously seen ones, manipulating the discrepancy between expected and 
actual fluency elicited by the items. Consistent with Whittlesea’s proposal, high fluency 
statements were considered more probably true than low fluency ones only when there 
was a change in the fluency level from low to high fluency. The discrepancy hypothesis 
was tested in yet another study, this time with a repetition manipulation to induce fluency 
(Dechêne et al., 2009). Differently from the previous work, the authors manipulated 
discrepancy by establishing the comparison standard of the fluency experience on the average 
processing ease of other statements in the judging context. That is, they asked participants to 
evaluate either a mixed set of repeated and new statements, or a set of only repeated 
statements. These conditions created a heterogeneous evaluation context, allowing between-
items comparisons, and a homogeneous context, allowing only within-items comparisons, 
respectively (Dechêne et al., 2009, 2010). Results showed that when individuals judged only 
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repeated statements the truth effect disappeared, supposedly because there was no 
variation in the fluency level of the test stimuli that could lead to some ringing truer than the 
other. 
 
Mechanisms Underlying Fluency Effects on Subjective Truth 
At this point, it is clear that the experience of processing fluency does not need to be 
elicited by previous exposure in order to affect truth evaluations, and for fluency to be 
informative about truth (or other dimensions) it needs to deviate from an a priori expectation 
regarding how easy it should be to process a given statement. However, holding these two 
assumptions does not provide by itself an explanation for the truth effect. So, why does a 
fluently processed statement ring as more probably true? In the next section we outline the 
most important mechanisms that have been proposed to explain how and why fluency affects 
judgments, and highlight the main differences between them. 
Fluency informs about truth via attributions to familiarity. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, one of the most relevant hypotheses that were raised to explain the 
repetition-based truth effect is based on a misattribution process, by which feelings of 
familiarity are attribute to the truthfulness of a statement (e.g., Begg et al., 1992). Now, 
although the fluency experience increases perceived truth even when it is promoted by 
variables not related with previous exposure or memory activation, such an effect may still be 
rooted in feelings of familiarity. As stated above, this was the idea originally proposed in 
Reber and Schwarz’s (1999) paper, drawing on the evidence that fluently processed stimuli 
are evaluated as familiar, even when encountered for the first time (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993; 
Whittlesea et al., 1990). The prevalence of this hypothesis is such that even in the studies 
testing the discrepant-fluency hypothesis, Hansen and colleagues (2008) also suggested that 
one possible mechanism is that “deviant fluency influences subjective truth via feelings of 
familiarity” (p. 690). However, if originally this was the view, the hypothesis has not been 
empirically pursued, remaining an open question. 
Some insights regarding this hypothesis may be found in the results of Parks & Toth’s 
(2006) study. While not testing directly the causal relationships between familiarity and truth 
evaluations, the authors found substantial correlations between participants’ ratings of 
familiarity with the general idea conveyed by statements and how true they considered them. 
The more familiar a claim was considered, the higher its perceived validity (replicating 
 
   
   
32 
previous findings, Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991). Importantly, these correlations were 
found in experimental settings in which fluency was associated not with repetition. In fact, in 
one of the experiments the correlation between familiarity and truth emerged when pure 
perceptual fluency was used by manipulating the statements’ graphic style, making them 
easy or difficult to read. According to Parks & Toth (2006), the presence of the correlation 
between familiarity and truth judgments in these conditions suggests “feelings of familiarity 
drive judgments of truth even in the absence of episodic memory manipulation” (p. 239). 
The hedonic marking of fluency. One of the main characteristics of fluency is that it 
seems to be inherently positive, and that aura of positivity is what supposedly leads to more 
favorable evaluations/judgments of fluent stimuli (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; 
Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman, et al., 2003). Support for the hypothesis that fluency is 
hedonically marked can be found in the evidence showing that the processing of perceptually 
fluent stimuli (due to longer presentation times) is accompanied by an increase of activity in 
the “smiling muscle” zygomaticus major (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Additionally, 
stimuli presented with a good figure-ground contrast or an easy-to-read letter font and size are 
liked more (e.g., Reber et al., 1998), inspire more confidence (e.g., Alter et al., 2007) and 
seem to have been written by more intelligent authors (Oppenheimer, 2006) than perceptually 
disfluent stimuli. Conceptual fluency manipulations lead to similar effects, with products 
being preferred when they are primed by related concepts (e.g., Lee & Labroo, 2004), and 
words being considered more familiar when primed by another word to which they are 
semantically related to (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). The same positivity ring is found in the 
experience of fluency induced by repetition, which leads to higher ratings of individuals’ 
positive affect (e.g., Garcia-Marques, 1999), and also to higher activity of the zygomaticus 
major (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001). The relation between familiarity and positive 
affect is further corroborated by studies showing they exert a bi-directional impact on 
latencies to judgments about the other (Garcia-Marques, T., Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-
Marques, L., 2010). Now, in what concerns truth judgments, this positivity that seems to be 
inherent to fluency drives truth judgments to the more “positive” pole, and thus fluently 
processed statements seem more probably true rather than false, as fluently processed words 
are perceived as more familiar rather than new. 
Contrary to this “hedonic marking of fluency” hypothesis, there is evidence suggesting 
fluency to have a rather diffuse nature, which makes it prone to attain different valences and 
meanings depending on context the individual is. That is, although fluency most frequently 
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(and perhaps by default) leads to more favorable evaluations/judgments, there is also evidence 
of its malleability regarding the attribution of meaning – similarly to how the physiological 
arousal associated with emotions is open to different interpretations and confounds, 
depending on the characteristics of the context where individuals search for cues to label and 
justify the arousing experience (see Schachter and Singer, 1962). A classic study by Mandler, 
Nakamura, and Van Zandt (1987) showed that enhancing stimuli’s processing ease through 
repetition led both to judgments of increased brightness and of increased darkness. These 
results were interpreted as suggesting that the meaning given to the fluency experience is not 
fixed, but moderated by the judgmental task (i.e., judgments of brightness vs. darkness). The 
idea is similar to the model presented by Jacoby and colleagues (1989) regarding memory 
attributions that we briefly presented in the previous chapter. However, this context-
dependency (or task-dependency) characteristic of fluency effects seems to be true only for 
non-evaluative judgments (for reviews see Reisenzein, 1983; Winkielman et al., 2003), and 
not much support has been found for judgments related with the perceived valence or 
affective experience associated with a target stimulus. For example, already in Mandler and 
colleagues’ study (1987; see also Seamon, McKenna, & Binder, 1998), high levels of 
processing fluency promoted higher judgments of liking, but not higher judgments of 
disliking. In the same fashion, Reber and colleagues (1998) showed that increasing the 
perceptual fluency of target pictures (by means of figure-ground contrast) led to higher rating 
of prettiness, but not to higher ratings of ugliness. Thus, it is likely that for truth evaluations 
the meaning of fluency is closer to the positive pole of truthfulness rather than the negative 
pole of falseness. 
But is the positivity associated with the experience of fluency responsible for illusions 
of truth? This hypothesis has been partially supported in a study by Unkelbach and 
collaborators (2011), who found that in within-individual analyses participants judged as 
more probably true statements that were framed positively (e.g., ‘‘The divorce rate in Grenada 
is higher than in the rest of Spain”) rather than negatively (‘‘The divorce rate in Grenada is 
lower than in the rest of Spain”), and also a correlation between the degree of positive 
feelings that each statement elicited and its rated truth. However, in another experiment in 
which participants judged repeated and new statements, and the positive vs. negative frame 
was again manipulated, only the typical pattern of the repetition-based truth effect emerged, 
and no effects involving positivity were observed. This led the authors to conclude that 
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processing fluency (in this case induced by repetition) drives illusions of truth over and 
above the positivity that may accompany it. 
Naïve theories about our cognitive experiences. One other mechanism that may 
underlie individuals’ judgments of whether a statement is true or false: the naïve theories that 
people hold about the fluency experiences that accompany the processing of a stimulus 
(Schwarz, 2004). Naïve theories can be defined as the assumptions or ideas that individuals 
have about what makes it difficult or easy to process or to think about certain information. 
That is, judgments are not the product of only the content or information that is available to 
individuals when forming them, and the metacognitive experiences associated with 
processing that content seem to be very relevant for the final decision. According to Schwarz 
(2004), naïve theories are “a necessary link between people’s [processing] experiences and 
the inferences they draw from them” (p. 333).  
One classic study by Schwartz and collaborators (1991) documenting the ease-of-
retrieval effect (which has to do with the availability heuristic, that states that individuals 
derive judgments of frequency or likelihood from the ease with which they can retrieve 
relevant information; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) exemplifies the influence of naïve theories 
very well. In a set of experiments, participants were asked list either 6 or 12 examples of 
assertive or of unassertive behaviors they had performed, and then to rate their own 
assertiveness. While, as expected, participants that recalled 6 assertive behaviors rated 
themselves as more assertive than participants that recalled 6 unassertive behaviors, the 
pattern of results for participants that recalled 12 behaviors was very different: increasing the 
number of examples of behaviors to be recalled reversed the pattern, with participants that 
that had to list assertive behaviors rating themselves less ass less assertive than participants 
that listed unassertive behaviors. The authors suggested that this happened because the 
difficulty experienced in listing so many assertive behaviors led participants to conclude they 
were not that assertive after all, or else it wouldn’t be so difficult to come up with the 
examples. This hypothesis was supported when in another experiment participants were told 
that the music playing in the background might lead them to experience difficulty in 
executing the task. As a result, because participants believed that the difficulty they were 
experiencing had nothing to do with coming up with examples of assertive behaviors, the 
group that had to recall 12 behaviors now rated themselves as more assertive than all the other 
groups of participants. 
More recently, other studies demonstrated how the beliefs people have about the 
 
   
   
35 
meaning of the processing experiences qualify the output of their judgments. One very good 
example is the study conducted by Pocheptsova, Labroo and Dhar (2010) showing that in 
some situations low processing fluency can actually raise the desire to buy a product (which 
goes against the thesis that fluency is hedonically, defended by Winkielman and colleagues, 
2003). They tested this hypothesis in the context of “special-occasion products” and showed 
that if an ad to those products promoted low levels of fluency (induced by hard-to-read fonts 
and difficulty of thought generation), then there was an increase in the purchase likelihood. 
The authors pointed out that this happens because low fluency signals that the product is less 
frequent and not so widely available, which is in accord with individuals’ beliefs about the 
desirable characteristics of “special-occasion products”. In the persuasion field, Petty, Briñol 
and Tormala (2006) specifically addressed the possibility that the meaning of processing 
fluency can change via an intentional manipulation of participants’ naïve theories. In their 
study, fluency was manipulated through the easiness (vs. difficulty) of generating a small (vs. 
large) number of arguments supporting a given policy. They manipulated the interpretation 
that was given to the experience of fluency by inducing in participants either the belief that 
feeling easiness in the generation of arguments is a good thing (because it’s typical of more 
intelligent people), or the belief that easiness while thinking is a bad thing (because it’s 
typical of less intelligent people). As the authors expected, the interpretation that was 
provided for the experience of fluency moderated the attitudes participants reported about the 
target policy: when fluency was characterized as a good thing, participants who had to 
generate only a small number of arguments were the ones who showed more favorable 
attitudes, while in the condition where fluency was described as a bad thing the opposite 
pattern was found.  
As these studies make clear, the way in which fluency is interpreted is modulated by 
the naïve theories we have about our own processing experiences. The question is whether 
this also applies for the interpretation of processing fluency as a sign of truth or of falseness. 
The studies reported by Skurnik, Schwarz, and Winkielman (2000) in a book chapter suggest 
that to be the case. In a set of unpublished data reported by the authors, the feeling of 
familiarity associated with the fluency induced by repetition was interpreted as a sign of 
falseness. This was done by leading participants to believe that a majority of statements 
previously presented were false. According to the authors, this information changed the naïve 
belief people hold about familiar information being most probably true, which then led 
participants to rate repeated statements as more false than new ones. However, that change in 
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the naïve theory did not alter the interpretation of the processing experience as familiarity. 
Fluency was always attributed to familiarity, and what changed was the belief about what 
familiarity meant. However, these studies do not clarify whether the inversion of the naïve 
theory parallels the automatic nature associated with the impact of familiarity on truth 
judgments (e.g., Begg et al., 1992), or if it encompassed an additional monitoring (control) 
process. 
Fluency as an ecologically valid cue for truth. Building on previous evidence 
showing the malleability of meaning and attributions that seem to characterize the experience 
of fluency (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989; Mandler et al., 1987; Whittlesea et al., 1990), Unkelbach 
(e.g., Unkelbach, 2006, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013) proposes that the reason why 
fluently processed statements are liked more, considered more familiar or more truthful (just 
to name a few evaluative dimensions) is the existence of an ecologically valid correlation 
between fluency and those evaluative dimensions. According to this approach, people learn 
that fluency is a valid cue to inform about a criterion/dimension of a stimulus via a feedback-
learning process that establishes a positive correlation between the presence of the cue and the 
criterion. Regarding the fluency-truth link, it is proposed that it spurs from a lifetime of 
experiences in which fluently processed information is indeed true rather than false. 
According to this hypothesis, it is more probable that we are repeatedly exposed to true 
information than to false information (both because individuals tend to present mostly truthful 
information, Grice, 1975; and because for each true fact about reality there are numerous false 
facts, increasing the probability that true facts are encountered more often, Unkelbach, 2007). 
Additionally, accepting a statement as true is less cognitively demanding, while the 
categorization of information as false is a lot more effortful (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 
1990). Once the correlation is established, it assumes the features of an apparently automatic 
process, being applied very quickly. But according to the authors, it is only “apparently” 
automatic, as it is not assumed the interpretation of fluency as truth to be restricted by such 
automatic vs. control assumptions (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). Congruently with the 
assumption that truthful information is associated with increased fluency, Unkelbach and 
Stahl (2009) showed that factually true statements were judged as more familiar than 
factually false ones, suggesting that the fluency experience that accompanied the 
processing of the factually true statements was misattributed to familiarity. 
The hypothesis that the fluency-truth correlation depends on the learning history 
established by a given context was tested in a set of experiments designed to show that it is 
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possible to reverse the truth effect. The assumption underlying the experiments was that if the 
environment promotes and reinforces the correlation fluency = falseness, then individuals will 
judge fluently processed statements as false rather than true, because now that is the 
ecologically valid correlation. In one of the experiments (Experiment 2) participants were 
asked to judge as true or false a group of unambiguous statements (i.e., clearly true and 
clearly false; “February is the first month of the year”, or “One hour has 60 minutes”), and 
received veridical feedback about the correctness of their responses. In this training block, 
fluency was manipulated through color contrast and participants trained either the classic 
fluency = truth link or its reversal (fluency = falseness). To promote the classic association of 
fluency = truth, all true statements were presented in high contrast to the background and all 
false statements were presented in low contrast; to promote the reversed link of fluency-
falseness, all false statements were now presented in high contrast and all the true statements 
in low contrast. After this training phase, participants continued with the task, but now the 
statements to be judged were ambiguous (i.e. unclear if true or false; “Methuselah was the 
grandfather of Noah”) and no feedback was given. Also, perceptual fluency was now 
orthogonal to truth status, preventing any systematic correlation between fluency and truth. 
The crucial result of this experiment was that participants that had learned the fluency = 
falseness correlation in the training phase applied it to the ambiguous statements. That 
is, they judged high contrast statements as more probably false than low contrast 
statements, showing a reversal of the classic truth effect. By opposition, participants who 
had learned the classic fluency = truth link evidenced the standard truth effect.3 To show that 
it was indeed the association of processing fluency with truth that had changed, and not 
merely the establishment of an association between a specific contrast level and truth or 
falseness, that was responsible for the results, in another experiment (Experiment 3) the 
reversal of the truth effect was generalized to fluency due to repetition. After learning the 
association low color contrast = truth in the training phase, participants subsequently 
judged new statements more probably true and old statements more probably false, 
reversing the repetition-based illusion of truth. Such a result was interpreted as supporting 
not only the relevant role of processing fluency in the truth effect, but also a functional 
equivalence between fluency due to color contrast and fluency due to repetition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Similar reversal effects have also been evidenced with recognition judgments, in a study in which high 
perceptual fluency was perfectly correlated with novelty and low perceptual fluency with familiarity. After 
training these associations, participants exhibited a bias to judge as “old” the disfluent stimuli and to judge as 
“new” the fluent stimuli, even when the two factors (fluency and familiarity) were no longer systematically 
correlated (Unkelbach, 2006; see also Olds & Westerman, 2012 for a replication). 
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How Do These Different Explanations Relate, and Differ, to Each Other? 
The different theoretical approaches outlined above share some assumptions and differ 
in regard to others. We analyze these similarities and differences focusing on the 
conceptualization of fluency as a direct cue for truth, and the automatic vs. controlled nature 
of the process underlying the association of fluency with truth. 
Fluency as a direct cue for truth. The “attribution to familiarity” approach presented 
by Begg and collaborators (e.g., Begg et al., 1992), and which was still evident in the views of 
Reber and Schwarz (1999) and Dechêne and colleagues (e.g., Dechêne et al., 2009; Hansen et 
al., 2008), argues that feelings of familiarity mediate processing fluency effects on subjective 
truth. Similarly, the “hedonic marking of fluency” hypothesis also suggests positive affect 
may mediate fluency effects on judgments (e.g., Winkielman, et al., 2003). Quite differently, 
the fluency as an ecologically valid cue” model advocates that the truth effect is the result of 
“a direct utilization of processing fluency as a cue” (Unkelbach, 2007, p. 220). That is, once 
the correlation between fluency and truth is established there is no need for memory 
mechanisms or attributions to familiarity for fluency to inform truth judgments. This idea is 
also quite different from the approach based on naïve theories, for which the positive relation 
between processing experiences and truth is not conceived as a direct effect of fluency. They 
assume the relationship exists but call for an additional top-down process (i.e., conceptually-
driven by a priori lay theories) that modulates the meaning given to the fluency experience 
(e.g., Schwarz, 2004)4. 
The assumption of a direct effect of processing fluency on perceived truth questions 
the use of the term “illusion” to characterize the truth effect. Whereas authors like Begg and 
colleagues (1992) assume that “there is no logical reason for repetition to affect rated truth or 
for earlier information to be trusted more than later information” (p. 447), the ecological 
perspective sees it as based on the premise that there are a number of factors that actually 
make processing fluency a good predictor of truth. Therefore, for this approach “the truth 
effect is not illusory after all, but a byproduct of an adaptive learning mechanism” (Unkelbach 
& Stahl, 2009, p. 35). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Unkelbach and Greifeneder (2013) integrate naïve theories in their general model of fluency effects. In the 
interpretation step of the model they thus consider that, besides the mechanism based on people learning that 
fluent processing and truth are positively correlated and interpret the experience as a truth experience 
(Unkelbach, 2007), the existence of lay theories that fluent processing indicates truth (e.g., Schwarz, 2004) may 
also be one path for fluency influences. 
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The controlled vs. automatic nature of the interpretation of fluency as truth. 
Another significant difference between the theoretical approaches reviewed before refers to 
the automatic vs. controlled natured of the process supporting the fluency-truth link. As 
presented in the previous chapter, for Begg and colleagues (1992) illusions of truth are rooted 
in the unintentional effects of the memory component Familiarity, which implies an 
automaticity assumption (e.g., Jacoby, 1991). However, for both the ecological validity and 
naïve theories approaches the interpretation of fluency experiences should not be restricted by 
automaticity. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we presented the main evidence showing that fluency experiences 
promoted by factors unrelated to previous exposure and memory are sufficient to generate 
illusions of truth. The studies addressing this hypothesis showed:  
∗ Statements presented in high visual contrast were judged true more frequently than 
statements presented in low color contrast (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999); 
∗ Processing fluency impacts the perceived validity of statements, and this is the 
case for experiences of fluency anchored in repetition but also in color contrast, 
letter font, rhyming or semantic priming (e.g., McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000; 
Toths & Park, 2006); 
∗ High fluency statements were considered more probably true than low fluency 
ones only when there was a change in the fluency level from low to high fluency 
(e.g., Hansen et al., 2008); 
∗ The correlation between ratings of familiarity and ratings of truth emerged when 
pure perceptual fluency was used (Parks & Toth, 2006); 
∗ One of the main characteristics of fluency is that it seems to be inherently positive 
and hedonically marked (e.g., Allen & Harmond-Jones, 2001; Garcia-Marques, 
1999; Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001); 
∗ Processing fluency (in this case induced by repetition) drives illusions of truth over 
and above the positivity that may accompany it (Unkelbach et al., 2011); 
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∗ Factually true statements were judged as more familiar than factually false ones, 
suggesting that the fluency experience that accompanied the processing of the 
factually true statements was misattributed to familiarity (Unkelbach & Stahl, 
2009); 
∗ Participants that had learned the fluency = falseness correlation in the training 
phase applied it to the ambiguous statements. That is, they judged high contrast 
statements as more probably false than low contrast statements, showing a reversal 
of the classic truth effect (Unkelbach, 2007); 
∗ After learning the association low color contrast = truth in the training phase, 
participants subsequently judged new statements more probably true and old 
statements more probably false, reversing the repetition-based illusion of truth 
(Unkelbach, 2007). 
The first accounts for the effect of fluency on truth judgments maintained that those 
effects were mediated by feelings of familiarity associated with fluently processed stimuli, 
and which then lead individuals to judge statements as more probably true (e.g., Hansen et al., 
2008; Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwartz, 1999). However, a more recent approach 
argues that fluency is an ecologically valid cue for truth, and thus fluency per se directly 
influences truth judgments, with no need for mediating processes such as attributions to 
familiarity or the existence of naïve theories about its meaning (e.g., Unkelbach, 2007; 
Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009), which directly informs our judgments with no need for mediating 
processes such as attributions to familiarity or the existence of naïve theories about its 
meaning (e.g., Unkelbach, 2006, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013; Unkelbach & Stahl, 
2009).  
All these findings and alternative mechanisms proposed to explain the truth effect 
open the chance for a better understanding of the role that repetition-based processing fluency 
plays in the phenomenon. As we stated early in this chapter, repetition has the unique 
characteristic of aggregating both conceptual and perceptual fluency experiences. Does this 
fact have any relevance for illusions of truth? Does it say anything about the nature of the 
effect? In the next chapter we will address these questions, which are at the core of the three 
papers that compose the empirical section of this dissertation. 
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Chapter IV: Is There Something Special in the Relation of Repetition to Truth? 
 
From the literature reviewed in the previous chapters, it is clear that repetition impacts 
the perceived validity of a statement (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher et al., 1972). The truth effect 
has been interpreted as the result of feelings of familiarity associated with the fluency of 
processing repeated stimuli, which are attributed to truth (e.g., Begg et al., 1992). The 
relevance of familiarity for the occurrence of illusions of truth is evident in the fact that 
statements that are perceived as repetitions are judged as more probably true than statements 
perceived as new, independently of the actual repetition status of the statement (e.g., Arkes et 
al., 1991; Begg & Armour, 1991). However, the truth effect has been shown to occur 
associated with other fluency sources unrelated to previous exposure or memory, namely 
perceptual fluency factors such as the color contrast of the statements that are presented for 
judgment (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999). This led to the proposal that fluency is the process 
underlying illusions of truth. While some authors still conceive fluency effects on perceived 
truth to be mediated by feelings of familiarity (e.g., Hansen et al., 2008; Reber & Schwarz, 
1999), others argue that fluency is a direct cue for truth, with no need for attributions to 
memory (e.g., Unkelbach, 2007). 
Despite other fluency sources being able to elicit the same illusions of truth as 
previous exposure, some evidence in the literature may suggest that the presence of a match 
between the information that is encountered and the information that is activated in memory is 
a relevant feature of the truth effect. This idea is suggested, for example, by the comparison of 
the magnitude of the truth effects induced by repetition and by perceptual fluency 
manipulations. A meta-analytic review of 70 studies comparing truth ratings to repeated vs. 
new statements (Dechêne et al., 2010) showed the truth effect to be medium-sized (d = .50). 
In comparison, the few experiments that manipulated the perceptual fluency of statements 
present effects of smaller magnitude. For example, in Reber and Schwarz’s (1999) study, the 
mean difference between how many of the high vs. low fluency statements (16 of each) were 
endorsed as true was only .23 (d = .13).  Similarly, Parks and Toth (2006) also reported small 
mean differences in the truth ratings given to easy vs. difficult to read statements – across the 
different experimental conditions, the difference was never greater than .09 in a 4 point scale. 
In this experiment, no main effects associated with perceptual fluency were found (only an 
interaction effect involved this variable, but also with a small effect size, d = .12). Now, 
considering Hansen and colleagues (2008) experiment, in which color contrast of the 
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statements was manipulated to test whether the experience of discrepant fluency was relevant 
for truth judgments, the magnitude of the fluency effect on rated truth was of d = .51 – 
comparable to the value presented in the meta-analysis of repetition-induced truth effects 
(Dechêne et al., 2010). However, in Dechêne and colleagues’ (2009) study testing the same 
discrepant-fluency hypothesis but using repetition as the fluency source, the effect size rose to 
d = 1.13, suggesting again the higher magnitude of repetition-based effects. One exception to 
these overall smaller effect sizes obtained with perceptual fluency manipulations has to be 
acknowledged: in one of his experiments, Unkelbach (2007, Experiment 2) found a truth 
effect associated with perceptual fluency (via color contrast) with a magnitude of d = 1.18. 
One possible explanation for why the repetition-based truth effect seems to be stronger 
than the effect anchored in perceptual fluency may be the fact that repetition aggregates 
different fluency experiences (Whittlesea, 1993). Previous exposure encompasses the 
encoding of semantic information, which can then be reactivated when the statement is re-
encountered. Thus, the fluency involved in processing a repeated statement can come from 
the repetition of different types of its perceptual features (e.g., wording, phrase structure), and 
from the repetition of different types of its conceptual characteristics (e.g., specific content, 
meaning, general topic). That is, repetition aggregates perceptual and conceptual fluency 
experiences. In fact, judged truth of statements increases not only when they are repeated 
verbatim (literally), but also when they repeat only the topic of previous statements (Arkes et 
al., 1991) or when they pertain to topics individuals have some knowledge about (Boehm, 
1994). Thus, even if the illusions of truth that anchor in the experience of perceptual fluency 
go through memory attributions or feelings of familiarity (what is still an open question), the 
fact is that mere manipulations of a statement’s perceptual attributes lack the “extra” 
conceptual fluency component that is part of repetition.  
 
Given this evidence, in this thesis we present three independent papers addressing the 
different status that repetition may have in the illusion of truth effect. The experiments 
presented in each paper address the association of repetition with truth, and try to understand 
the relevance that the conceptual fluency component that is involved in repetition may have 
for the truth effect, as compared to the experience of mere perceptual fluency. 
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Overview of the Empirical Articles 
The first paper, entitled “The differential effects of fluency due to repetition and 
fluency due to color contrast on judgments of truth” (submitted to the journal Psychological 
Research, edited by Springer), approaches the differences between the fluency elicited by 
repetition and by color contrast. In this paper, the association of the two sources of fluency 
with truth is contrasted, in a context designed to reverse that association and turn fluency into 
a sign of falseness. In one of the experiments, we compare how easy it is to associate each of 
the fluency sources with falseness. In a second experiment, repetition and color contrast are 
manipulated orthogonally to each other, allowing the direct contrast of the distinctive features 
the two experiences may have. If the conceptual features associated with repetition are a 
relevant feature of the fluency experience it elicits, than we should expect differences between 
the two fluency manipulations. 
The second paper, entitled “Hearing a statement now and believing the opposite later” 
(submitted to the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, edited by Elsevier), revisits a 
manipulation first used by Bacon (1979), and which allows to separate the influence of the 
repetition of conceptual features of a statement from the influence of repeating only its 
perceptual characteristics. This is achieved by the use of contradictory statements, which 
maintain the perceptual structure (words, phrase structure) of the items that were previously 
encountered, while totally changing their meaning. We expect contradictory statements to 
promote an illusion of falseness, because individuals remember the original statements and 
will thus reject the version that does not match their memory content. However, by 
introducing a longer delay between exposure and truth ratings phase, we expect to reduce 
explicit memory mechanisms and the access to the conceptual aspects of the original 
statements, creating the opportunity for perceptual fluency effects to emerge. 
The experiments in the third paper, entitled “The informative value of type of 
repetition: Perceptual and conceptual fluency influences on judgments of truth” (submitted to 
the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, edited by the 
American Psychological Association) follow-up the second paper, extending and detailing its 
effects. In this paper, we isolate the different components of fluency associated with the 
repetition of the conceptual and perceptual features of the statements. For that, participants 
are asked to judge statements that: (1) change the wording of the original statements while 
maintaining their specific meaning (paraphrases), (2) change the meaning of the original 
statements while maintaining their wording and phrase structure (contradictory statements), 
 
   
   
44 
(3) change both the wording and the specific meaning of the statements, but maintain their 
general topic and subject (contradictory paraphrases), and (4) totally new statements, not 
sharing any conceptual or perceptual characteristic with original items. As in the previous 
paper, a delayed judgment condition is included to separate the direct influence of explicit 
memory from pure fluency effects. The comparison between the truth ratings given to all 
these types of repetition and those given to original statements allows understanding the role 
of the different conceptual and perceptual components of repetition in illusions of truth. 
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Section II 
Empirical Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
“If you tell the truth, you don't have to remember anything.” 
Mark Twain (1835-1910) 
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Abstract 
Two experiments contrast the effects of fluency due to repetition and fluency due to 
color contrast on judgments of truth, after participants learn to associate high levels of fluency 
with falseness (i.e., a reversal of the fluency-truth link). Experiment 1 shows that the 
interpretation of fluency as a sign of truth is harder to reverse when fluency spurs from 
repetition than when it comes from color contrast. Experiment 2 shows that when color 
contrast and repetition are manipulated orthogonally, the reversal of the truth effect learned 
with color contrast does not generalize to repetition. These results suggest specificities in the 
processing experiences generated by the two different sources of fluency, and their influences 
on truth judgments are separated when the context allows the comparison of their distinctive 
features. We interpret and discuss these results in light of the research addressing the 
convergence vs. dissociation of the effects elicited by different fluency sources. 
 
152 words 
 
Keywords: illusions of truth, processing fluency, repetition, color contrast 
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The Differential Effects of Fluency Due to Repetition and Fluency Due to Color 
Contrast on Judgments of Truth 
 
Is the statement “The ice cream cone was invented in the U.S. in 1924” true or false? 
Most of us would be uncertain about the correct answer. However, if we hear it repeatedly we 
will most probably consider it true. This phenomenon is known as the illusion of truth effect, 
which shows that repeated statements have a higher truth-value than new statements (Hasher, 
Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). This effect has been observed under many different conditions, 
both in laboratorial and more ecological contexts, and also with different types of statements 
(trivia facts, personal opinions, product-related claims; see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & 
Wänke, 2010, for a meta-analysis). 
Illusions of truth have been explained as the product of the processing fluency that is 
associated with repeated stimuli (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Congruently, the effect was 
shown to occur in conditions where other sources of fluency are used. For example, 
statements are considered more probably true when presented in good contrast rather than in 
low contrast (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999), in a rhyming rather than a non-rhyming form 
(McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000), or when words are primed by semantically related 
concepts vs. not primed (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993).  
Yet, although the impact of fluency on truth judgments is undisputable, the literature 
also shows that the repetition-based truth effect has a greater magnitude than the truth effect 
elicited by perceptual fluency manipulations, such as color contrast or graphic style (e.g., 
Hansen, Dechêne, & Wänke, 2008; Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; but see 
Unkelbach, 2007 for an exception). And although some researchers recognize it (e.g., Parks & 
Toth, 2006; Unkelbach, 2007), this evidence is generally devaluated due to the belief that no 
differences are expected between the fluency elicited by different sources. Their effects are 
simply assumed to reflect a unitary construct (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009) and result in the 
same general subjective experience of processing ease (e.g., Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 
2004; Wurtz, Reber, & Zimmermann, 2008).  
Our goal with the present experiments is to show that this may not always be the case. 
The effects of two different sources of fluency, in this case repetition and perceptual contrast, 
on subjective judgments of truth may differ and even be dissociated. If so, it would suggest 
the existence of specificities in the processing experiences that these different sources of 
fluency generate, and which can be disentangled by our cognitive system in some contexts. 
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Unkelbach’s (2007) work on the reversal of fluency effects on truth judgments shows 
evidence of an equivalence between perceptual fluency and repetition. The author asked 
participants to categorize a set of easy statements (e.g., “February is the first month of the 
year”, or “One hour has 60 minutes”) as true or false, and gave feedback about their answers. 
To reverse the fluency-truth link, true statements were always presented in low-contrast 
colors and false statements always in high-contrast colors. The effectiveness of the reversal 
was visible in a subsequent phase, when participants judged ambiguous statements (i.e., 
difficult to know if true or false, such as “Methuselah was the grandfather of Noah”) without 
feedback: participants continued to judge low-contrast statements more probably true than 
high-contrast ones, showing evidence of having learned the fluency = falseness association. 
Importantly, the learning that occurred with perceptual fluency was generalized to the fluency 
experience elicited by repetition. That is, after learning that low-contrast was a sign that the 
statement was true, participants applied the same logic to old vs. new statements, and took 
novelty as a sign of truth. 
Besides focusing on the relevance of fluency for the truth effect and that the fluency 
experience is open to different interpretations (e.g., Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987; 
Skurnik, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2000; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990), these findings 
suggest that there are no specificities regarding the processing experiences elicited by the two 
sources of fluency that could be detected and result in a dissociation of their effects on 
subjective truth judgments. That possibility matches Reber and collaborators’ (Reber et al., 
2004; Wurtz et al., 2008) data showing that although different sources of perceptual fluency 
may have different objective impacts (measured in response times) in different stages of the 
perceptual process, they produce similar effects on the subjective judgment of how easy a 
stimulus is perceived. 
But if, on the one hand, this evidence suggests that “fluency exerts the same influence 
on judgments independently of how it is generated” (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 220), on 
the other hand, other evidence suggests that the use of fluency may be a sophisticated process, 
and that there are occasions when the effects promoted by the different fluency sources can be 
dissociated. One good example is the study by Whittlesea (1993) showing that when the 
perceptual and conceptual features of words were manipulated to induce fluency, judgments 
of semantic relatedness were only affected by conceptual fluency manipulations. This clearly 
suggests some degree of domain-specificity in the use of the fluency experience as a cue for 
our judgments, and also that different fluency manipulations do not always lead to the same 
 
   
   
51 
effect. In addition, Olds and Westerman (2012) presented data suggesting that the reversal of 
fluency effects found by Unkelback (2006) in the context of memory judgments (i.e., fluency 
= novelty) were not so easy to generalize from one fluency manipulation to another (learning 
the reversal with fluency due to visual contrast was not generalized to fluency due to 
repetition priming). Furthermore, the reversal did not generalize across different judgments 
(learning with recognition judgments did not generalize to frequency judgments), suggesting 
some specificity regarding the task and context in which the new association is learned and 
then applied. 
Given this evidence, we hypothesize that the effects elicited by two different sources 
of fluency can be separated and dissociated in contexts that allow their distinctive features to 
emerge. We tested this hypothesis in two experiments, in which the effects of fluency due to 
color contrast and fluency due to repetition were contrasted within a learning context 
designed to reverse the association of fluency with truth. 
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment tested how easy it is to reverse the fluency-truth link when fluency 
anchors in color-contrast vs. repetition, replicating the feedback-learning procedure used by 
Unkelbach (2007). Only if the processing experiences that result from the two fluency sources 
are different should we expect differences regarding the ease with which learning occurs. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety-four undergraduate students (84 women; Mage = 
20.19 years, SD = 6.01) participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. They 
were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (fluency manipulation: repetition vs. color-
contrast) × 2 (learning condition: classic vs. reversed) between-participants factorial-design. 
Material. A set of 40 ambiguous (e.g., “It takes 60 days for a house fly to become 
great-grandmother”) and 80 easy (e.g., “A guitar is a string instrument”) statements about 
various topics were used. Ambiguous statements consisted of items that in previous pre-tests 
showed an equal probability of being considered true or false. Half of the statements in each 
category were true and half were false. Statements were written in Arial (size 28) and in blue 
color. Color contrast was manipulated by varying the RGB values (e.g., Hansen et al., 2008; 
Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007), creating a low-contrast and a high-contrast blue. 
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Procedure. Participants were invited to take part in a study composed of different 
tasks, some related with reading sentences in different colors and others with the evaluation of 
images. The experiment began with an exposure phase, in which participants read a list of 40 
ambiguous and 40 easy statements, about which they were told that half were true and half 
were false. Statements were presented one at a time, in high-contrast blue in the center of the 
screen with a 500 ms blank screen between them (the order of the statements was randomly 
determined for each participant). A rapid presentation time of 3 s per statement was used, to 
minimize chances of profound encoding and processing operations (see Unkelbach, 2007, 
experiment 3). Then, a filler task lasting approximately 15 minutes asked participants to rate 
the pleasantness of 35 images (objects, food, people). After this, the learning phase of the 
experiment started. Forty easy statements were presented and participants had to decide 
whether they were true or false. Participants in the color-contrast conditions judged only new 
statements, while participants in the repetition condition judged 20 new and 20 repeated 
statements (from the exposure phase). Statements (randomly ordered) were presented 
individually and remained on the screen until participants pressed either the “S” or the “L” 
key to indicate whether the statement was “True” or “False”, respectively. Each response 
received veridical feedback, with the words “correct” or “wrong” appearing above the 
statement for 2 s. A 1 s blank screen separated each trial. Depending on the learning 
condition, high-contrast/repeated statements were always true – classic learning, or always 
false – reversed learning (and the opposite for low-contrast/new statements). Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible. Materials and responses were presented and 
registered using e-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Dependent measures. Using the proportions of “True” responses to true statements – 
Hit rate, and to false statements – false alarms (FA) rate, we derived signal detection theory 
(SDT) estimates of d’ (discrimination ability; higher values represent better discrimination 
between true and false statements) and C (criteria for answering “True”; C = 0 represents a 
unbiased respondent; negative values indicate a bias to answer “True”, and positive values 
indicate a bias to answer “False”). Participants’ response times (RTs) to high fluency 
(repeated or high-contrast items) and low fluency (new or low-contrast items) statements were 
also analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
   
   
53 
Results and Discussion 
Mean Hit rates, FA rates, and SDT d’ and C estimates are provided in Table 1. For 
parsimony, we report only the analyses of the SDT measures. 
Discrimination estimates (d’) were analyzed with an ANOVA, with fluency 
manipulation (repetition vs. color-contrast) and learning condition (classic vs. reversed) as 
independent factors. Corroborating that the statements used were very clear concerning their 
factual true or false status, d’ estimates were high in all conditions (all d’s > 2.00). However, 
discrimination was significantly better in the classic learning condition (M = 3.27, SD = .52) 
than in the reversed condition (M = 2.80, SD = .64), F(1, 90) = 20.82, p < .001, η2partial = .19, 
suggesting that either the congruency of the cues in the classic condition facilitated the task, 
or that the contrast of the information received in the reversed condition inhibited it. Relevant 
to our goal, discrimination was better in the color-contrast condition than in the repetition 
condition, F(1, 90) = 10.67, p = .002, η2partial = .11, suggesting that the two sources of fluency 
provide different learning contexts. Congruently with this hypothesis, fluency source 
moderated the effect of learning condition, F(1, 90) = 4.00, p = .049, η2partial = .04: the lower 
discrimination observed in the reversed learning (vs. classic learning) was clearly more 
pronounced when the fluency source was repetition (Mdifference = .76), t(90) = 4.21, p < .001, d 
= 1.35, than when it was color-contrast (Mdifference = .29), t(90) = 2.04, p = .044, d = .54. This 
suggests that repetition offered more resistance to a change of meaning than color contrast 
did. 
Results of the ANOVA with the same factors analyzing C estimates suggest that the 
lower accuracy observed in the reversed learning condition with repetition was in fact due to a 
resistance in associating repeated statements with the response “False” (and not in associating 
new statements with the response “True”). This is evidenced by the significant interaction 
between fluency source and learning condition, F(1, 90) = 7.11, p = .009, η2partial = .07: 
participants in the repetition condition adopted a more liberal criterion in the reversed 
learning than in the classic learning, t(90) = 2.89, p = .004, d = .93; a difference that does not 
exist in the color-contrast condition, t(90) = .66, p = .513. In fact, the bias to answer “True” 
was only visible in the specific reversed learning condition with repetition as the fluency 
source (note also the high FA rate in that condition, Table 1), whereas in all other conditions 
participants performance is practically unbiased (i.e., C = 0). So, it seems that participants 
were not able to totally counteract the default association between repetition and truth, 
something that is apparently easier to do when fluency stems from color contrast. Because the 
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criterion to judge statements “True” was more liberal in the reversed learning condition with 
repetition than in all other conditions, a main effect of fluency source also emerged, F(1, 90) 
= 4.21, p = .043, η2partial = .05, and the effect of learning condition was marginally significant, 
F(1, 90) = 3.40, p = .069, η2partial = .04, (Mreversed = -.08, SD = .24 and Mclassic = -.02, SD = 
.20). 
Participants’ RTs (Table 2) were analyzed with an ANOVA with fluency level (high 
vs. low) as a within-participants factor and fluency manipulation (repetition vs. color contrast) 
and learning condition (classic vs. reversed) as between-participants factors.5 A main effect 
associated with fluency level emerged, showing the expected response facilitation when 
statements were easier to process: RTs were faster to high fluency than to low fluency 
statements, F(1, 90) = 57.88, p < .001, η2partial = .39. The main effect of learning condition 
supports the idea that the learning procedure was more difficult in the reversed condition (as 
suggested by the lower discrimination ability in that condition), with slower RTs in that 
condition (M = 2835, SD = 722) than in the classic learning (M = 2279, SD = 717), F(1, 90) = 
15.08, p < .001, η2partial = .14. 
Contrasts on the data associated with the interaction involving all three factors (F(1, 
90) = 2.74, p = .101, η2partial = .03) support the increased difficulty associated with learning 
the reversal of the repetition-truth link. While in the color-contrast reversed learning condition 
there were no differences in RTs to high-contrast vs. low-contrast statements (t < 1), in the 
repetition reversed learning condition RTs were faster to repeated than to new items, t(90) = 
3.62, p < .001, d = .37. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that participants have a 
greater tendency to base their responses on the automatic repetition-truth association (which is 
not correct in the reversed learning condition), what does not happen with perceptual contrast. 
This hypothesis fits the lower discrimination ability and the higher bias for truth observed in 
the repetition conditions. 
The general pattern of results is associated with other effects. The main effect of 
fluency source shows faster RTs in the repetition conditions than the color-contrast ones 
(Mrepetion = 2365, SD = 717 and Mcolor-contrast = 2737, SD = 760), F(1, 90) = 6.58, p = .012, 
η2partial = .07. A significant interaction between fluency level and learning condition also 
emerged, F(1, 90) = 17.86, p < .001, η2partial = .17. This interaction corroborates the idea that 
reversed learning demands participants to inhibit the responses that are more readily available 
(to avoid errors), what is evident in smaller difference in the RTs to low vs. high fluency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We also analyzed RTs after trimming the values at 1000 ms and 5000 ms (following Unkelbach, 2007), and 
results were unchanged. 
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items in the reversed learning (Mdifference = 109) than in the classic learning (Mdifference = 381). 
Finally, the interaction involving fluency level and fluency source, F(1, 90) = 40.31, p < .001, 
η2partial = .31, shows that in the repetition conditions RTs were faster for high fluency (old) 
than for low fluency (new) items, t(90) = 8.96, p < .001, d = .62, whereas in the color-contrast 
condition that difference was not significant, t(90) = 1.00, p = .318. 
 
Table 1 
Mean (SD) Hits, False Alarm Rates, and SDT Estimates in Experiment 1, by Fluency Source 
(Repetition vs. Color-contrast) and Learning Condition (Classic vs. Reversed) 
 Hits FA d’ C 
Repetition n = 37 
Classic learning n = 19 
Reversed learning n = 18 
.93 (.05) 
.94 (.05) 
.91 (.05) 
.12 (.08) 
.06 (.05) 
.18 (.10) 
2.81 (.68) 
3.18 (.56) 
2.42 (.57) 
-.10 (.23) 
-.00 (.16) 
-.20 (.26) 
Color contrast n = 57 
Classic learning n = 29 
Reversed learning n = 28 
.95 (.06) 
.96 (.05) 
.93 (.07) 
.06 (.06) 
.05 (.06) 
.07 (.05) 
3.18 (.55) 
3.32 (.49) 
3.03 (.57) 
-.01 (.21) 
-.03 (.23) 
 .00 (.19) 
 
 
Table 2 
Mean (SD) Response Times in ms to High and Low Fluency Statements in Experiment 1, by 
Fluency Source (Repetition vs. Color-contrast) and Learning Condition (Classic vs. 
Reversed) 
 
High Fluency Statements 
(Repeated / High Contrast) 
Low Fluency Statements 
(New / Low Contrast) 
Repetition n = 37 
Classic learning n = 19 
Reversed learning n = 18 
2149 (769) 
1735 (543) 
2562 (755) 
2598 (664) 
2373 (636) 
2822 (628) 
Color contrast n = 57 
Classic learning n = 29 
Reversed learning n = 28 
2721 (774) 
2442 (726) 
3000 (729) 
2761 (745) 
2565 (730) 
2957 (720) 
Total n = 94 
Classic learning n = 48 
Reversed learning n = 46 
2488 (819) 
2088 (741) 
2781 (762) 
2692 (715) 
2469 (694) 
2890 (682) 
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The results observed in this experiment clearly suggest that the fluency experience 
elicited by repetition and by color contrast is not equivalent, and seems to be differently 
connected with the inference of truth. Congruently with the fact that the truth effect is 
stronger with repetition than when perceptual fluency sources are used (e.g., color contrast or 
letter font), the association between fluency and truth was harder to reverse in the repetition 
condition than in the color-contrast condition. The fact that these effects emerged with 
statements that were unambiguous in their true/false status is quite remarkable, as it is 
expected that with such stimuli individuals answer on the basis of the factual knowledge they 
possess (Dechêne et al., 2010; Unkelbach, 2007). 
 
Experiment 2 
By showing that the reversal of the truth effect learned with fluency due to color 
contrast can be generalized to a repetition manipulation, Unkelbach (2007) presented relevant 
evidence that the two sources of fluency generate a processing experience with convergent 
effects on subjective judgments of truth. However, because the generalization occurred in a 
context where only repetition was manipulated, a confounding between the fluency 
experiences promoted by repetition and color contrast may have happened. That is, it is 
possible that the experiences resulting from the two fluency sources are not exactly the same, 
but just similar enough for one to be mistaken for the other. To understand which of these 
hypotheses is more likely to be true, participants should experience the fluency induced by 
repetition and color contrast simultaneously. Such context allows assessing whether both 
sources of fluency still exert convergent effects, or if their impact is dissociated due to their 
opposite associations with truth (the reversal of the truth effect is trained only with color 
contrast). This is what we did in Experiment 2, replicating Unkelbach’s (2007) previous 
experiment while introducing that small but relevant factor (i.e., the manipulation of color 
contrast orthogonal to repetition) in the test phase. In addition, we added a recognition test in 
the end of the experiment to understand how memory mechanisms might contribute to the 
expected reversal effects. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Fifty-three undergraduate students (42 women; Mage = 20.58 
years, SD = 4.61) participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (learning condition: classic vs. reversed) × 2 
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(familiarity: repeated vs. new statements) × 2 (color contrast: high vs. low) factorial-design, 
with the last two factors manipulated within-participants. 
Material. A set of 96 ambiguous and 60 easy statements were used.6 Half of the 
statements in each category were true and half were false. Color contrast was manipulated as 
in Experiment 1, but different colors were used: blue and red in the learning phase, and green 
and orange in the test phase (to avoid the association of a particular color with a particular 
answer, Unkelbach, 2007). For each color, two levels of contrast (high vs. low) were created. 
Procedure. Procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the following adaptations: a) 
the exposure phase presented 48 ambiguous statements (24 true and 24 false); b) the learning 
procedure was done solely with color contrast, and 60 statements were used (30 true and 30 
false); c) a test phase was presented as a continuation of the learning task; and d) a final 
recognition test was introduced. In the test phase, participants were again told that half of the 
statements were true and half were false, but that different colors would be used and feedback 
would no longer be provided. They were also instructed to answer as fast as possible. Ninety-
six ambiguous statements were presented (all 48 from the exposure phase plus 48 new items), 
half in high-contrast colors and half in low-contrast. Truth status of the statements was 
orthogonal to both repetition and color contrast. In the recognition test, 44 statements were 
presented (16 old items from the exposure phase, 16 of the items presented as new on the test 
phase, and 16 totally new statements, all randomly selected),7 written in black and with the 
question “Was this statement presented in the first exposure phase of the experiment?” on top. 
Participants used the “S” key to signal that a statement had been presented in the exposure 
phase (“Old” responses), and the “L” key to signal that it had not (“New” responses). A 1 s 
blank screen separated the trials. After the recognition test, participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
Dependent Measures. For the learning and test phases, d’ and C estimates were again 
calculated from the Hit and FA rates in the different experimental conditions, and 
participant’s RTs were also analyzed. However, for the recognition test we considered only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Statements were selected from the same pre-test described in Experiment 1. 
7 Due to an error in programming, order of presentation of the items in the recognition test was not random: first, 
all the exposure phase statements were presented, then all the items that served as new in the test phase, and then 
all the new items. 
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the proportions of “Old” responses to the three types of statements – old (Hits), “new” items 
from the test phase (FA-test phase), and new statements (FA).8 
 
Results and Discussion 
Only the data of 47 participants were analyzed, as 6 participants could not be 
considered due to (a) having participated in a similar experiment in the previous semester (n = 
2), (b) not finishing the experiment (n = 2), and (c) interrupting the viewing of the exposure 
phase to complain about the rate at which stimuli were presented (n = 2). 
 Learning phase. Table 3 presents mean Hits and FA rates and d’ and C estimates in 
all conditions. Regarding C estimates, a t-test with learning condition (classic vs. reversed) as 
the independent factor revealed no differences between the two groups (t < 1), with mean 
values of C reflecting unbiased decisions in both conditions (both Cs ≈ 0). The analysis of d’ 
estimates showed equally high accuracy levels in the two conditions, t(45) = 1.37, p = .177, 
indicating that participants in each learning group clearly understood which statements were 
true and which were false (all d’s > 3.00). 
Participants’ RTs (Table 4) were analyzed with an ANOVA with color contrast (high 
vs. low) as a within-participants factor, and learning condition as a between-participants 
factor. No main effects where found (color contrast: F(1, 45) = 1.22, p = .276; learning 
condition: F(1, 45) = 1.28, p = .263).9 However a significant interaction emerged between the 
two factors, F(1, 45) = 18.03, p < .001, η2partial = .29, showing that while in the classic 
learning condition participants were faster responding to high-contrast statements than to low-
contrast ones, the opposite occurred in the reversed learning condition. As fluency and truth 
were perfectly confounded in this phase of the experiment, this result reflects participants’ 
overall faster responses to true statements than to false statements, replicating Unkelbach’s 
(2007) findings. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 SDT estimates were not computed for this task because two different d’ and C estimates would have to be 
calculated, as there were two different types of FA rates and a single Hit rate. In this analysis, this would not 
bring any advantage to comparing the differences between the three proportions themselves. 
9 RTs were analyzed after trimming the values at 1000 ms and 5000 ms in the learning phase, and at 1000 ms 
and 7000 ms in the test phase (Unkelbach, 2007), and as before results were unchanged. 
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Table 3 
Mean (SD) Hits, False Alarm Rates, and SDT Estimates in the Learning Phase of Experiment 
2, by Learning Condition (Classic vs. Reversed) 
Learning Condition Hits FA d’ C 
Classic learning n = 26 
Reversed learning n = 21 
Total (n = 47) 
.93 (.06) 
.95 (.03) 
.94 (.05) 
.09 (.07) 
.08 (.07) 
.08 (.07) 
3.06 (.73) 
3.32 (.54) 
3.18 (.66) 
-.04 (.24) 
-.07 (.29) 
-.05 (.26) 
 
Table 4 
Mean (SD) Response Times in ms to High and Low-Contrast Statements in the Learning 
Phase of Experiment 2, by Learning Condition (Classic vs. Reversed)  
Learning Condition High-Contrast Low-Contrast 
Classic learning n = 26 
Reversed learning n = 21 
Total n = 47 
2967 (584) 
3065 (652) 
3016 (611) 
3336 (706) 
2848 (563) 
3092 (684) 
 
Test phase. To understand whether the learning phase was successful in reversing the 
truth effect elicited by perceptual fluency, C estimates (Table 5) were analyzed in an ANOVA 
with learning condition (classic vs. reversed) as between-participants factor and familiarity 
(repeated vs. new) and color contrast (high vs. low) as within-participants factors. A 
successful reversal of the perceptual fluency experience should result in the use of a more 
liberal criterion for low-contrast statements than high-contrast ones in the reversed learning 
condition, by opposition to what is expected in the classic learning. And this is exactly what 
was found, as shown by the significant interaction between color-contrast and learning 
condition, F(1, 45) = 10.16, p = .003, η2partial = .18. In the classic learning condition, the 
typical illusion of truth emerged and participants showed a higher bias for truth for high-
contrast statements (M = -.27, SD = .55) than low-contrast ones (M = -.07, SD = .51), t(45) = 
2.46, p = .018, d = .38. But this pattern inverted in the reversed learning condition, and the 
higher bias for truth emerged for low contrast statements (M = -.39, SD = .49) rather than 
high-contrast ones (M = -.57, SD = .45), t(45) = 2.08, p = .044, d = .38. This result 
demonstrates that the learning procedure was effective in promoting the reversal of the truth 
effect associated with color contrast. 
The key question is now if such reversal was extended to repetition. This would 
suggest it to be experienced similarly to perceptual fluency and that their effects could not be 
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dissociated. However, contrary to that hypothesis, there was a main effect of repetition 
reflecting the typical truth effect pattern: the criteria to judge a statement “True” was a lot 
more liberal for repeated statements (M = -.49, SD = .61) than for new ones (M = -.13, SD = 
.46), F(1, 45) = 37.78, p < .001, η2partial = .46. Additionally, although the interaction between 
repetition and learning condition was also statistically significant, F(1, 45) = 5.61, p =.022, 
η2partial = .11, its pattern does not mimic what happened with color contrast; in fact it shows 
the opposite. This interaction shows the truth effect was larger in the reversed learning 
condition (difference between repeated and new items = .52) than in the classic one 
(difference between repeated and new items = .29). The ANOVA also revealed a main effect 
of learning condition, with participants in the reversed learning condition showing a higher 
bias to judge statements “True” than participants in the classic condition, F(1, 45) = 7.59, p = 
.008, η2partial = .14. All other effects were not significant (F < 1). 
The analysis of participants’ discrimination ability supports the ambiguity of the 
material regarding truth status. Mean d’ estimates were very low across all conditions (Table 
5), suggesting that it was highly difficult to distinguish true from false facts. Congruently, an 
ANOVA with the same factors as the previous one yielded no significant main effects or 
interactions on d’ estimates (all Fs < 1, except the three-way interaction, F(1, 45) = 1.70, p = 
.199). Only the interaction between repetition and color contrast was marginally significant, 
F(1, 45) = 3.51, p = .069, η2partial = .07, showing a tendency for new statements to be 
discriminated better when presented in high  than in low-contrast (Mhigh-contrast = .08, SD = .62; 
and Mlow-contrast = -.11, SD = .48), while the opposite happened for repeated statements (Mlow-
contrast = .09, SD = .48; and Mhigh-contrast = .01, SD = .57). 
Participants’ RTs (Table 6) corroborate that both repetition and high-contrast increase 
statements’ processing fluency. Results of the ANOVA associated with the design showed the 
expected processing advantage of repetition – participants were faster to answer to repeated 
than to new statements (Mrepeated = 3699, SD = 1042, and Mnew = 4396, SD = 1081), F(1, 45) = 
87.08, p < .001, η2partial = .66. Similarly, participants were also faster responding to high-
contrast than to low-contrast statements (Mhigh-contrast = 3909, SD = 1070 and Mlow-contrast = 
4186, SD = 1053), F(1, 45) = 15.45, p < .001, η2partial = .26. No other effects were significant 
(all Fs < 1, except the three-way interaction, F(1, 45) = 1.31, p = .26). 
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Table 5 
Mean (SD) Hits, FA Rates, and SDT Estimates in the Test Phase of Experiment 2, by 
Learning Condition (Classic vs. Reversed), Repetition (Repeated vs. New) and Color Contrast 
(high vs. Low) Level  
Learning Condition Hits FA d’ C 
Classic learning n = 26 
Repeated - High contrast 
Repeated - Low contrast 
New - High contrast 
New - Low contrast 
.56 (.20) 
.64 (.23) 
.57 (.23) 
.55 (.18) 
.47 (.17) 
.55 (.20) 
.61 (.21) 
.55 (.18) 
.53 (.21) 
.51 (.21) 
.02 (.57) 
.10 (.57) 
 .06 (.46) 
.03 (.68) 
-.11 (.55) 
-.17 (.53) 
-.40 (.61) 
-.18 (.55) 
-.14 (.48) 
.03 (.48) 
Reversed learning n = 21 
Repeated - High contrast 
Repeated - Low contrast 
New - High contrast 
New - Low contrast 
.65 (.18) 
.67 (.20) 
.79 (.16) 
.56 (.19) 
.58 (.17) 
.66 (.16) 
.73 (.19) 
.76 (.13) 
.53 (.15) 
.62 (.16) 
.01 (.50) 
-.13 (.57) 
.13 (51) 
.14 (.54) 
-.12 (.37) 
-.48 (.47) 
-.63 (.59) 
 -.86 (.46) 
-.15 (.38) 
-.29 (.44) 
 
Table 6 
Mean (SD) Response Times in ms in the Test Phase of Experiment 2, by Learning Condition 
(Classic vs. Reversed), Repetition (Repeated vs. New) and Color-Contrast (high vs. Low) 
Level 
Learning condition High contrast Low contrast 
Classic learning n = 26 
Repeated 
New 
3998 (1146) 
3584 (1143) 
4412 (1148) 
4232 (1096) 
3950 (1112) 
4513 (1080) 
Reversed learning n = 21 
Repeated 
New 
3803 (984) 
3457 (942) 
4149 (1025) 
4130 (1018) 
3774 (952) 
4486 (1083) 
Total n = 47 3909 (1070) 4186 (1053) 
 
Recognition test. Proportions of “Old” responses in the recognition test (Table 7) 
were analyzed with an ANOVA, having learning condition (classic vs. reversed) and type of 
statement (old vs. “new” items of the test phase vs. new items; repeated measures) as 
independent factors. As Table 7 shows, participants had good memory for the information 
that had been presented in the exposure phase. This is evidenced by the main effect of type of 
statement, F(2, 90) = 97.68, p < .001, η2partial = .69, showing a high mean proportion of Hits 
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and a very low proportion of FA (associated with totally new items). This means that even 
though statements in the exposure phase were presented rapidly, participants were still able to 
register the information they were exposed to and later recognize it. However, the proportion 
of FA associated with “new” items of the test phase was at chance level (t-test comparing this 
FA rate with chance level of .50, t(46) = -1.17, p = .250), evidencing some confusion 
regarding the origin of this type of statements. 
 
Table 7 
Mean (SD) Hits, FA and FA-Test Rates in the Recognition Test of Experiment 2, by Learning 
Condition (Classic vs. Reversed) 
Learning condition Hits FA FA-test phase 
Classic learning n = 26 
Reversed learning n = 21 
Total n = 47 
.80 (.21) 
.85 (.21) 
.82 (.21) 
.07 (.08) 
.11 (.18) 
.09 (.13) 
.48 (.39) 
 .38 (.38) 
.43 (.38) 
 
Conditional analysis. Repetition elicits not only an increased experience of fluency 
but also familiarity with the items, which also supports illusions of truth (e.g., Begg et al., 
1992). The absence of a reversal of the truth effect associated with repetition suggests that the 
experience of familiarity may have been more relevant than the increased experience of 
fluency for participants’ truth judgments. We tested this hypothesis by comparing the 
proportion of “True” responses to the statements that participants perceived as familiar 
(“old”) and those they considered “new”, independently of their real repetition status. The 
ANOVA with learning condition (classic vs. reversed) as between-participants factor and 
recognition (old vs. new) status of the statements as repeated measures revealed only a main 
effect of the items’ recognition status, F(1, 45) = 16.94, p < .001, η2partial = .27. Congruently 
with previous studies (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991), the proportion of “True” 
responses was higher for statements that participants considered old (M = .65, SD = .17) than 
for those they considered new (M = .46, SD = .26). This result, allied with the fact that 
participants were quite accurate in recognizing repeated statements, suggests that indeed the 
experience of familiarity was relevant for the decision. Neither the effect of learning 
condition, F(1, 45) = 1.76, p = .19, nor the interaction between the two factors, F(1, 45) = 
1.63, p = .21, were significant. 
Together, the results of this experiment suggest that although there are occasions when 
the effects associated with a specific source of fluency are generalized to another one, it 
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seems that such generalization is more prone to happen in a context where there is not the 
possibility to contrast the distinctive features between the two fluency instances. When such 
possibility for differentiation is allowed (by putting the two fluency sources side by side with 
opposing signs regarding the inference of truth) the confounding previously found is 
eliminated and effects are dissociated. 
 
General Discussion 
Our goal in this study was to contrast perceptual fluency and repetition effects on 
subjective judgments of truth, as a way to understand if there are specificities in the 
processing experiences they promote that can be disentangled by our cognitive system. 
Experiment 1 showed that although the interpretation of fluency due to repetition is 
susceptible to a reversal, it is not as easy to train it as when fluency spurs from color contrast. 
Experiment 2 corroborates this by showing that even though there are occasions when the 
experience elicited by one source of fluency can be confounded with another one and be 
interpreted in the same way (Unkelbach, 2006, 2007), it seems that such confound is more 
prone to happen in a context where it is not possible to contrast the distinctive features 
between them. When repetition and color contrast were manipulated orthogonally and had 
opposing signs regarding the association with truth, they were differentiated and their effects 
dissociated. 
Results of Experiment 1 fit well with the fact that in the literature the truth effect 
associated with repetition is usually of a higher magnitude than when perceptual fluency 
manipulations are used (e.g., Hansen et al., 2008; Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 
1999; but see Unkelbach, 2007, for an exception). Given the difficulty that our participants 
demonstrated in associating repeated statements with the response “False”, even though they 
were clearly false (only easy statements were used in this experiment), it seems that repetition 
has a stronger connection to truth, which is also less malleable than in the case of perceptual 
fluency. One reason for why this might happen is that repetition aggregates different levels of 
fluency – besides the perceptual fluency that comes from reprocessing the wording and phrase 
structure of the statements, repetition also increases conceptual fluency due to the 
reprocessing of the semantic content and meaning of the stimuli. 
Our results add elements to the learning process that Unkelbach (2007; Reber & 
Unkelbach, 2010) suggested to underlie the interpretation of fluency as truth. According to 
the author’s learning approach, throughout their lives individuals learn that fluency correlates 
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positively with truth, and thus if the opposite correlation is promoted then individuals will 
learn to interpret fluency as falseness. What our data suggests is that fluency due to repetition 
and perceptual fluency may have a different learning history regarding the association with 
truth, what calls for an explanation based on differences that may exist between them.  
In this regard, the examination of response-reversal paradigms that Coutanche and 
Thompson-Schill (2012) presented recently suggests that the response reversal observed after 
a block of training does not necessarily mean that the primary association (e.g., fluency-truth) 
itself has changed. To illustrate this, the authors explain the context-specificity characteristic 
of a newly formed association after a new contingency between stimulus and response is 
established. In summary, a training block aiming at reversing the typical response to stimulus 
turns it ambiguous, with two possible interpretations – the original and the reversed one. And 
just like for any ambiguous stimulus, the choice between the two available responses can be 
cued/supported by the context an individual is in. Additionally, a crucial consequence of 
ambiguity is that it drives attention to the context, in search of cues to help in the decision. 
Therefore, the new response is most likely to be the one selected in the specific context where 
it was developed. However, the exhibition of this apparent response reversal cannot be taken 
as a clear sign that the original association has been changed. Rather, it probably remained 
unaltered and is just not being activated in that specific context because individuals learned 
that it is not the appropriate one. 
Our results challenge the idea that fluency will always have the same effect on 
subjective judgments, independently of how it is promoted (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009). Congruently with Whittlesea’s (1993) work demonstrating that conceptual judgments 
(e.g., semantic relatedness) are influenced only by conceptual fluency (e.g., semantic priming 
manipulations) and not perceptual fluency, Experiment 2 also suggests that there is some 
degree of specificity in the fluency experiences that repetition and color contrast generate and 
how they are used. This is visible in the fact that the truth effect was reversed only for color 
contrast, while repetition continued to increase subjective truth independently of the learning 
condition participants were in. Since the learning procedure was directed only to color 
contrast, this result evidences that the new fluency-falseness association was limited to the 
fluency instance with which it was learned. 
Reber and colleagues (2004; Wurtz et al., 2008) showed that different instances of 
perceptual fluency (e.g., figure-ground contrast and letter font) have different impacts in 
objective measures of the perceptual process (e.g., RTs in detection and discrimination tasks). 
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They also showed that those different objective impacts condensed in one and the same 
subjective feeling of processing ease. We extend these conclusions by showing that the 
impact of different fluency experiences can also be dissociated in subjective judgments, such 
as truth judgments, and not only in objective measures of cognitive processing. 
But even though different fluency manipulations may result in different (objective and 
subjective) effects, the fact is that certain evaluative contexts lead to confounds between 
them, suggesting that the experiences they elicit share important characteristics. For example, 
it seems that the processing experience promoted by diverse fluency sources is positive and 
hedonically marked (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). This, or other 
shared features of different fluency sources, can lead to one being taken by another when the 
context does not allow the comparison of their distinctive attributes. A reason that contributes 
for the confound is the diffuse nature of fluency (e.g., Mandler et al., 1987), which results in 
no clear borders between the experiences elicited by different manipulations, or between them 
and the judgments they affect. 
To conclude, by showing a dissociation of perceptual fluency and repetition effects on 
truth judgments, our results present the first direct evidence that the fluency elicited by the 
two different sources is not equivalent. Additionally, these results highlight the relevance of 
the contexts in which individuals make their judgments. When the evaluative context allows 
the simultaneous experience of the fluency generated by different factors, their influences on 
subjective judgments can be separated.  However, in this work we only contrasted repetition 
and color contrast as sources of fluency. It is high relevant that future research explores 
whether the dissociations found are a specific case of repetition, or if they would also emerge 
with other stimuli’s features that impact processing ease. Another question to be addressed is 
whether these dissociations are also found for other types of judgments, especially those 
addressing directly the subjective experience of ease. 
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Abstract 
Existing findings on the truth effect could be explained by recollection of the 
statements presented in the exposure phase. In order to examine a pure fluency account of this 
effect, we tested a unique prediction that could not be derived from recollection of a 
statement. In one experiment, participants judged the truth of a statement that had the same 
surface appearance as a statement presented earlier but contradicted it, for example 
“crocodiles sleep with their eyes open” one week after having heard “crocodiles sleep with 
their eyes closed”. We predicted and found that participants judged contradictory statements 
as being more false than new statements after a delay of only a few minutes, but judged them 
as more likely to be true after one week. In contrast to earlier findings, this result cannot be 
explained by accounts relying on recollection of the previously presented statements.  
 
144 w. 
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Hearing a statement now and believing the opposite later 
 
The truth effect is the phenomenon that people believe a statement due to repeated 
exposure. For example, hearing the statement “The first animated film was shot in France” 
makes people believe this statement when they hear it again a week later. This repetition-
induced illusion of truth effect is highly robust and frequently replicated (e.g., Bacon, 1979; 
Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; see the meta-analytic review by Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, 
& Wänke, 2010). However, does hearing the statement “The first animated film was shot in 
France” make people also believe a week later that “The first animated film was shot in 
England”? That is, does the repetition-induced truth spread to verbally similar, but 
semantically contradictory statements? 
 This question has important theoretical implications. The repetition-induced truth 
effect is often explained as a processing fluency effect; processing fluency influences truth 
judgments independent of repetition (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; McGlone & 
Tofighbakhsh, 2000) and it is therefore a prime candidate to explain illusions of truth based 
on repetition. Several experiments tried to separate recollection and fluency effects by 
“tagging” statements as true or false during presentation, for example, via honest and 
dishonest statement sources  (e.g. Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Brown & Nix, 1996; 
Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). For example, participants would see statements from 
an honest and a dishonest source. If participants consciously recollect that a statement came 
from a dishonest source, they should not call it “true”. If they nevertheless judge repeated 
statements from a dishonest source as true, their judgments cannot rely on conscious 
recollection; they apparently must have relied on something else.   For example, Begg and 
colleagues (1992) used such a setup to dissociate conscious recollection from unintentional 
memory processes and suggested that people rely on an automatic familiarity component in 
their judgments of truth. However, as these studies used identical statements at presentation 
and test, these findings could still be explained without invoking fluency as the underlying 
mechanism. In line with explanations for the sleeper effect (Hovland & Weiss, 1951), people 
may simply recollect a given statement, but lose the “tag” or mix-up the source, and judge the 
statement as true. 
Here, we present stronger support for the fluency account of the repetition-induced 
truth effect: the phenomenon that people believe statements that contradict previously heard 
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statements. Such finding strongly supports a fluency account because fluency and recollection 
predict opposite effects of repeated exposure on the believability of statements that contradict 
previously encountered ones. On the one side, recollection should decrease believability, 
because, as Gilbert (1991) proposed, people accept statements as true upon understanding 
them, akin to the process by which people accept the existence of physical objects upon 
seeing them. Thus, people who recollect having heard the statement should have accepted its 
previous version as true, and therefore should reject a new statement that contradicts the 
original one. In our example, people should believe the statement about England less, because 
they already accepted that the first animated film was shot in France. This recollection-based 
explanation is supported by findings that the repetition-induced illusion of truth is contingent 
on perceived repetition, with the subjective experience of having seen or heard a statement 
being more important than the actual repetition status of an item (e.g., Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 
1991; Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985). Further, Bacon (1979) showed that a statement that 
contradicts the one presented in the exposure phase has a lower truth-value than both new 
statements and the original statement itself. The effect occurs supposedly because people are 
able to recognize changes in the meaning of the original statement. 
 On the other side, processing fluency should increase the believability of statements 
that contradict previously encountered statements. For most authors, processing fluency is a 
meta-cognitive experience of ease associated with perceptual, conceptual, and other cognitive 
processes (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Unkelbach and 
Greifeneder summarized two ways in which the experience of processing fluency should 
influence truth judgments: people might have lay theories that fluent processing indicates 
truth (Schwarz, 2007), and/or people might learn that fluent processing and truth are 
positively correlated and interpret the experience as a truth experience (Unkelbach, 2006, 
2007). In the present case, typographic information and the re-exposure to the general topic of 
the repeated statement generate experiences of fluency (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach 
& Stahl, 2009), which are independent of whether or not people retrieve specific statement 
contents from memory. Indeed, judged truth of statements increases not only when they are 
repeated verbatim, but also when they pertain to related topics (Arkes et al., 1991; Begg et al., 
1985).  
Consequently, we expect people to believe more in the statement that the first 
animated film was shot in England than in new and semantically unrelated statements, if they 
cannot consciously recollect that it was shot in France. Yet, if people remember the statement, 
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we expect them to discard the contradictory version as they have accepted the original 
statement upon comprehending it (Gilbert, 1991). Without recollection of the original 
statements, the experience of processing fluency should create illusions of truth (see Begg, et 
al., 1992, for a similar dual-process view). 
This dual-process view is supported by earlier research (e.g., Brown & Nix, 1996; 
Skurnik et al., 2005) showing that statements labeled as “false” in the exposure phase were 
judged as true after a long delay. However, in these experiments, statements in the exposure 
and the judgment phase were identical. Because long delays increase the probability that a tag 
is lost or that a dishonest source is confused with an honest source, participants may have 
judged statements as being true because they recollected them but forgot the qualifying label 
or forgot the source. Therefore, the present experiment provides a stronger test of recollection 
and fluency accounts, as instead of presenting the same judgment at exposure and test, 
participants are given two statements that contradict each other. To achieve this effect, we 
changed either the predicate or one of the arguments of the original statement, so that if one of 
the statements is true, the other is necessarily false. With this manipulation recollection and 
fluency counteract each other when participants encounter contradicting statements.   
In sum, in this experiment participants judge the truth of either verbatim (exact 
repetitions) or contradictory statements, either after a short delay (few minutes) or after a long 
delay (one week). The comparison standard is a participants’ judgment about new statements 
that have not appeared before; that is, we compare old-verbatim and old-contradictory to new 
statements. Participants should be more likely to recollect the original statement after a short 
delay (Kintsch, Welsch, Schmalhofer, & Zimny, 1990), judging the contradictory statements 
as being more probably false than new statements. After a long delay, participants should be 
less likely to consciously recollect the specific meaning of the original statement, while gains 
in processing fluency due to repetition should remain stable over time. In sum, the relative 
effect of processing fluency, compared to recollection, increases over time (e.g., Arkes et al., 
1991; see meta-analysis by Dechêne et al., 2010). Consequently, participants should judge the 
contradictory statements as being more probably true than new statements. 
 
Method 
 Fifty-eight university students (47 women; age: M = 20.69, SD = 1.81) were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (old-verbatim vs. old-contradictory statements) x 2 (same-session vs. 1-week) 
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x 2 (old- vs. new-statements) design, with the last factor as a within-participants 
manipulation. Given the average effect size of d = 0.49 [95% CI: 0.45 – 0.55] reported by 
Dechêne and colleagues (2010), the present design has sufficient power to detect the predicted 
interaction (with α = .05, 1-β = .80, and correlation between repeated measures = .20; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
 We created two lists with 20 neutral statements each (following Bacon, 1979). The 
two lists of statements contradicted each other, but were otherwise identical (“crocodiles sleep 
with their eyes closed” vs “crocodiles sleep with their eyes open”; or the animated movie 
example mentioned earlier). A pre-test showed that both versions of all statements were rated 
as equally likely to be true. Twenty new statements served as baseline for all groups. The 
verbatim-old condition presented participants (n = 30) with the same statements in both the 
initial exposure and the truth rating phase; the opposite-old condition presented participants (n 
= 28) with statements that contradicted the old statements in the test phase, but were 
otherwise identical. Statement lists were counterbalanced across exposure and test phases. 
 Experimental sessions included 10-15 participants. In the exposure phase, participants 
listened to tape recorded statements, including four practice statements at the beginning (not 
included in the statistical analysis). Their task was to rate the interestingness of the statements 
and they were told that half of the statements were true and half were false. In the test phase, 
participants received a booklet with 40 statements. Depending on condition, statements were 
20 old-verbatim or 20 old-contradictory statements, mixed with 20 new-statements. 
Participants rated all statements for truth (1 = “certainly-false” to 7 = “certainly-true”). Half 
of the participants made their ratings in the same session, the other half one week later. Each 
participant only judges one version of a repeated statement (verbatim vs. contradictory) and 
delay was a between-participants variable. Thereby, the design allows separating the effects 
of recollection and fluency of the statement. 
 
Results 
 We computed participants’ mean rated truth score. Figure 1 depicts these means as a 
function of delay (same session vs. one week) and repetition status (old verbatim/old 
contradictory vs. new). Figure 1 shows that participants gave higher truth scores to old-
verbatim statements (M = 4.99, SD = .82) than new statements (M = 4.59, SD = .51) across 
both delay conditions, t(28) = 2.21, p = .035, d = .86, replicating the standard truth effect. For 
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contradictory statements, we expected and found that within the same session, participants 
gave lower truth scores to old-contradictory statements, t(26) = 5.19, p < .001, d = 2.04, than 
to new statements. Yet, after a delay of one week, participants gave old-contradictory 
statements higher truth scores than to new-statements, t(26) = 2.11, p = .044, d = .83. This 
differential pattern results in a significant three-way interaction in the respective ANOVA 
(F(1, 54) = 13.37; p < .001, η2partial = .20 ). 
In sum, we first replicate the standard truth effect across the delay conditions. Second, 
contradictory statements are believed less than new statements when judged within the same 
session. However, after one week, participants believe contradictory statements more than 
new statements. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean ratings of truth by delay condition (Same Session vs. 1 Week) and 
statement type (old verbatim vs. old contradictory vs. new). Error bars represent standard 
errors of the means. 
 
In addition to the predicted effect, the ANOVA showed a main effect of type of old 
items (F(1, 54) = 14.72; p < .001; η2partial = .21) and a two-way interaction involving 
repetition and type of old statement (F(1, 54)= 9.20; p =.004; η2partial = .15) that can be 
derived from the pattern of results reported above: a) participants in the verbatim statement 
conditions gave higher ratings than participants in the contradictory statement conditions;  b) 
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the interaction qualifies this main effect; repeated ”same vs. contradicting” differed whereas 
new items did not differ.  
 
Discussion 
The design of this experiment allows us to oppose the repetition-based influences of 
processing fluency and recollection memory on truth judgments. In the short delay condition, 
participants judge a contradictory statement as less probably true compared to new 
statements. After one week, however, participants were more likely, compared to new 
statements, to believe a statement that contradicted the original statement they heard before. 
The results obtained in the short delay condition follow from Gilbert’s (1991) notion that 
people believe statements upon comprehending them. In a similar vein, it could be argued that 
when participants made their judgments in the same session, contradictory statements are 
considered false by the same recall-to-reject mechanism that allows individuals to reject lures 
that are similar to original items in memory tests (e.g., Jones, 2005; Rotello & Heit, 1999, 
2000). This process involves recollecting the original item and comparing it to the similar 
lure. When participants are tested immediately after learning the stimuli they are likely to 
recollect the original statement, leading to rejections of the contradictory statements. When 
they are probed after a longer delay, recollection of the original statement is less likely, but 
repetition-induced fluency experiences remain intact to guide the truth judgment.  
In contrast to earlier studies that presented identical statements at training and test but 
tagged some statements at test as false or present statements from honest and dishonest 
sources (Brown & Nix, 1996; Skurnik et al., 2005; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009), we changed the 
meaning of test statements, making their truth value mutual exclusive with statements 
presented in the exposure session. Thus, the effect cannot be attributed to a weaker 
association of the statement with its tagged truth status or lost and/or confused sources. It has 
to be attributed to a property of the processing of repeated stimuli that is not sensible to their 
semantic features, and that seems to be the fluency with which the items are processed. This 
finding reveals that processing fluency influences truth judgments independently of semantic 
memory mechanisms; and thus experienced truth is much more malleable than previous 
research has shown.  
 
Conclusion 
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Does hearing the statement “The first animated film was shot in France” make people 
also believe a week later that “The first animated film was shot in England”? In light of our 
results, this seems to be the case. When memory fails, people have to rely on their experience 
of processing fluency to provide truth judgments. Our study shows that after a delay of one 
week, this lack of recollecting of the original statement results in the endorsement of claims 
that contradicted it.   
This effect requires a modification of a Bayesian analysis of the truth effect provided 
by Reber and Unkelbach (2010). According to this analysis, people may trust their feeling of 
fluency for judging the truth of a proposition under most ecologically valid circumstances. A 
modified analysis would have to consider the fact that fluency does not only stem from the 
same statement.  
The illusion of truth found in this study has important implications for teaching, 
marketing, health prevention, or politics. Imagine a teacher telling students that the first 
animated movie was shot in France. Some days later, the teacher notes that this was wrong. 
The first animated movie was made in England. Our findings suggest that simply stating the 
true statement increases its validity for those who heard the wrong statement, compared to 
those who never heard any statement about this topic. At least in some situations, it may be 
more effective to just tell the truth without mentioning what was wrong. Finally, the finding 
reveals the power of opposite statements as innuendos. For example, the statement “the 
supervisor harassed the employee” is straightforward and would be seen as an offense that 
damages the reputation of the supervisor. Our research shows, however, that the statement 
“The boss did not harass the employee” may in the long run be as dangerous to the superior’s 
reputation as the affirmative statement.  
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Abstract 
The similarity of a statement with a previously presented one enhances its ease of 
processing, promoting an illusion of truth. In two experiments, we address similarity with a 
statement’s core meaning (conceptual fluency) in opposition to similarity with its verbatim 
quote (perceptual fluency). After being exposed to a set of statements, participants rated the 
truth of exact repetitions (verbatim) or/and paraphrased versions. A long-delay condition was 
added to hamper explicit memory mechanisms. In Experiment 1 with a between-participant 
design, paraphrases were evaluated exactly as verbatim repetitions, with delay moderating the 
magnitude of the illusions of truth elicited by both types of statements. In Experiment 2, 
participants judged both verbatim and paraphrased repetitions with the same vs. contradictory 
meaning regarding the original statements, in a within-participants setting. In this context an 
illusion of truth for same-meaning items, and an illusion of falseness for contradictory items 
emerged. A long delay reduced the magnitude of both those effects, and disrupted the illusion 
of falseness more if contradictory statements were verbatim repetitions. We discuss the role of 
memory and fluency mechanisms on the illusion of truth effect, as well as the nature of the 
evaluative context (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) in which the truth evaluations are made. 
 
203 words 
Keywords: illusion of truth, repetition, perceptual fluency, conceptual fluency 
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The informative value of type of repetition in the illusion of truth effect 
 
Statements that are repeated are considered more probably true and more valid than 
new statements, the so-called “Illusion of truth effect”. Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino (1977) 
were the first to empirically demonstrate this effect, which has been repeatedly replicated in 
different settings and with different materials (see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010, 
for a meta-analysis). 
The majority of experiments that illustrate this effect have used “literal” (verbatim) 
repetition of the statements. That is, participants evaluate the truth of exactly the same items 
they were previously exposed to. However, to capture the processes that underlie evaluations 
of truth, some empirical approaches have made changes to the statements that are judged. 
Three changes are of particular relevance for that purpose: (1) changes to the wording of the 
statements while maintaining their core meaning (i.e., paraphrases), (2) changes to the 
meaning of the statements while maintaining most of their wording (i.e., contradictory 
statements), and (3) changes in both the wording and the specific meaning of the statements, 
but maintaining their general topic and subject (i.e., gist repetition). By comparing truth 
judgments of repeated statements with these kinds of changes, we are able to contrast the role 
of memory activation vs. perceptual fluency features have in illusions of truth. 
This paper first provides an overview on the memory and fluency accounts to explain 
the impact of repetition on perceived truth, and the experiments that introduced changes to the 
repeated statements to find support for one or the other account. In addition, we present two 
experiments that contrast those manipulations’ effects, showing the relevance of the type of 
repetition that is used for the emergence of illusions of truth, and thus bringing further 
understanding about the processes underlying truth judgments. 
 
Processes underlying repetition’s impact on truth judgments 
Several processes can sustain the evaluation of truth of repeated statements. People 
might use their knowledge to infer the validity of a statement – we know at least some 
proportion of what is true and what is not. And our knowledge can generate either correct or 
incorrect conclusions regarding the truth status of propositions we are not sure about, based 
on inferential processes (e.g., syllogistic reasoning, Klauer et al., 2000). 
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Simply remembering that we have heard or read a statement before influences how we 
judge its validity. One reason for why this may occur is that when we recognize the statement 
we also recall information about its epistemic value (whether it was presented as true or false; 
see Brown & Nix, 1996, for evidence of referential validity). It may also happen because just 
the fact that we remember the statement signals it must be true (see Arkes, Hacket, & Boehm, 
1989, and Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991, for evidence of convergent validity; and Bacon, 1979 
for the first demonstration). 
The effects of memory on subjective truth are expected to be conscious and strategic 
(Bacon, 1979). This becomes visible when the judged status of statements as old or new 
determines their truth evaluations, regardless of their actual repetition status. For example, 
Bacon (1979) showed that truth evaluations are enhanced only for statements that participants 
correctly recognized as old (hits). Begg and Armour (1991) showed that statements judged as 
old were evaluated as true whether they were repetitions that subjects correctly remembered 
or new statements that subjects mistook for repetitions. Furthermore, old statements that were 
forgotten were evaluated just as true as new statements correctly identified as such. In 
addition, Ozubko and Fugelsang (2010) demonstrated that information that is retrieved from 
memory (in the absence of explicit repetition) has an increased subjective truth-value. 
But repeated statements can affect truth ratings even when explicit memory plays no 
role. In this case, an individual will simply experience familiarity with a statement, which is 
anchored in its fluent processing (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Begg, Anas, and Farinacci 
(1992) offer evidence of this second route for judging truth, showing that memory and 
processing fluency have independent contributions in the enhancement of subjective truth. 
Repeated stimuli are easy to process, and fluency can support memory judgments (e.g., 
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) as well as evaluations of truth. Although fluency is intrinsic to 
the processing of repeated stimuli, its role on illusions of truth is better observed when 
isolated from it. For example, individuals evaluate statements as more probably true simply 
because they are presented in high as compared to low visual contrast (Reber & Schwarz, 
1999). Similarly, aphorisms are perceived as truer when presented in a rhyming (e.g., “Birds 
of a feather flock together”) rather than a non-rhyming form (e.g., “Birds of a feather flock 
conjointly”, McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000). Also, semantically primed words (i.e., words 
that are preceded by related concepts) are judged as better answers to trivia questions than 
words that are not primed (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). 
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The ubiquity of the repetition-based truth effect may come from the fact that repetition 
aggregates fluency experiences elicited by different sources/factors (Whittlesea, 1993). 
Repetition may even combine the several mechanisms proposed by the different theoretical 
approaches. The fluency involved in the processing of a repeated statement can come from 
the repetition of different types of its perceptual features – perceptual fluency, and/or the 
repetition of the different types of its conceptual characteristics – conceptual fluency. 
Previous exposure induces perceptual fluency due to the creation of a feature-based 
representation of the stimulus (visual, auditory, pictorial), which supposedly facilitates the 
encoding and processing of the statement when faced again (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Shapiro, 
1999). But through repetition individuals also learn about the structural properties of 
statements (e.g., grammars), which facilitate their subsequent processing (Reber, 1967). Thus, 
even if a statement is not the same but has a similar structure to a previous one, individuals 
may experience increased fluency (see Reber & Unkelbach, 2010, for a similar argument), 
which does not come from conceptual details. Conceptual fluency occurs because previous 
exposure creates a meaning-based representation that facilitates retrieval, encoding and 
processing in future encounters (Shapiro, 1999; Whittlesea, 1993). This type of fluency can 
come from the activation of the core meaning of the statement or of a more general 
knowledge structure (theme, topic category or schemata). The activation of these knowledge 
structures in memory facilitates subsequent processing (e.g., Bartlett, 1932). Knowing the 
convergence of effects that fluency exerts in a great diversity of judgments (see Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009), the power of repetition in consistently promoting illusions of truth is not 
surprising – repetition simply aggregates different sources of perceptual and conceptual 
fluency. 
Previous experiments have contrasted conceptual and perceptual fluency effects, 
showing that the two can bias judgments about stimulus repetition, and liking (see Whittlesea, 
1993). Whittlesea manipulated the fluency of a target word (e.g., boat) either by repeating it 
(referring it as “perceptual fluency”) or by simply placing it in a predictable context (e.g., “the 
stormy seas tossed the boat”; conceptual fluency). He showed that both fluency manipulations 
impacted the subsequent judgments of the word.  
However, using an experimental paradigm inspired in Whittlesea’s (1993), Shapiro 
(1999) provided evidence that these effects can be moderated by the similarity of the context 
– that is, although perceptual and conceptual fluency may exert similar effects in similar 
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contexts, only conceptual fluency influences individuals’ choices when the context of 
evaluation is modified. 
The evidence of the distinctive roles of the two types of fluency is corroborated by 
data showing that conceptual fluency increases through elaboration and is affected by 
attentional processes, which is not the case for perceptual fluency (Eich, 1984; Hamann, 
1990). Also, although perceptual changes have been found to influence implicit and explicit 
memory judgments, their impact seems not to be same in both memory measures and the 
literature suggests mixed results regarding the direction of the effects. While some evidence 
suggests that perceptual fluency increases “Know” responses but has little effect on 
“Remember” responses (e.g., Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; Rajaram, 1993), other data shows that 
physical overlap between studied and tested pictures boosts the experience of remembering 
but not the experience of knowing, while conceptual fluency affects both “Know” and 
“Remember” responses (Rajaram, 1996; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). 
 
Types of repetition 
Although illusions of truth have mostly been associated with verbatim repetition, this 
is not a necessary feature of the effect. The effect is expected to occur if a target statement is 
sufficiently similar (perceptually or conceptually) to a previously presented one, facilitating 
its processing. Thus, different kinds or levels of repetition are expected to promote illusions of 
truth. However, this assumption is only weakly supported, as there is “a lack of findings on 
similarity and judged truth so that this issue awaits further research.” (Reber & Unkelbach, 
2010, p. 566). 
Research has focused different types of repetition so to better understand the 
mechanism that underlies the truth effect. Thus, besides verbatim repetition, we also find data 
showing illusions of truth with “topic” (gist) repetition and part of the statement’s verbatim 
repetition. 
To activate the topic of statements that participants were going to evaluate for truth, 
Begg, Armour and Kerr (1985) exposed participants to parts of the target statements in a 
previous phase of the experiment (e.g., “A hen’s body temperature” was presented as part of 
the statement “The temperature of a hen’s body is about 104 degrees Fahrenheit”), leading to 
an increase in those items’ perceived validity. These results were replicated in a second 
experiment in which the statements’ topic was activated by posing a question that included 
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more ("Do you have any idea how long the extended right arm of the Statue of Liberty is?") 
or less (“Do you have any idea how long the Statue of Liberty has been in New York?") 
relevant details regarding a target statement that would be rated for truth (e.g., “The right arm 
of the Statue of Liberty is 42 feet long”). 
Arkes and colleagues (1991) wanted to test these effects in a context of simple topic 
repetition. They familiarized participants with statements either about China or other topics, 
and one week later presented either China-related text passages or unrelated ones. Another 
week later, participants had to evaluate for truth a group of statements pertaining to China, 
including those presented before. Results showed that reading the China text passages on 
week 2 led participants to consider the China-related statements more valid, independently of 
having been exposed to the statements previously. 
Hawkins, Hoch, and Meyers (2001) offer further evidence of the impact of non-
verbatim repetition on perceived truth. These authors tested how the perceived truth of a 
claim was influenced both by its exact repetition and by the repetition of associated claims 
(which shared some words with the original statement). They found little evidence of truth 
effects with the associated claims. However, both repetition conditions increased the 
perceived truth of a superordinate general claim to which all others were (conceptually) 
related. Mediation analyses suggested that the effect was mediated both by an increase in 
perceived familiarity and in perceived coherence of the claim (possibly related with the ease 
of processing its content). 
By manipulating these different types of repetition, these studies could yield 
information regarding the role that perceptual and conceptual fluency mechanisms exert in the 
truth effect. Unfortunately neither of the studies that repeated the gist of the statements 
isolated conceptual fluency from perceptual fluency. For example, in the Arkes et al. (1991) 
study, repetition of the topic made use of several words that had been heard in the first 
exposure to the statements. So individuals may have experienced some level of perceptual 
fluency just by processing those overlapping words (e.g., China). This possibility is even 
stronger in the experiments by Begg et al. (1985), in which a considerable part of the 
statements is literally repeated.  
However, Hawkins and collaborators’ (2001) study provides some insight, since their 
data suggests that the relevant feature of the gist manipulations was the conceptual 
component. They got a null result when they used as repetitions statements that shared only 
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some words with the original claim (e.g., the name of the product), but a significant impact of 
topic repetition in a general statement that was conceptually represented in all the original 
claims. Thus, simply repeating some words in the absence of an overlap with the meaning of 
the original statement may not provide a significant level of perceptual fluency to increase 
truth evaluations.  
 Other studies have used repetitions in which all the perceptual characteristics (words, 
phrase structure) of the original statements are kept, except for one small detail that produces 
a contradiction to its original meaning. Using this kind of stimuli, Bacon (1979) found that 
when contradictions are presented together with original statements participants rated them as 
falser than new statements, creating an illusion of falseness. The falseness effect has been 
replicated even in the absence of original statements, but it seems to occur only when 
evaluations occur in the same session as the exposure phase and not after longer 1-week 
delays (Garcia-Marques, Silva, Reber, & Unkelbach, 2014), suggesting explicit memory 
mechanisms to moderate how perceptual fluency informs judgments of truth. Findings by 
Begg and colleagues’ (1992) provide further support for the role of explicit memory 
mechanisms in the illusion of falseness. In an experiment the authors asked individuals to 
evaluate both original and contradictory statements, showing that when statements 
contradicted items that had been presented as false, they were evaluated with about the same 
truth-value as new statements. In contrast, if the original statements had been presented as 
being true, participants rated contradictory items as falser than new ones. 
 Thus, it seems that memory for the statements that were presented before may 
modulate the effect of perceptual fluency arising from the similarities between the original 
and contradictory statements (e.g., wording and sentence structure; Garcia-Marques et al., 
2014). This is also shown by Johar and Roggeveen’s (2007) experiments, which investigated 
the effectiveness of refutations of an original statement depending on whether they shared 
perceptive similarity with it or not. Their study showed that refutations that were direct 
contradictions of the original claim and therefore perceptually similar were less believed than 
indirect refutations (i.e., statements not seen before but that could be inferred from old 
statements). Mediation analysis suggested that more similar refutations were stronger recall 
cues for the original claims, and this recall decreased belief in the contradiction itself. Thus, in 
agreement with other studies, explicit memory for the original statement was shown to 
decrease contradictions’ truth-value. 
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The Present Experiments 
 One type of repetition that has not been clearly and fully explored is the repetition of 
the core meaning of a statement independent of its perceptual features. This kind of 
paraphrase reduces perceptual fluency mechanisms (visual and sound features), isolating 
conceptual fluency effects. Besides having the same theme of the original statements, 
paraphrases overlap in all their semantic features while differing in the perceptual features. 
Reading time measures show that these statements tend to be reprocessed as unchanged 
repetitions (Levy, Barnes & Martin, 1993), suggesting that although perceptual features may 
be sufficient causes for illusions of truth to emerge, they might not be necessary causes.  
The present experiments tested the impact of paraphrases of previously presented 
statements on truth judgments, to understand the role that conceptual and perceptual fluency 
play in illusions of truth. By doing so, these experiments extend prior research, introducing a 
manipulation that maintains the exact core meaning of the original statement (and not only its 
topic), and at the same time reduces the perceptual fluency usually associated with repetition. 
In addition to paraphrases, participants in Experiment 2 judged statements that contradict the 
core meaning but maintain the perceptual features of the items first presented. Such 
contradictory statements maintain both the topic/gist and the perceptual features of the 
original ones, while differing in their core meaning (which is the only overlap paraphrases 
have with original items). Furthermore, by making paraphrases of the contradictory 
statements, we isolate the fluency due to having the same topic from the fluency of both the 
core meaning and the perceptual features, which are changed. The comparison between the 
truth ratings promoted by these manipulations allows us understanding the relevance that each 
of these components has in the promotion of illusions of truth. 
In their meta-analysis, Dechêne and colleagues (2010) contrasted the results of the 
experiments that manipulated the repetition of topic and related issues with those that focused 
on the repetition of literal (verbatim) statements. Their analyses suggest that gist repetition 
produces small truth effects in heterogeneous contexts (which allow between-item 
comparisons) and null effects in homogeneous contexts (in which the comparisons are within-
item). The authors interpreted this difference as indicating that homogeneous contexts are 
more likely to activate explicit memory processes, and are thus less prone to the influence of 
low-level perceptual processes, which are typical of implicit memory (Roediger, 1990). This 
assumption is supported by the fact that homogeneous contexts are more sensible to 
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manipulations that disturb explicit memory mechanisms, such as the delay of measurement 
(Dechêne et al., 2010).    
Therefore, we introduced a delayed judgment condition in our experiments. 
Experiment 1 presents a homogeneous evaluation context in which participants rate only one 
type of repeated statements, and Experiment 2 a heterogeneous context in which participants 
evaluate all types of statements. With these manipulations we expect to understand how pure 
perceptual and conceptual fluency modulate perceptions of truth when isolated from explicit 
memory processes. 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 goal was to contrast paraphrases and verbatim repetition effects on 
perceived truth, either when judgments are made within a few minutes after exposure or after 
a long delay. We expected a truth effect associated with repeated statements to emerge in the 
two delay conditions. We also expected the contribution of explicit memory mechanisms to 
illusions of truth to be reduced when evaluation occurs after a long delay. If the truth ratings 
given to paraphrases are similar to those given to verbatim-repetitions, this suggests that 
processing fluency rising only from conceptual overlap can induce illusions of truth. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. A total of 105 undergraduate students (95 women; Mage = 
22.00, SD = 7.03) participated in the experiment for course credit. Participants were randomly 
distributed by the cells of two between-participants manipulations: statement repetition type 
(verbatim vs. paraphrase) x truth evaluation session (same-session vs. 1-week delay). All 
participants evaluated repeated and new items. 
Stimulus Development. We developed paraphrases of 52 statements that had been 
previously pre-tested as neutral (equal probability of being considered true or false),10 
ensuring that they: (a) had approximately the same length (number of words) as the original 
statements, (b) repeated as few words as possible from the original statements, (c) had a 
different phrase structure, and (d) shared exactly the same meaning of the original statements. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Garcia-Marques et al. (2014), for details about this pre-test. 
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For example, the paraphrase of the statement “Crocodiles sleep with the eyes open” is “When 
sleeping, crocodiles don’t close their eyelids”.11 
From the original-paraphrases pairs, we selected the 42 (21 factually true and 21 
factually false) that scored higher in a pre-test regarding meaning similarity (all the pairs that 
had Msimilarity ≥ 5 in a rating scale from 1 to 7; overall mean was Msimilarity = 6.21, SD = 1.37). 
From those, 10 true and 10 false pairs were randomly selected to compose the list of target 
(i.e., repeated) stimuli of the experiment. Twenty further statements (half true, and half 
paraphrases) were randomly selected from the remaining highly similar pairs to serve as the 
new statements in the truth evaluation task. This selection balanced the number of statements 
by their characteristics, that is, True/False status and Set A/Set B (one is the paraphrase of the 
other). New statements were the same for both sets. 
Procedure. Participants arrived in the lab and were seated on individual workstations. 
In the exposure phase, participants were asked to evaluate a set of 24 statements on their level 
of interest (1 - Not Interesting at all; 7 - Very Interesting). Statements were presented one at a 
time through headphones, with an interval of 3 seconds between each. The first four 
statements were used as practice trials. Half of the participants listened to Set A and the 
remaining to Set B. 
After the exposure phase, participants in the 1-week delay group were invited to 
participate in another, unrelated experiment. Participants in the same-session group were 
presented with an “unrelated” task, in which they had to evaluate how true they considered a 
new group of 40 statements, half true and half false, using a 7-point scale (1 - Certainly False; 
4 - Uncertain; 7 - Certainly True). Half of the statements were new and half were old. 
Depending on the experimental condition, participants evaluated either verbatim-repetitions 
or paraphrases of the original statements. 
The two tasks lasted between 15-20 minutes, and upon completion participants were 
thanked and debriefed. All participants were instructed to come back to the lab one week 
later, and whereas those in the 1-week delay group completed the truth evaluations at that 
time, the same-session group participated in a different study. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 All the statements were presented in Portuguese, and thus the overlap of words between the two versions of 
the statements is less than what the translation to English suggests (e.g., “A infeção com maior prevalência no 
mundo é a Malária” vs. “ A Malária é a doença infecciosa mais predominante no planeta”). 
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Results 
We expected participants to indicate higher truth-values to repeated items than to new 
ones, showing evidence of an illusion of truth effect. In addition, session of the truth 
evaluation (same-session vs. 1-week delay) was expected to moderate the effect, depending 
on how explicit memory drives truth judgments in the same session group. If, as expected, it 
contributes positively to illusions of truth, the effect should be less visible in the delayed 
condition. Finally, if paraphrases are dealt with as unchanged repetitions, we expected them to 
ring as true as verbatim repetitions.   
Mean ratings of truth (Table 1) were analyzed in a 2 (same-session vs. 1-week delay) 
x 2 (verbatim vs. paraphrased repetition) x 2 (Old vs. New items) ANOVA, with the last 
factor as repeated measures. The only significant effects that emerged from the analysis were 
the expected main effect of repetition, F(1, 101) = 105.54, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.51, evidencing a 
truth effect associated with old items (MOld = 5.01, SD = .82; MNew = 4.26, SD = .46), and its 
moderation by time of the evaluation session, F(1, 101) = 13.81 p < .001; ƞp2 = 0.12, showing 
the predicted decrease of the difference between the ratings given to repeated and new 
statements in the 1-week delay condition. No effects associated with type of repetition were 
found (all Fs < 1), suggesting verbatim and paraphrased repetitions to induce the same effects 
on truth judgments. 
 
Table 1 
Mean (SD) Ratings of Truth to Old and New Statements in Experiment 1, by Type of 
Repetition and Truth Evaluation Session 
 Same-Session 1-Week Delay 
 Verbatim Paraphrases Total Verbatim Paraphrases Total 
Old 5.14 (1.01) 5.37 (.90) 5.24 (.96) 4.92 (.67) 4.71 (.60) 4.82 (.64) 
New 4.10 (.43) 4.28 (.36) 4.18 (.41) 4.33 (.56) 4.29 (.42) 4.32 (.49) 
n 26 22 48 29 28 57 
 
Direct tests of our hypothesis were performed with planned comparisons testing the 
presence of the truth effect (repeated statements: 1; new statements: -1) in all experimental 
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conditions. For the verbatim-repetition condition, a truth effect emerged in both the same-
session, t(101) = 6.84, p < .001, d = 1.34, and the 1-week delay condition, t(101) = 4.08, p < 
.001, d = .96. The same pattern was found for paraphrases: same-session, t(101) = 6.59, p < 
.001, d = 1.59; 1-week delay, t(101) = 2.80, p < .006, d = .81.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that paraphrases are evaluated exactly as true as verbatim 
repetitions, both when evaluations are made immediately after exposure or after a 1-week 
delay. This suggests that processing fluency promoted exclusively at the conceptual level 
mimics processing fluency associated with verbatim-repetition. The perceptual overlap 
incorporated in verbatim repetition does not seem to add any additional effect. 
Yet although perceptual overlap is not a necessary condition for the truth effect to 
occur, we already know from previous research (see above) that it seems to be a sufficient 
cause. Thus, perceptual fluency may still support verbatim repetition effects, but our 
experimental context did not allow detecting it because it created a homogeneous context in 
which paraphrases were never contrasted with pure repetitions.   
To enable such comparisons, Experiment 2 collected data in a heterogeneous context, 
by adding to the verbatim vs. paraphrases conditions a factor manipulating whether repeated 
statements maintained or contradicted the core meaning of the statements originally 
presented, and asking participants to give truth ratings of all these types of statements. 
 
Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to further investigate the role that conceptual and 
perceptual fluency exert in truth evaluations of repeated statements, by allowing participants 
to contrast statements that share either perceptual (same words and sentence structure, but not 
the meaning) or conceptual features (same topic and core meaning, but not the wording or 
sentence structure) with the original ones. Thus, four types of statements were presented: (1) 
verbatim repetitions (original statements), (2) paraphrases, (3) contradictory statements, and 
(4) paraphrases of the contradictory statements (contradictory paraphrases). Participants 
evaluated all types of statements in a heterogeneous context (Dechêne, et al., 2010), either in 
a same-session or in a 1-week delay condition. The contrasts between all these types of items 
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allow us isolating the effects of the different sources of fluency, and consequently address 
their specific contributions to illusions of truth. Compared to original statements, paraphrases 
isolate the core meaning and topic of the original items from their perceptual features, which 
are altered. Contradictory statements isolate the fluency due to topic similarity and perceptual 
features from the fluency due to repetition of the core meaning of the original statement 
(because that core meaning is changed). Contradictory paraphrases isolate the fluency due to 
sharing the topic with original statements from both the fluency due to repeating its core 
meaning and perceptual details.  
By analyzing truth ratings that take recognition classifications of the statements into 
account (i.e., conditional analysis), we can test differences between statements thought to be 
repeated and those thought to be new relative to actual repetitions and new statements. 
Therefore, a recognition test was added to the experiment. Although we expect memory and 
truth judgments to share variability (as both judgments are influenced by the ease with which 
a statement is processed), we expect this not to completely overlap. Additionally, any effects 
associated with the different types of statements in the conditional analysis will inform about 
the role that conceptual and perceptual features play in the relation memory and truth 
judgments seem to have.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Forty-five undergraduate students (36 women; Mage = 
20.20, SD = 3.00) participated in the experiment for course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to one of the between-participants condition: truth evaluation session (same-session 
vs. 1-week delay). All participants evaluated five types of statements: original statements 
(verbatim-repetitions), paraphrases, contradictory statements, contradictory paraphrases, and 
new statements. 
Stimulus Development. From the 52 pairs of neutral statements and paraphrases pre-
tested in Experiment 1, we selected the 40 pairs (20 true and 20 false) that scored the highest 
on meaning similarity to use as target stimuli. For each statement and its paraphrase, we 
developed a contradictory version by changing a small detail in the statements (usually a word 
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or two) that alters and contradicts its original meaning.12 For example, for the statement 
“Crocodiles sleep with the eyes open”: the paraphrase is “When sleeping, crocodiles don’t 
close their eyelids”; the contradictory version is “Crocodiles sleep with the eyes closed”; and 
the contradictory paraphrase version is “When sleeping, crocodiles do close their eyelids”. As 
new statements, we used 20 other items (half true and half false), 12 of which were the 
original version of the remaining pairs of the similarity pre-test, and added eight more 
statements that had also been pre-tested regarding their neutral/ambiguous truth status. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same of Experiment 1, except that in the truth 
evaluation task participants rated all the four types of repeated statements (n = 10 of each 
type; statements in each of the repetition conditions were counterbalanced, so that each 
statement was evaluated equally often in all four versions), mixed with the 20 new ones 
(statements were randomly ordered for each participant). 
After providing truth ratings, participants were presented with exactly the same set of 
statements (again in random order) and were asked to indicate if each item had been presented 
in the first interest ratings task. Responses in this memory test were given in a dichotomic 
scale, by means of the “S” and “L” keys (Yes vs. No, respectively). 
The three tasks (interest ratings, truth evaluation, and memory test) lasted between 20 
and 30 minutes, depending on individual speed. When participants completed their 
recognition judgments they were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results 
We expected a replication of the truth effect, evidenced by higher truth evaluations to 
repeated items than to new ones. In line with Experiment 1, we expected delay of the 
evaluation to moderate the truth effect, reducing its magnitude. Although we expected no 
differences between original and paraphrased statements in the 1-week delay condition, the 
heterogeneous context may promote some differences when judgments are made in the same-
session, since participants may rely more on explicit memory in making their judgments. By 
opposing the core meaning of original items, contradictory statements were expected to 
promote an illusion of falseness (illusion, because there is no reason to consider the changed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Contradictory statements were also pre-tested as neutral regarding truth status, and this pre-test showed that 
both versions of all statements were rated as equally likely to be true. (see Garcia-Marques et al., 2014, for 
details). 
 
   
   
96 
statements to be the false ones), being evaluated as less true than new items. However, we 
expected this effect to be reduced in the delayed evaluation because of the perceptual 
similarity of contradictory statements to the original items (Garcia-Marques et al., 2014). 
Contradictory paraphrases were also expected to promote an illusion of falseness in the same-
session condition, as they also oppose the core meaning of original statements. But if 
perceptual fluency drives the reversion of the falseness effect in the delayed judgment 
condition, we did not expect the two types of contradictory items to promote the same effects 
in that condition. 
Truth Judgments. Truth evaluations (Table 2) were analyzed with an ANOVA13 
defined by 5 (type of statement) x 2 (truth evaluation session). No direct effect of the time 
factor was observed (F < 1). A main effect of type of statement suggests differences in the 
evaluation of the 5 types of items, F(4, 156) = 31.48, p < .001, ƞp2 = .45. As expected, the 
effect of type of statement was moderated by the time of the evaluation session, F(4, 156) = 
9.33, p < .001; ƞp2 = .19. 
As in Experiment 1, we tested our direct hypotheses with planned comparisons 
addressing the presence of truth effects (repeated statements: 1; new statements: -1) with each 
type of repeated statement in both evaluation session conditions.  
Replicating Experiment 1, we found clear evidence of a truth effect associated with 
original statements both in the same-session, t(39) = 6,26, p < .001, d = 1.97, and in the 
delayed-session condition, t(39) = 2,51, p < .016, d = 0,84. The same pattern was found for 
paraphrases: same-session condition, t(39) = 6,23, p < .001, d = 1.91, and delayed-session 
condition, t(39) = 2.88, p < .007; d = 1.10. As in Experiment 1, paraphrases were rated just as 
true as original statements (t < 1), suggesting that even when the context favors activation of 
other types of fluency, repetition of the statements’ core meaning is sufficient to promote the 
effect. 
Contradictory statements produced an illusion of falseness effect in the same-session 
condition, being considered less true than new items, t(39) = -2.01, p = .052; d = .36, and 
therefore also less true than original statements. However, this effect disappeared in the 1-
week delay condition, in which they were evaluated to be just as true as original items, t(39) = 
1.11, p = .275, and presented a marginal tendency to be evaluated as more probably true than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Four participants were excluded from our analysis given their extreme values in their response times. The 
main findings reported here did not change when these participants were included in the analysis. 
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new statements (a unilateral hypothesis, marginally significant, p = .07, in line with  Garcia-
Marques et al.’s, 2014 results in a homogeneous context). This suggests that in the absence of 
an overlap in conceptual features, perceptual fluency promoted effects similar to pure 
repetitions when explicit memory mechanisms were prevented from intervening (i.e., 1-week 
delay condition). 
Contradictory paraphrases were also perceived as less true than new statements in the 
same-session condition, t(39) = -2.75; p = .009; d = .58 (and thus also less true than original 
items), reinforcing the idea that changing the statements’ core meaning leads to an illusion of 
falseness. However, in the delayed session these statements were evaluated just as true as new 
ones (t < 1) and falser than original statements, t(39) = 2.72, p = .010, d = .82. The 
simultaneous change of meaning and of perceptual features hampered the process by which 
illusions of truth are elicited, and independently of statements sharing the theme with original 
ones. Thus, it seems that in a heterogeneous context, sharing the same topic or theme with 
original statements does not increase subjective truth. 
The comparison of contradictory statements and contradictory paraphrases in the 1-
week delay condition allows us to assess perceptual fluency effects in the absence of 
conceptual fluency: contradictory statements were considered more probably true than their 
paraphrases, t(39) = 2.00, p = .052, d = .45, and this can only be attributed to the fact that they 
share perceptual features with the original statements. The lack of differences between the 
two types of statements in the same-session condition (t < 1) suggests that the observed 
illusion of falseness was not caused by perceptual fluency. 
By comparing paraphrases with contradictory paraphrases in the 1-week delay 
condition we assess conceptual fluency effects in the absence of perceptual fluency. In this 
condition, paraphrases were rated more probably true than contradictory paraphrases (t(39) = 
3.14, p = .003, d = 1.02), emphasizing the relevance of conceptual fluency for the emergence 
of the truth effect in the absence of perceptual fluency. 
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Table 2 
Mean (SD) Ratings of Truth in Experiment 2, by Type of Item and Truth Evaluation Session 
 
Original Contradictory Paraphrases 
Contradictory  
Paraphrases 
New 
Same-Session, n = 20 5.17 (.69) 3.66 (1.02) 5.12 (.68) 3.61 (.62) 3.95 (.54) 
1-Week Delay, n = 21 4.58 (.67) 4.33 (.61) 4.64 (.52) 4.05 (.63) 4.10 (.46) 
Total, n = 41 4.87 (.74) 4.00 (.90) 4.88 (.64) 3.83 (.65) 4.03 (.50) 
 
Memory Judgments. Proportions of hits (saying yes to the original items) and false 
alarms (FA, saying yes to new, contradictory statements, paraphrases, and contradictory 
paraphrases) for old/new discrimination of statements are depicted in Table 3. While mean 
proportions of FA to the different types of repetition were in between M = .50 and M = .72 
(with 98% of participants making at least one FA to each type of item), FA related to new 
statements were M = .16 (and less da 70% of participants committed this kind of FA).  
To understand the independent influence of each type of statement similarity in level 
of discrimination, we computed signal detection theory d’ scores for each type of statement, 
using the proportions of hits and the proportions of the four different types of FA. These 
scores (Table 3) inform us about how much participants could distinguish between pure 
repetitions and all other set of “new” items. Discrimination scores were analyzed with a 
repeated measures ANOVA, with delay condition as a between-participants factor. 
A set of hypotheses can be deducted from our previous claims. First, the idea that 
paraphrases are perceived as unchanged repetitions suggests that paraphrases would be more 
falsely recognized than any other type of item. The d’ scores computed with FA to 
paraphrases is thus expected to be the lowest one and to be associated with a main effect of 
type of statement. Second, as delay of the judgments reduces recognition performance, we 
also expected it to lower all d’ values due to the increase in FA and the decrease in Hits (main 
effect of evaluation session). Third, as delay is expected to decrease explicit memory but not 
implicit memory mechanisms (which are based on processing fluency), we also expected that 
type of statement should qualify the effects of the evaluation session due to variation in 
fluency. 
Results of the ANOVA support all these predictions, showing the presence of 
significant main effects of type of statement, F(3, 117) = 76.16, p < .001, ƞp2 = .66, and 
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evaluation session, F(1, 39) = 15.13, p < .001, ƞp2 = .28, as well as a significant interaction 
between the two, F(3, 117) = 6.67, p < .001, ƞp2 = .15. In order to understand how these 
effects inform recognition memory, we performed the same specific planned comparisons as 
we did for the truth judgments. Thus, main contrasts compared the discrimination indices of 
each type of statement (1) with those of new statements (-1), in the two evaluation session 
conditions. 
In line with our hypotheses, discrimination of paraphrases was worse than 
discrimination of new items in both the same-session, t(39) = -11.01, p < .001, d = 3.06, and 
the delayed-session conditions, t(39) = -6.13, p < .001, d = 1.87. In fact, the relevance of 
conceptual fluency is such that the level of discrimination of paraphrased statements did not 
differ from a pure chance level (d’ = 0), either in the same (t < 1) or the delayed-session (t(20) 
= 1.61, p = .123). Once again, the repetition of statements’ meaning led participants to accept 
paraphrases as unchanged repetitions.  
Contradictory statements were also worse discriminated than new statements in the 
two evaluation session conditions (same-session, t(39) = -6.74, p < .001, d = 1.71, and 
delayed-session, t(39) = -4.91, p < .001, d = 1.40). The overlap of perceptual features thus 
seems to harm individuals’ ability to discriminate between original items and statements that 
contradict their meaning.  
Sharing the original statements’ topic also led to poorer discrimination than totally 
new statements. This is clearly shown in the contrast between the discrimination scores of 
contradictory paraphrases and new items, in both evaluation sessions (same-session, t(39) = -
7.86, p < .001, d = 1.80, and delayed-session, t(39) = -6.14, p < .001, d = 1.60). Thus, 
independently of sharing the core meaning and the perceptual features of original statements, 
sharing the same topic induces false memories.   
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Table 3.  
Mean (SD) Proportions Of Hits And False Alarms (FA), and SDT Discrimination Estimates 
(d’) in Experiment 2, by Type of Item and Truth Evaluation Session 
 Hits and False Alarms 
Discrimination ability (d’) 
 
Hits 
Original 
FA 
Contradictory 
FA 
Paraphrases 
FA 
Contradictory 
Paraphrases 
FA 
New 
Same-session 
n = 20 
.93 (.11) 
--- 
.56 (.25) 
d’ = 1.17 (.68) 
.89 (.13) 
d’ = .12 (.61) 
.59 (.22) 
d’ = 1.11 (.65) 
.16 (.26) 
d’ = 2.60 (.97) 
1-week delay 
n = 21 
.63 (.23) 
--- 
.45 (.22) 
d’ = .53 (.60) 
.57 (.22) 
d’ = .20 (.58) 
.49 (.19) 
d’ = .42 (.54) 
.16 (.15) 
d’ = 1.55 (.84) 
Total 
n = 41 
.78 (.23) 
--- 
.50 (.24) 
d’ = .84 (.71) 
.72 (.24) 
d’ = .26 (.59) 
.53 (.24) 
d’ = .76 (.69) 
.16 (.21) 
d’ = 2.06 (1.04) 
 
Conditional Analysis of Truth Ratings. The preceding analyses revealed differences 
in both the rated truth and the recognition of the different types of statements. To understand 
whether perceived familiarity supported the evaluations, we calculated the mean ratings of 
truth of only those items that were considered old in the recognition test, for each type of 
statement; new statements were excluded. This was necessary because although all types of 
items promoted FA, mean truth estimates of the perceived to be “old” items have a different 
reliability than those of the items perceived as “new”, for two main reasons. First, as results of 
the recognition test revealed (Table 3), not all participants committed FA with new statements 
and only a few set of new statements were falsely recognized (M = .16). This makes mean 
truth ratings of the new statements falsely recognized as “old” less reliable than the estimates 
of the other types of items. Second, exactly the opposite happens with the estimation of means 
of all the other statements when perceived to be “new”, as most participants (98%) evidenced 
false recognitions for at least 50% of items belonging to each type of repetition.  
Truth ratings of the perceived to be “old” items (Table 4) were analyzed with an 
ANOVA with the 4 types of repeated statements as a within-participants factor and evaluation 
session as a between-participants factor. Results revealed a main effect of type of statement, 
F(3, 114) = 7.21, p < .001, ƞp2 = .159, showing that contradictory paraphrases were 
considered as less probably true than all the other types of statements (MContradictory-paraphrases = 
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4.23, SD = 1.16 vs. MContradictory = 4.68, MOriginal = 4.97, SD = 0.93, MParaphrases = 5.17, SD = 
0.86; contrast,  t(38) = 3.34; p = .002; d = 1.08). Thus, statements that lack both conceptual 
and perceptual fluency were not perceived as true as any of the statements whose conceptual 
and/or perceptual features elicit processing fluency, even if they are falsely recognized. Time 
of the evaluation session did not affect truth ratings of the perceived to be Old items (F < 1), 
and it also did not interact significantly with the type of statement factor, F(3, 114) = 1.21, p = 
.310. 
 
Table 4.  
Mean (SD) Ratings of Truth of the Perceived to Be “Old” and Perceived to Be “New” 
Statements in Experiment 2, by Type of Item and Truth Evaluation Session 
Type of Statement 
 Perceived Original Contradictory Paraphrases ContradictoryParaphrases New14 
Same 
Session 
“Old”  
n = 20 
5.13  
(.93) 
4.60  
(1.04) 
5.26  
(.90) 
4.08  
(1.27) 
4.13 
 (.83) 
“New”  
n = 6 
3.38 
(1.20) 
2.16  
(.98) 
3.08  
(1.96) 
2.90  
(.78) 
3.93 
(.51) 
1-week 
delay 
“Old”  
n = 20 
4.81 
(.92) 
4.76  
(.83) 
4.95  
(.82) 
4.38  
(1.04) 
4.32  
(1.08) 
“New”  
n = 21 
4.05 
(1.16) 
3.78  
(1.32) 
4.22  
(.97) 
3.90  
(.84) 
4.08  
(.52) 
Total 
“Old”  
n = 40 
4.97  
(.93) 
4.68  
(.93) 
5.11  
(.86) 
4.23  
(1.16) 
4.23  
(.96) 
“New”  
n = 27 
3.90  
(1.18) 
3.42  
(1.41) 
3.97  
(1.30) 
3.68  
(.92) 
4.00  
(.51) 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated and extended the results of Experiment 1 in several ways. 
First, the effects observed in Experiment 1 were replicated in a heterogeneous context in 
which participants evaluated all different types of statements. This context rendered the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The values presented for new statements reflect the truth evaluations of a different number of participants than 
that of the other types of statements (as new statements were not included in the ANOVA). Thus, in the same-
session condition, new items perceived as “old”, n = 13; and perceived as new, n = 20. In the delayed condition, 
items perceived as “old”, n = 15; and perceived as new, n = 21. 
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differences between items clearer, being therefore more likely to prevent biases. Individuals 
reacted to paraphrases as if they were pure repetitions, showing that the simultaneous 
presentation of verbatim repetitions and paraphrases does not promote a differentiation 
between these two types of items in either truth or memory judgments, in both evaluation 
session conditions.   
Second, Experiment 2 replicates previous results (Garcia-Marques et al., 2014) 
obtained in a homogeneous context, by showing a falseness effect for statements sharing 
perceptual features but not the core meaning of the original statements (i.e., contradictory 
statements) in the same session, which disappeared in the delayed condition. The 
heterogeneous nature of the context seems however to reduce the magnitude of the impact of 
delay on the truth effect. Thus, although contradictory statements were perceived as true as 
verbatim repetitions in the delayed evaluation, the contrast with new items did not reach 
statistical significance. Nevertheless, these results make clear that perceptual fluency elicited 
by sharing the visual form of original statements is a sufficient condition to promote illusions 
of truth. In the heterogeneous context provided by this experiment, sharing the theme or topic 
of an original statement was not enough to induce a change in processing that influenced truth 
judgments (however, one should not interpret this as evidence that topic similarity never 
impacts perceived truth). 
The conditional analyses showed that memory and truth judgments share the influence 
of the statements’ characteristics to a great extent. Replicating previous results (e.g., Bacon, 
1979; Begg & Armour, 1991), statements that were perceived to be old were also perceived to 
be more probably true, independently of their actual old/new status. However, the different 
patterns of results obtained for the two measures suggest that not all features that produce 
false memories produce illusions of truth or vice versa. For example, statements that share 
only the topic of the previously presented ones (contradictory paraphrases) and statements 
that share also their perceptual features (contradictory statements) seem to affect truth ratings 
independently from having been judged as repeated or not. Presumably, the contradictory 
status of these items prevents their impact on memory judgments (reducing false memories), 
but not the influence that the remaining similarities with the original statements (i.e., 
perceptual features and topic) has on perceived truth. 
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General Discussion 
The goal of the two reported experiments was to understand how the repetition of 
different conceptual and perceptual features of statements influences their subjective truth-
value. Experiment 1 showed that paraphrases were evaluated exactly as true as verbatim 
repetitions of the original statements, both in immediate evaluations and after a 1-week delay. 
This result suggests that perceptual overlap is not necessary for the emergence of illusions of 
truth. However, perceptual fluency effects were found in Experiment 2, which replicated and 
extended Garcia-Marques and collaborators’ (2014) results. A falseness effect was found for 
statements that contradicted the core meaning of the original items when evaluations 
immediately followed the exposure phase. This was true independently of whether repetitions 
maintained the perceptual characteristics of the previous items (contradictory statements) or 
not (contradictory paraphrases). However, when truth evaluations were delayed, the fluency 
associated with repeating the perceptual features of original statements (wording and phrase 
structure) led to a reversal of the falseness effect, and contradictory statements were perceived 
to be as true as verbatim repetitions. In contrast, contradictory paraphrases lacked the 
perceptual overlap with original statements and thus continued to be perceived as less true 
than original items. 
These results yield further understanding of the effects of explicit memory 
mechanisms on perceived truth. Explicit memory mechanisms seem to support both illusions 
of truth for items that match what was seen before, and illusions of falseness for items that do 
not. While memory prevented the effects of perceptual fluency when truth evaluations were 
made in the same session as the first exposure to statements, such effects manifested 
themselves when the evaluations were delayed for one week. In fact, results of the delayed 
evaluation conditions indicate that processing fluency elicited by repeated items, either in 
their conceptual (paraphrases) or perceptual (contradictory statements) components, drives 
judgments of truth. These findings are akin to those of Johar and Roggeveen (2007). These 
authors investigated whether there was a difference in the effectiveness of refutations (i.e., 
contradictory statements) to an original claim based on the degree of perceptual similarity 
between them. They found that refutations with high similarity to the original claim were 
believed less than the less similar ones, because they contained stronger recall cues for the 
original statement, and this recall decreased belief in the contradiction itself. However, when 
the authors tried to interfere with the explicit memory mechanism, by raising perceptual 
similarity between the original claim and the refutations to a degree that participants no longer 
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recognized refutations as such, then highly similar contradictions were believed more. This is 
exactly what we observed in Experiment 2. In immediate truth evaluations, there were no 
differences in the truth-value attributed to contradictory statements and contradictory 
paraphrases, which were both believed less than original items. However, when explicit 
memory mechanisms were hindered by delaying the truth evaluation by one week, 
contradictory statements were considered more probably true than contradictory paraphrases 
and just as true as original statements. This happened supposedly because they share the 
original perceptual features to a great extent (while contradictory paraphrases do not) and thus 
participants no longer recognized them as contradictions. 
The context in which individuals make their truth evaluations has a considerable 
degree of influence on the effects that fluency can promote (Dechêne et al., 2010), and the 
present experiments are also informative about this subject. Conceptual fluency effects were 
found in both a homogenous (Experiment 1, in which participants evaluated only one type of 
repeated statements) and a heterogeneous (Experiment 2, in which participants evaluated all 
types of repeated statements) context. However, the falseness effect found in Experiment 2 
for contradictory statements in the same-session condition was not completely reversed into 
an illusion of truth in the delayed-session condition, as it was in the study by Garcia-Marques 
and collaborators (2014) in which presented items in a homogeneous evaluation context. This 
might have happened because homogeneous contexts are more sensible to manipulations that 
disturb explicit memory mechanisms, such as the delay of measurement (see Dechêne et al., 
2010), or because heterogeneous contexts allow more comparisons between the fluency 
experiences generated by the different types of repetition. 
Interestingly, contradictory paraphrases were considered less probably true than all 
other types of repetitions even if they were falsely recognized as statements presented before. 
Since items that are perceived as familiar are considered more valid than items perceived as 
new (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991), this result suggests that the objective 
dissimilarities regarding the core meaning and perceptual features of original statements 
reduced the influence of subjective familiarity on truth evaluations. Thus, the impact of 
subjective familiarity on judgments of truth seems to take into account the level at which that 
feeling is originated, with the fluency that comes from simple topic repetition not being able 
to increase the truth-value of a statement (at least in a heterogeneous evaluation context). This 
dissociation between recognition and truth judgments opens a door for a better understanding 
of the mechanism underlying the truth effect. In this sense, some relevant information may be 
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found in Rajaram’s (1996, 1998) distinctiveness–fluency hypothesis. This framework 
assumes that processing the salience and distinctiveness of conceptual and/or perceptual 
features of a stimulus gives rise to the experience of remembering, while leaving “know” 
responses unaffected. 
Our experiments show the flexible use of fluency as information for judgments of 
truth. Reber, Wurtz, and Zimmermann (2004) and Wurtz, Reber, and Zimmermann (2008) 
presented evidence that different manipulations of perceptual fluency have different objective 
impacts (measured by response times) at different stages of the perceptive process but they all 
seem to feed into one and the same subjective experience of ease. Our data shows that if 
conceptual fluency is not present and explicit memory mechanisms are reduced, perceptual 
fluency can take over as the relevant source of information for our judgments, producing 
convergent effects in subjective judgments of truth. 
There is no doubt that judgments of truth are determined by a multitude of processes, 
and that both memory and fluency mechanisms contribute to it. The present work supports 
this argument by showing how these diverse mechanisms play their role in different 
evaluative moments and contexts. All in all, as Oscar Wilde wrote, “The truth is never pure 
and rarely simple”, and we will always find the necessary information to decide whether it is 
true that “Crocodiles sleep with their eyes open”. 
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Section III 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
“I have a theory that the theory is never told during the nine-to-five hours”  
Hunter S. Thompson (1937-2005) 
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General Discussion 
 
The three papers that were presented in the empirical section addressed the 
specificities of the repetition-truth link, exploring the role that the experience of conceptual 
vs. perceptual fluency may have in that relation. 
The experiments reported in the first empirical article contrasted perceptual fluency 
and repetition effects on judgments of truth. Our goal was to understand whether there are 
specificities in the processing experiences they promote that can be disentangled by our 
cognitive system and be translated in a dissociation of effects on a subjective judgment. 
Making use of the feedback-learning procedure that Unkelbach (2006, 2007) introduced in his 
studies, Experiment 1 showed that although the interpretation of fluency due to repetition is 
susceptible to a reversal, it is not as easy to train it as when fluency spurs from color contrast. 
Experiment 2 showed that even though there are occasions when the experience elicited by 
one source of fluency can be confounded with another one and be interpreted in the same way 
(Unkelbach, 2006, 2007), that confound does not happen in a context where there is the 
possibility to contrast the distinctive features between them. When repetition and color 
contrast were manipulated orthogonally and had opposing signs regarding the association 
with truth, they were differentiated and their effects on perceptions of truth were dissociated. 
These experiments suggest that there are differences in the relation that fluency due to 
repetition and fluency due to perceptual features have with inferences of truth. Also, they 
suggest that the fluency elicited by the two different manipulations is not equivalent. 
The main purpose of the second paper was to contrast the role of processing fluency 
and explicit memory in supporting truth judgments. As the results of that experiment showed, 
within a short interval between the exposure and truth ratings phase participants judged a 
statement as less probably true than new statements when it contradicted the original 
statement, an illusion of falseness. After one week, however, participants were more likely to 
believe a statement that contradicted the one they heard before than new statements. This 
happened supposedly because recollection of the original statement failed, and the fluency 
elicited by the match in perceptual features influenced truth judgments. These results suggest 
that the processing fluency elicited by the match of perceptual features influences truth 
judgments when the mismatch regarding conceptual features is not identified because 
recollection of the statements is impaired. 
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These results were replicated and extended in the third paper, in two experiments 
aiming to understand how repetition of conceptual and perceptual features influences 
subjective truth. Experiment 1 showed that paraphrased versions of previously heard 
statements were evaluated just as true as their verbatim (literal) repetitions, both in immediate 
evaluations and after a one-week delay. As paraphrases share the conceptual features of 
original statements (i.e., their meaning) but not their perceptual features, this result suggests 
that fluency resulting from perceptual overlap is not a necessary condition for illusions of 
truth to occur when there is already a match with the conceptual characteristics (semantic 
content) of original statements. Replicating the results of the second paper, in Experiment 2 
perceptual fluency was sufficient to promote illusions of truth, but only when the conceptual 
details about the original statements were lost. When truth evaluations immediately followed 
the exposure phase and thus the specific content of original statements was still available in 
memory, an illusion of falseness emerged for contradictory statements. This illusion of 
falseness occurred both for contradictory statements that maintained the perceptual 
characteristics of the previous items and for those that did not (i.e., contradictory 
paraphrases), suggesting again the relevance of conceptual fluency. Yet, when truth 
evaluations were delayed, the fluency associated with the re-exposure to the perceptual 
features of original statements led to a reversal of the falseness effect, and contradictory 
statements were perceived to be as true as verbatim repetitions. In contrast, contradictory 
statements lacking the perceptual overlap continued to be perceived as less true than original 
items as there was neither a match in conceptual or perceptual features. These experiments 
suggest that the fluency promoted by conceptual overlap takes precedence over the fluency 
that may be elicited by at a pure perceptual level – perceptual fluency-based illusions of truth 
emerged only when individuals cannot access the semantic content of the statements they 
were exposed to.  
 
Taken together, the three papers suggest that the relation between repetition and 
inferences of truth may be substantially different than that of sources of fluency based merely 
on the perceptual features of the stimuli. By nature, repetition encompasses not only the 
reactivation of perceptual information, but also of semantic information concerning the 
content and meaning of the stimuli. This characteristic makes repetition a unique case among 
the many fluency sources, as it aggregates two different types of fluency experience – 
perceptual and conceptual fluency. Additionally, our experiments suggest conceptual fluency 
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to be a relevant, if not the most relevant, part of the mechanism underlying illusions of truth, 
with effects that do not seem to gain much from increases in perceptual fluency. But it is also 
clear that our judgments can be biased by perceptual fluency alone. 
We will address some theoretical proposals that may help to understand why 
conceptual fluency is such a relevant factor for the truth effect. We will discuss the relevance 
of the congruency between the type of fluency that is experienced and the type of judgment 
that is asked, and clarify the conditions under which reversal effects have been found and how 
they are related with the presence vs. absence of a conceptual component in the fluency 
experience. Subsequently, we will focus the illusion of falseness effect that was found in our 
studies (replicating Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991), discussing how it relates with the 
access to conceptual content of the original statements, and also “re-open” the discussion 
regarding the role that memory attributions have in the truth effect.  
 
The Relevance of Conceptual Fluency 
 Congruency between fluency manipulation and type of judgment. Whittlesea 
(1993) showed that conceptual judgments pertaining to semantic relatedness of words (or 
“familiarity of meanings” as the author called them) are susceptible to the influence of 
conceptual fluency manipulations, while perceptual fluency does not seem to affect them 
strongly unless it is (mis)interpreted as resulting from conceptually driven processing. 
According to the author, the use of processing fluency as a heuristic for familiarity judgments 
“requires that the fluency of performance feel as though it is due to a source that normatively 
would be appropriate for the decision to be made” (Whittlesea, 1993, p. 1244).  
Truth judgments are conceptual in nature, as the assessment of whether a proposition 
is valid or not implicates an evaluation of its semantic content, of its meaning. Therefore, 
according to Whittlesea’s (1993) proposal, truth judgments should be more affected by 
fluency resulting from conceptually, rather than perceptually driven processing. One set of 
experiments by Parks and Toth (2006) suggests this to be the case. In two different 
experiments, the authors presented participants with product claims varying in fluency levels. 
In the first experiment, perceptual fluency was induced via the manipulation of statements’ 
graphic style, making them easy vs. difficult to read. In this setting, barely any effects of 
perceptual fluency on rated truth were found. However, when a conceptual fluency 
manipulation was used, which consisted of placing a statement in the end of a paragraph that 
was either semantically related vs. not related to it, fluency significantly impacted truth 
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ratings (with an effect size of d = .52). Interpreting these findings with Whittlesea’s (1993) 
theoretical proposal, it seems likely that conceptual fluency is felt as the appropriate 
experience to base truth judgments, contrary to what happens with perceptually induce 
fluency. 
The experiments of the second and third empirical articles of this dissertation further 
clarify the relevance of the experience of conceptual fluency associated with repetition. 
Maintaining the conceptual meaning of the statements between exposure and truth evaluations 
was more determining for illusions of truth than was the existence of a match in perceptual 
characteristics. Perceptual fluency was relevant for the evaluation of truth-value only when 
conceptual fluency was significantly diminished by a longer interval that hindered memory 
for the meaning of original statements. The relevance of the congruence between the type of 
judgment and fluency experience (conceptual or perceptual) is also visible in the results of the 
first empirical article. As reported in Experiment 1, participants demonstrated higher 
difficulty in associating repetition with falseness than was the case with high color contrast. 
One of the reasons why this happened may be the conceptual fluency component involved in 
repetition. This characteristic may add “extra strength” to the relation repetition has with 
truth, making its reversal more difficult. 
 One way in which this hypothesis can gain stronger support is by creating an 
experimental setting akin to the one Whittlesea (1993, Experiment 4) implemented to 
examine whether perceptual fluency would influence judgments of semantic relatedness if it 
were interpreted as resulting from conceptual factors. The same can be done in the context of 
truth judgments, by objectively manipulating the perceptual fluency of statements (e.g., color 
contrast, letter font, exposure duration) and leading participants to believe that the resulting 
processing experience is caused by conceptual aspects of the stimuli or the context in which 
they are presented (e.g., presenting a statements after a text passage that supposedly is related 
vs. unrelated to it). 
 
Repetition and reversal effects. The theoretical approach that conceptualizes fluency 
as an ecologically valid cue for truth (e.g., Reber & Unkelbach, 2010; Unkelbach, 2007; 
Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013) does not presume differences regarding the effects of 
perceptual and conceptual fluency. Congruently, it also does not assume truth judgments to be 
anchored in conceptual fluency (being it objectively manipulated, or individuals believing the 
fluency they are experiencing results from the conceptual processing; Whittlesea, 1993). 
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However, our first paper shows that the attempt to reverse repetition’s use as a cue for truth is 
prone to more errors than it is the case with color contrast. One hypothesis for this fact may 
be that the conceptual fluency component in repetition brings an “extra layer” to its 
association with truth, making it harder to reverse. This possibility finds some support in the 
other two studies we presented, by showing that conceptual overlap with original statements 
is more relevant for illusions of truth than is fluency based on perceptual similarities. 
Yet, Unkelbach (2007) did find a reversal of the truth effect associated with repetition. 
In light of the theories that we have been discussing here, one possible explanation for the 
reversal effect is that it was actually based on the fluency elicited merely by the perceptual 
match/mismatch with original statements. Two findings in that experiment may support this 
alternative explanation. First, participants’ memory regarding what statements had been 
presented before was at chance level, and second, there was also no evidence of truth 
judgments being affected by the recognition status of the statements (i.e., whether they were 
perceived as “old” or “new”), as revealed by conditional analysis. Assuming that 
comprehending a statement implies that individuals accept it as true (Gilbert, 1991), these 
results suggests that participants in that experiment probably could not remember the content 
of the repeated statements, and thus their judgments were guided by perceptual fluency. In 
this sense, it is conceivable that participants simply generalized the reversal they had learned 
from one perceptual fluency source (color contrast) to another (wording and syntax of the 
statements). 
In Experiment 2 of our first paper a dissociation of the effects promoted by pure 
perceptual fluency and by repetition was found. The orthogonal manipulation of these two 
sources of fluency resulted in the reversal of the truth effect to be associated only with color 
contrast (the source of fluency with which it was trained), while repetition was always 
associated with the typical illusions of truth. We interpret these findings as the result of a 
direct contrast of the distinctive features between the two fluency manipulations, which 
allowed the elimination of the confound that had been found previously (Unkelbach, 2007). If 
the experience of conceptual fluency associated with repetition is the relevant attribute driving 
illusions of truth, future research should replicate this experiment with other conceptual 
fluency manipulations. Specifically, it should be addressed whether conceptual fluency has to 
be related with the reactivation of the specific meaning of the statement (vs. conceptual 
fluency not anchored on previous exposure or memory) in order to promote the dissociation 
of effects that was found in our experiments. 
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Illusions of Falseness 
In our papers we replicated an effect already detected by Bacon (1979), which shows 
that statements contradicting what has been seen or heard before are judged as more probably 
false than original items, and also than totally new statements. Illusions of falseness are also 
conceptual fluency effects, as they result of the assessment of the truth-value of repeated 
statements – when we believe (vs. not believe) a proposition, we accept (vs. discard) its 
semantics and meaning, not its words and syntax. This is very evident also in the results we 
obtained with the paraphrased versions of the original statements. Because this type of 
statements maintain the conceptual meaning and content of the original items, they are always 
judged as true as the original statements.  
Why do individuals judge contradicting claims as less valid than statements they never 
saw before, instead of simply evaluating them equal to new statements? In this sense, our data 
needs to be read also in light of Gilbert’s (1991; Gilbert et al., 1990) theory of “how mental 
systems believe”. In accord with Spynoza’s proposal, Gilbert and colleagues (1990) found 
that individuals seem to accept a proposition as valid merely by comprehending it, this being 
a rather automatic operation. Categorizing a fact as false entails an extra step, which 
consumes time and (cognitive) energy. Thus, our general results can be explained as a 
consequence of a “if you understand it, you believe it” kind of mechanism. As reported, in 
short delay conditions participants judged a statement as less probably true when it 
contradicts the original statement, because they have accepted it as “true” upon 
comprehending it, and still remember clearly what it was that they accepted as a true 
proposition. However, after one week participants were more likely to believe contradictory 
statements than new ones, probably because they could no longer remember original 
statements’ exact meaning, and thus perceptual fluency took over. Some results of our first 
paper also reflect this mechanism, as for example the errors that emerged for participants 
learning the reversal of the “repeated = true” association. It is possible that when individuals 
were exposed to a set of facts they automatically accepted them as true, and this made it more 
difficult to categorize (all of) repeated statements as false in a subsequent moment. 
Thus, the falseness effect seems to suggest as well the relevance that the conceptual 
features of a repeated statement have in the direction that truth judgments may take. 
Repetition of the conceptual features of the statements takes precedence over repetition of 
perceptual features. When the conceptual attributes are no longer accessible, perceptual 
fluency effects arise.  
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Do Attributions to Familiarity Mediate Fluency Effects on Subjective Truth? 
In the literature review, it became clear that there is a strong positive relation between 
feelings of familiarity (a belief that the information was previously encountered) and illusions 
of truth created by repetition (e.g., Arkes et al., 1989, 1991; Bacon, 1979; Boehm, 1994). This 
relation is evident in the studies showing that statements recognized as repetitions are 
evaluated as truer than statements perceived to be new, independently of their actual 
repetition status. This evidence suggests that there is an “attribution of truth to statements that 
feel familiar” (Begg, et al., 1992; p. 457), and those feelings of familiarity may rise both from 
the activation of “real” and of “false” memories. But what happens with other sources of 
fluency? Do feelings of familiarity also play a role when the source of the fluency experience 
is not related to memory? 
Although some of the authors that have found evidence of illusions of truth associated 
with pure perceptual fluency manipulations (e.g., color contrast of the statements with the 
background) suggested feelings of familiarity could mediate the effects (e.g., Hansen et al., 
2008; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), this hypothesis was not thoroughly investigated. But some 
clues for answering this question can be extracted from the results of Parks and Toth’s (2006) 
study. While not testing directly the causal relationships between familiarity and truth 
evaluations, the authors found substantial correlations between participants’ ratings of 
familiarity with the general idea conveyed by statements and how true they considered them. 
The more familiar a claim was considered, the higher its perceived validity. Importantly, these 
correlations were found in experimental settings in which there was no statement repetition. 
In fact, in one of the experiments the correlation between familiarity and truth emerged when 
pure perceptual fluency was used (easy vs. difficult-to-read graphic style). According to Parks 
and Toth (2006), such a result was “evidence that feelings of familiarity drive judgments of 
truth even in the absence of episodic memory manipulation” (p. 239). 
The studies presented in the Empirical Section did also not address this issue directly. 
However, they may provide some useful insights and directions for future research. 
Considering specifically our third paper, in Experiment 2 we found that when individuals 
made truth ratings immediately after the exposure phase, contradictory statements were less 
true than original items, and congruently they were also the statements that were better 
discriminated from the original ones in the recognition test. We argue this to be a reflex of 
contradictory statements not matching in conceptual content with original statements. When 
looking at the data from participants making truth ratings only one week after exposure, the 
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story changes a little. In this condition, contradictory statements are now evaluated just as true 
as original ones and their discrimination from original items drops markedly in comparison to 
the immediate evaluation condition. But, this drop in the discrimination index seems to rise 
not from the fact that contradictory statements are considered “old” more often, but from a 
higher failure in the recognition of original statements (see Tables 2 and 3 of the third paper). 
In fact, in the delayed condition all attributions to memory are simply lower, what may be due 
to a decrease in the confidence participants have in their memory judgments. Given our 
interpretation that the illusion of truth found for contradictory statements is driven by 
perceptual fluency (as they match the wording and structure of original items), these results 
may suggest that the reported perceptual fluency effects on truth may not have gone through 
an attribution to familiarity. However, the analysis of the truth ratings conditional to the 
recognition status of the items suggests the opposite regarding the relation between memory 
and truth judgments. These data show that all types of statements have higher ratings of truth 
when they are perceived as “old” than when they are perceived as “new”, also when 
judgments were delayed, which is when perceptual fluency increased perceived validity of the 
statements (see Table 4). This suggests that also in our experiment the relation between 
memory and truth evaluations is a positive one, even in the condition where perceptual 
fluency is driving the illusions of truth. 
Thus, although some theoretical approaches assume that fluency effects on rated truth 
are direct and memory attributions are not necessary for the truth effect (e.g., Unkelabch, 
2007; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009), many studies show a positive relation between subjective 
familiarity and truth – statements perceived as familiar are considered truer than statements 
perceived to be new (e.g., Arkes et al., 1989; Bacon, 1979; Begg & Armour, 1991; Parks & 
Toth, 2006). And given Parks and Toth’s (2006) results (and our own), this may well be the 
case even when the fluency experience is merely perceptual and not related with previous 
exposure. 
 
Conclusion 
Although many questions remain open and in need for future research, we believe that 
the studies presented in this thesis contribute to a better understanding of the mechanism 
underlying the truth effect. They give clear indications of repetition “special” status regarding 
its influence on the perceived truth-value of the information we (re)encounter. These studies 
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also present clear evidence of the relevant role that conceptual fluency seems to have in 
judgments of truth in comparison to pure perceptual fluency manipulations. 
 
 
   
   
120 
 
   
   
121 
References 
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of fluency to form a 
metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13, 219-235. 
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007). Overcoming intuition: 
Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136, 569-576. 
Arkes, H., Boehm, L., & Xu, G. (1991). Determinants of judged validity. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 576–605. 
Arkes, H., Hacket, C., & Boehm, L. (1989). The generality of the relation between familiarity 
and judged validity. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2, 81-94. 
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of 
judgments. In Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, leadership, and men (pp. 222-236). 
New York, NY: Russell and Russell. 
Atkinson, R. C., & Juola, J. F. (1973). Factors influencing speed and accuracy of word 
recognition. Attention and Performance, 4, 583-612. 
Bacon, F. (1979). Credibility of repeated statements: Memory for trivia. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 5, 241-252. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The Four Horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, efficiency, intention, 
and control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of 
social cognition (2nd ed., pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 
   
   
122 
Begg, I., Anas, A., & Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in belief: Source 
recollection, statement familiarity, and the illusion of truth. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 121, 446-458. 
Begg, I., & Armour, V. (1991). Repetition and the ring of truth: Biasing comments. Canadian 
Journal of Behavioural Science, 23, 195-213. 
Begg, I., Armour, V., & Kerr, T. (1985). On believing what we remember. Canadian Journal 
of Behavioral Science, 17, 199-214. 
Begg, I., Duft, S., Lalonde, P., Melnick, R., & Sanvito, J. (1989). Memory predictions are 
based on ease of processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 610-632. 
Begg, I., & Wickelgren, W. A. (1974). Retention functions for syntactic and lexical vs 
semantic information in sentence recognition memory. Memory & Cognition, 2, 353-
359. 
Boehm, L. E. (1994). The validity effect: A search for mediating variables. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 285-293. 
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968–
1987. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 265-289. 
Bornstein, R. F., & D'Agostino, P. R. (1992). Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure 
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 545-552. 
Brown, A. S., & Nix, L. A. (1996). Turning lies into truths: Referential validation of 
falsehoods. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
22, 1088-1100. 
 
   
   
123 
Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: 
effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude 
judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 460-473. 
Chiesi, H. L., Spilich, G. J., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Acquisition of domain-related information 
in relation to high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 18, 257-273. 
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2009). Mix me a list: Context moderates 
the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 1117-1122. 
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010). The truth about the truth: A meta-
analytic review of the truth effect. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 238-
257. 
Ebbinghaus, H. (1913). Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology. New York, NY: 
Teachers College, Columbia University. (Original work published 1885) 
Evans J. S. B. (2003). In two minds: dual process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 7, 454–459. 
Evans, J. S. B. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-140. 
Feustel, T. C., Shiffrin, R. M., & Salasoo, A. (1983). Episodic and lexical contributions to the 
repetition effect in word identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
112, 309-346. 
Garcia-Marques, T. (1999). The mind needs the heart. The mood-as-regulation-mechanism 
hypothesis (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa. 
 
   
   
124 
Garcia-Marques, T., & Mackie, D. M. (2001). The feeling of familiarity as a regulator of 
persuasive processing. Social Cognition, 19, 9-34. 
Garcia-Marques, T., Mackie, D. M., Claypool, H. M., & Garcia-Marques, L. (2010). Is it 
familiar or positive? Mutual facilitation of response latencies. Social Cognition, 28, 
205-218. 
Garcia-Marques, T., & Silva, R. R. (May, 2014). Individuals’ processing conditions (capacity 
and motivation) moderate the illusion of truth effect. Poster presented at the 26th 
Convention of the Association for Psychological Science, San Francisco, CA. 
Garcia-Marques, T., Silva, R. R., Reber R., & Unkelbach, C. (2014). Hearing a statement 
now and believing the opposite later. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1984). External validity of laboratory experiments: The frequency-validity 
relationship. The American journal of psychology, 97,185-195. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107-119.  
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some 
problems in the rejection of false information. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 59, 601-613. 
Glucksberg, S., & McCloskey, M. (1981). Decisions about ignorance: Knowing that you 
don't know. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 
311-325. 
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint: Using 
social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 35, 472-482. 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.). Syntax and 
semantics: Vol. 3. Speech acts (pp. 41–58). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
 
   
   
125 
Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., & Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain: neural models 
of stimulus-specific effects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 14-23. 
Hansen, J., Dechêne, A., & Wänke, M. (2008). Discrepant fluency increases subjective 
truth. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 687-691. 
Harmon-Jones, E., & Allen, J. J. (2001). The role of affect in the mere exposure effect: 
Evidence from psychophysiological and individual differences approaches. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 889-898. 
Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977). Frequency and the conference of referential 
validity. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16, 107-112. 
Hawkins, S. A., & Hoch, S. J. (1992). Low-involvement learning: Memory without 
evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 212-225. 
Hawkins, S. A., Hoch, S. J., & Meyers-Levy, J. (2001). Low-involvement learning: Repetition 
and coherence in familiarity and belief. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 11, 1-11. 
Henkel, L.A., & Mattson, M. E. (2011).  Reading is believing: The truth effect and source 
credibility. Consciousnsess and Cognition, 11, 1705-1721. 
Hintzman, D. L. (1969). Apparent frequency as a function of frequency and the spacing of 
repetitions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 80, 139-145. 
Hovland, C. I., & Weiss, W. (1951). The influence of source credibility on communication 
effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 15, 635-650. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541. 
Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the relationship between autobiographical memory 
and perceptual learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 110, 306-340. 
 
   
   
126 
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In H. L. Roediger, & 
F.I.M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in honour of 
Endel Tulving (pp. 391-422). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Jacoby, L. L., Toth, J. P., & Yonelinas, A. P. (1993). Separating conscious and unconscious 
influences of memory: Measuring recollection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 122, 139-154 
Jacoby, L. L., & Whitehouse, K. (1989). An illusion of memory: False recognition influenced 
by unconscious perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 126-
135. 
Kelley, C. M., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Remembering mistaken for knowing: Ease of 
retrieval as a basis for confidence in answers to general knowledge questions. Journal 
of Memory and Language, 32, 1-24. 
Kintsch, W., Welsch, D., Schmalhofer, F., & Zimny, S. (1990). Sentence memory: A 
theoretical analysis. Journal of Memory and language, 29, 133-159. 
Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Naumer, B. (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. 
Psychological Review, 107, 852-884. 
Kolers, P. A., & Ostry, D. J. (1974). Time course of loss of information regarding pattern 
analyzing operations. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 599-612. 
Lee, A. Y., & Labroo, A. A. (2004). The effect of conceptual and perceptual fluency on brand 
evaluation. Journal of Marketing Research, 41, 151-165. 
Light, L. L., Prull, M. W., LaVoie, D. J., & Healy, M. R. (2000). Dual-process theories of 
memory in old age. In T. J. Perfect & E. A. Maylor (Eds.), Models of cognitive aging 
(pp. 238-300). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
   
   
127 
Luo, L., & Craik, F. I. (2009). Age differences in recollection: Specificity effects at retrieval. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 60, 421-436. 
Lupker, S. J. (1984). Semantic priming without association: A second look. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23, 709-733. 
Lyons, K. E., Ghetti, S., & Cornoldi, C. (2010). Age differences in the contribution of 
recollection and familiarity to false‐memory formation: a new paradigm to examine 
developmental reversals. Developmental Science, 13, 355-362. 
Mandler, G. (1980). Recognizing: The judgment of previous occurrence. Psychological 
Review, 87, 252-271. 
Mandler, G., Nakamura, Y., & Van Zandt, B. J. (1987). Nonspecific effects of exposure on 
stimuli that cannot be recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 13, 646-648. 
McGlone, M. S., & Tofighbakhsh, J. (2000). Birds of a feather flock conjointly (?): Rhyme as 
reason in aphorisms. Psychological Science, 11, 424-428. 
Moons, W. G., Mackie, D. M., Garcia-Marques, T. (2009). The impact of repetition-induced 
familiarity on agreement with weak and strong arguments. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 96, 32-44. 
Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., & Simon, H. A. (1959). The processes of creative thinking. Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
Olds, J. M., & Westerman, D. L. (2012). Can fluency be interpreted as novelty? Retraining 
the interpretation of fluency in recognition memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 653-664. 
 
   
   
128 
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of 
necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
20, 139-156. 
Palmer, S.E. (1975). The effects of contextual scenes on the identification of objects. Memory 
& Cognition, 3, 519-26. 
Parks, C. M., & Toth, J. P. (2006). Fluency, familiarity, aging, and the illusion of truth. Aging, 
Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 13, 225-253. 
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & Tormala, Z. L. (2002). Thought confidence as a determinant of 
persuasion: the self-validation hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82, 722. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123-205. 
Pocheptsova, A., Labroo, A. A., & Dhar, R. (2010). Making products feel special: When 
metacognitive difficulty enhances evaluation. Journal of Marketing Research, 47, 
1059-1069. 
Reber, A. S. (1967). Implicit learning of artificial grammars. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 6, 855-863. 
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth. 
Consciousness & Cognition, 8, 338-342. 
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing fluency and aesthetic pleasure: 
Is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 8, 364-382. 
 
   
   
129 
Reber, R., & Unkelbach, C. (2010). The epistemic status of processing fluency as source for 
judgments of truth. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 563-581. 
Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Effects of perceptual fluency on affective 
judgments. Psychological Science, 9, 45-48. 
Reber, R., Wurtz, P., & Zimmermann, T. D. (2004). Exploring “fringe” consciousness: The 
subjective experience of perceptual fluency and its objective bases. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 13, 47-60. 
Reber, R., & Zupanek, N. (2002). Effects of processing fluency on estimates of probability 
and frequency. In P. Sedlmeier, & T. Betsch (Eds.), Frequency processing and 
cognition (pp. 175–188). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Reisenzein, R. (1983). The Schachter theory of emotion: two decades later. Psychological 
Bulletin, 94, 239-264. 
Sachs, J. S. (1967). Recognition memory for syntactic and semantic aspects of connected 
discourse. Perception & Psychophysics, 2, 437-442. 
Scarborough, D. L., Cortese, C., & Scarborough, H. S. (1977). Frequency and repetition 
effects in lexical memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 3, 1-17. 
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of 
emotional state. Psychological Review, 69, 379-399. 
Schwarz, N. (2004). Metacognitive experiences in consumer judgment and decision making. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14, 332-348. 
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). 
Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202. 
Seamon, J. G., McKenna, P. A., & Binder, N. (1998). The mere exposure effect is 
differentially sensitive to different judgment tasks. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 
85-102. 
 
   
   
130 
Seamon, J. G., Williams, P. C., Crowley, M. J., Kim, I. J., Langer, S. A., Orne, P. J., & 
Wishengrad, D. L. (1995). The mere exposure effect is based on implicit memory: 
Effects of stimulus type, encoding conditions, and number of exposures on recognition 
and affect judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 21, 711-721. 
Skurnik, I., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2000). Drawing inferences from feelings: The 
role of naive beliefs. In H. Bless & J. Forgas (Eds.), The message within: The role of 
subjective experience in social cognition and behavior (pp. 162-175). Philadelphia, 
PA: Psychology Press. 
Skurnik, I., Yoon, C., Park, D. C., & Schwarz, N. (2005). How warnings about false claims 
become recommendations. Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 713-724. 
Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: 
Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and 
social psychology review, 4, 108-131. 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3-22. 
Sloman, Steven A. (2002). Two systems of reasoning. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. 
Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 
379-396). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Spinoza, B. (1982). The ethics and selected letters. (S. Feldman, Ed., and S. Shirley, Trans.). 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work published 1677) 
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Topolinski, S., & Reber, R. (2010). Gaining insight into the “Aha” experience. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 19, 402-405. 
Tulving, E., Schacter, D. L., & Stark, H. A. (1982). Priming effects in word-fragment 
completion are independent of recognition memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8, 336-342. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and 
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232. 
 
   
   
131 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
Underwood, B. J. (1971). Recognition memory. In H. H. Kendler & J. T. Spence (Eds.), 
Essays in neo-behaviorism. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Underwood, B. J., Zimmerman, J., & Freund, J. S. (1971). Retention of frequency 
information with observations on recognition and recall. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 87, 149-162. 
Unkelbach, C. (2006). The learned interpretation of cognitive fluency. Psychological Science, 
12, 339-345. 
Unkelbach, C. (2007). Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing 
fluency in judgments of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 33, 219-230. 
Unkelbach, C., Bayer, M., Alves, H., Koch, A., & Stahl, C. (2011). Fluency and positivity as 
possible causes of the truth effect. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 594-602. 
Unkelbach, C., & Greifeneder, R. (2013). A general model of fluency effects in judgment and 
decision making. In C. Unkelbach & R. Greifeneder (Eds.), The experience of 
thinking: How the fluency of mental processes influences cognition and behaviour (pp. 
11–32). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Unkelbach, C., & Stahl, C. (2009). A multinomial modeling approach to dissociate different 
components of the truth effect. Consciousness & Cognition, 18, 22-38. 
Westerman, D. L. (2008). Relative fluency and illusions of recognition memory. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 15, 1196-1200. 
Whittlesea, B. W. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1235-1253. 
Whittlesea, B. W., Jacoby, L. L., & Girard, K. (1990). Illusions of immediate memory: 
Evidence of an attributional basis for feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 716-732. 
Whittlesea, B. W., & Leboe, J. P. (2003). Two fluency heuristics (and how to tell them apart). 
Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 62-79. 
 
   
   
132 
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2000). The source of feelings of familiarity: The 
discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 26, 547-565. 
Whittlesea, B. W., & Williams, L. D. (1998). Why do strangers feel familiar, but friends 
don't? A discrepancy-attribution account of feelings of familiarity. Acta Psychologica, 
98, 141-165. 
Wilde, O. (2000). The Importance of Being Earnest and Other Plays. London, UK: Penguin 
Books (Original work published 1895). 
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at ease puts a smile on the face: 
psychophysiological evidence that processing facilitation elicits positive affect. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 989-1000. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Fazendeiro, T., & Reber, R. (2003). The hedonic marking of 
processing fluency: Implications for evaluative judgment. In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer 
(Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion 
(pp. 189-217). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Wurtz, P., Reber, R., & Zimmermann, T. D. (2008). The feeling of fluent perception: A single 
experience from multiple asynchronous sources. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 
171-184. 
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 years of 
research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 441-517. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 9, 1-27. 
 
  
 
   
   
133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIXES 
 
  
 
   
   
134 
 
   
   
135 
Appendix A: Statements Used in the Experiments of the Empirical Articles 
 
The statements used in the experiments of the empirical articles were selected from 
two different sources. Part of the statements was selected from the material previously pre-
tested and validated by Garcia-Marques (1999, see Table 1). The studies that have been 
conducted with this material since it was pre-tested show that the statements maintain their 
neutral truth status still in the present day (e.g., when presented as new, they are judged 
around the mean point of the rating scales used to measure truth-value). 
Additionally, a pre-test was carried out to validate another set of statements, as more 
stimuli were required for some of the experiments presented earlier. This pre-test consisted in 
the presentation of 60 statements (30 true and 30 false), selected from encyclopedias and 
other sources of information. These statements were evaluated by 49 university students, who 
were asked to read each of them and indicate whether they consider it true or false 
(dichotomic decision). The proportion of “True” and “False” responses were calculated for 
each statement, and t-tests were performed to test if there were significant differences against 
a 50% chance. 
 
Table 1.  
Means associated with each pre-tested sentence and proportion of individuals that considered 
each sentence true (n for each sentence in between 16-20).  In bold – statements validated as neutral. 
Source: Garcia-Marques (1999). 
 
TRUE  VERSION 
 
 
True 
 
 
False 
 
FALSE VERSION 
 
O ovo de uma avestruz leva cerca de uma hora a cozer 
A maior cidade  a  sul do  equador é Melbourne,  na    Austrália 
Até à cerca de 300 anos atrás comia-se apenas com os dedos* 
Os crocodilos dormem de olhos fechados 
Um cubo de gelo aumenta o nível da água de um copo à medida 
que derrete 
A harpa tem 47 cordas e sete pedais 
Henry Ford esqueceu-se de incluir a marcha-atraz no seu 
primeiro veículo. 
A estátua do Cristo-Rei tem 28m de altura 
Um ano luz corresponde a 10 biliões de kms 
Duas mãos direitas juntas eram o símbolo da amizade para 
os romanos 
O coração da cobra localiza-se a cerca de metade da distancia 
entre  a sua cabeça e a cauda  
 
4.11 (56%) 
4.86 (70%) 
4.22 (56%) 
4.00 (42%) 
1.71 (0%) 
 
2.88 (30%) 
3.33 (0%) 
 
5.11 (58%) 
3.85 (15%) 
4.78 (56%) 
 
3.57 (15%) 
 
 
2.42 (0%) 
3.13 (33%) 
2.29 (15%) 
4.25 (56%) 
5.50  (67%) 
 
3.14 (30%) 
2.14 (0%) 
 
4.71 (52%) 
4.00 (56%) 
4.71 (58%) 
 
3.75 (23%) 
 
 
O ovo de uma avestruz leva cerca de seis horas a cozer 
A maior cidade a  sul do  equador é Buenos Aires, na Argentina 
Até à cerca de 200  atrás anos comia-se apenas com os dedos* 
Os crocodilos dormem de olhos abertos 
Um cubo de gelo não aumenta o nível da água de um copo à 
medida que derrete. 
A harpa tem 27 cordas e dois pedais 
Henry Ford esqueceu-se de incluir travões no seu primeiro 
veículo 
 
A estátua do Cristo-Rei tem 38m de altura 
Um ano luz corresponde a 10 triliões de kms 
Uma mão direita e esquerda juntas eram o símbolo da 
amizade para os romanos 
O coração da cobra localiza-se a cerca de um quinto da 
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“Mackintosh” em 1924 designava um tipo de tecido sedoso  
transparente 
A altitude máxima média a que voa um avião, não vai além dos 15 
km 
Apenas 50% do calor energético da gasolina é aproveitado para 
mover o automóvel. 
O recorde de salto de uma pulga é de 18 cm. 
O gelado de cone surgiu  nos EUA em 1904. 
Pela Bíblia  não se pode provar que Jesus alguma vez chorou 
O primeiro filme de desenhos animados é francês 
Os ovos de  cobra são ou brancos ou creme 
São necessários 20 dias para que uma mosca doméstica 
seja bisavó 
O homem tem 20% mais  glóbulos vermelhos no seu corpo do 
que a mulher 
Os dentes  do siso  não nascem em 60% dos seres humanos 
Na época medieval eram os vidreiros quem fabricava lentes de 
correcção para a vista 
No ano de 205 A.C os romanos instituíram uma lei que proibia as 
mulheres de conduzir  carros de gala 
Nenhum lugar na terra está livre de tempestades eléctricas 
Para obter um kg de açafrão são necessárias 70 a 80 000 flores 
As zonas polares não se encontram delineadas com precisão 
nos mapas 
O presidente John Taylor dos EUA, adoptou  14 crianças 
A árvore-vaca da Venezuela designa-se deste modo por produzir 
folhas malhadas de branco e preto com aparência de pele de 
vaca 
As partículas atómicas sabem diferenciar entre direita e 
esquerda 
As borboletas têm o paladar nas patas e não na boca 
Os tubarões antecedem temporalmente os dinaussaros 
Uma flor de papoila só dura 3-5 dias 
A temperatura dentro de um pepino é sempre mais quente do 
que do ar ambiente 
Uma joaninha recém nascida é amarela e vermelha 
A infecção com maior prevalência no mundo é a malária 
As três cores com maior predominância nas flores são, por 
ordem, o branco, vermelho e azul. 
Um bébé elefante chucha com a sua tromba e não com a boca 
A profissão de arquitecto era reconhecido em Roma como a de 
um artista e intelectual 
Mozart escreveu uma sonata intitulada Les Adieux 
A maior distância a que uma bola de basebol foi lançada é 
de cerca de 230 metros 
A Igreja Metodista foi estabelecida em1698 
Andrew Jackson foi o primeiro presidente dos EUA a andar de 
balão 
O primeiro cão-guia para cegos foi apresentado a um cego 
em 1938 
O preço da pituitária de porco ultrapassa os 6 contos o Kg 
Os chineses inventaram uma moeda de pagamento de favores e 
protecção aos mortos 
A porta giratória  foi inventada no Norte de África 
Apenas cerca de 3% da energia de uma lâmpada eléctrica 
resulta em luz 
As avestruzes não enterram a cabeça na areia 
A primeira bandeira da Confederação nos EUA designava-se 
“Estrelas e Linhas” 
Cabelos e unhas crescem em cadáveres. 
O lago Itasca em Michigan é a nascente do rio Mississipi 
A distância  de Cucujães a Lisboa é de 123 km. 
2.14 (15%) 
 
3.33 (33%) 
3.85 (15%) 
 
3.33 (33%) 
4.66 (56%) 
2.57 (15%) 
4.44 (52%) 
4.22 (33%) 
3.86 (42%) 
 
3.55 (33%) 
 
4.86 (70%) 
3.67 (56%) 
 
3.00 (22%) 
 
5.55 (58%) 
4.66 (33%) 
4.88 (67%) 
 
3.43 (42%) 
5.43 (86%) 
 
3.77 (22%) 
4.44 (56%) 
3.67 (33%) 
3.43 (42%) 
3.88 (33%) 
 
4.00 (42%) 
3.89 (56%) 
4.44 (67%) 
 
5.00 (57%) 
5.78 (90%) 
 
3.43 (30%) 
4.86 (58%) 
 
4.00 (15%) 
3.57 (15%) 
 
4.66 (61%) 
 
3.67 (33%) 
3.44  (22%) 
 
5.17 (58%) 
3.33 (10%) 
 
2.00 (10%) 
5.11 (42%) 
 
6.43 (86%) 
4.28 (15%) 
3.57 (30%) 
4.28 (42%) 
 
4.00 (30%) 
2.87(10%) 
 
3.57 (30%) 
3.37 (23%) 
 
3.71 (42%) 
5.71 (70%) 
3.00 (10%) 
5.14 (56%) 
5.86 (87%) 
4.00 (42%) 
 
3.28 (30%) 
 
4.00 (35%) 
2.71 (15%) 
 
2.86 (15%) 
 
4.71 (52%) 
4.00 (30%) 
2.83 (30%) 
 
3.00 (40%) 
4.56 (35%) 
 
5.00 (42%) 
3.33 (15%) 
3.50 (30%) 
5.00 (67%) 
5.00 (56%) 
 
4.77 (67%) 
3.83 (42%) 
3.83 (30%) 
 
3.00 (10%) 
3.67 (30%) 
 
2.89 (10%) 
4.67 (55%) 
 
3.78 (10%) 
3.44 (10%) 
 
3.50 (40%) 
 
3.50 (42%) 
4.50 (30%) 
 
3.56 (35%) 
4.16 (58%) 
 
6.00 (70%) 
5.00 (55%) 
 
4.44 (55%) 
4.22 (35%) 
3.78 (35%) 
4.44 (42%) 
 
4.55 (67%) 
distancia entre  a sua cabeça e a cauda 
“Mackintosh” em 1924 designava um tipo de tecido 
impermeável vulcanizado 
A altitude máxima média a que voa um avião, não vai além 10 
km 
Apenas 20% do calor energético da gasolina é aproveitado para 
mover o automóvel 
O recorde de salto de uma pulga é de 11 cm  
O gelado de cone surgiu  nos EUA em 1924. 
Pela Bíblia  não se pode provar que Jesus alguma vez sorriu 
O primeiro filme de desenhos animados é inglês 
Os ovos de cobra  são ou castanhos ou creme  
São necessários 60 dias para que uma mosca doméstica 
seja bisavó 
A mulher tem 20% mais  glóbulos vermelhos no seu corpo do 
que o homem 
Os dentes do siso não nascem em  40% dos seres humanos  
Na época medieval eram os curandeiros quem fabricava lentes 
de correcção para a vista 
No ano de 205 A.C os romanos instituíram uma lei que proibia 
as mulheres de  possuir carros de gala 
Nenhum lugar na terra está livre de actividade vulcânica 
Para obter um kg de açafrão são necessárias 700 a 800 flores 
As ilhas do Japão não se encontram delineadas com precisão 
nos mapas 
O presidente John Taylor dos EUA, foi pai de 14 crianças 
A árvore-vaca da Venezuela designa-se deste modo por 
produzir um leite com aparência e gosto idêntico ao leite de vaca 
As partículas atómicas não sabem diferenciar entre direita e 
esquerda 
As borboletas têm o paladar nas cavidades nasais e não na boca 
Os tubarões são contemporâneos dos dinossauros 
 Uma flor de papoila só dura um dia. 
A temperatura dentro de um pepino é sempre mais fria do que 
do ar ambiente 
Uma joaninha recém nascida  é cinzenta e amarela 
A infecção com maior prevalência no mundo é a cólera 
As três cores com maior predominância nas flores são, por 
ordem, o vermelho, azul e branco 
Um bébé elefante chucha com a sua boca e não com a tromba 
A profissão de arquitecto  era tida  em Roma por a de um 
técnico e não por a de um artista 
Beethoven escreveu uma sonata intitulada Les Adieux   
A maior distância a que uma bola de basebol foi lançada é 
de cerca de 130 metros 
A Igreja Metodista foi estabelecida em  1738 
Andrew Jackson foi o primeiro presidente dos EUA a andar de 
comboio 
O primeiro cão-guia para cegos foi apresentado a um cego 
em 1948  
O preço da pituitária de porco ultrapassa os 16 contos o Kg 
Os moris inventaram uma moeda de pagamento de favores e 
protecção aos mortos 
A porta giratória foi inventada nos Estados Unidos da América 
Apenas cerca de 40% da energia de uma lâmpada eléctrica 
resulta em luz 
As avestruzes enterram a cabeça na areia 
A primeira bandeira da Confederação nos EUA designava-
se “Antiga Glória” 
Cabelos e unhas não crescem em cadáveres. 
O lago Itasca em Minnesota é a nascente do rio Mississipi 
A distância  de Cucujães a Lisboa é de 283 km 
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A Etiópia tem apresentado nos últimos anos as taxas 
mundiais mais baixas de suicídio 
O carvalho através das suas folhas numa semana de verão, 
pode perder até 560 litros em humidade. 
A cortina de fogo, para camuflar o andamento de tropas, foi 
inventada em 1943 
Devido à iluminação artificial, caí na terra por  hectare, em 
média, cerca de 2,5 kg de nitrogénio 
A primeira mulher a receber uma medalha na Força Aérea 
mundial foi uma enfermeira americana 
O maior estádio do mundo é a de Kharkov na Rússia 
A raposa põe uma pata ao lado da outra deixando duas linhas de 
pegadas 
O melhor modo de retirar um insecto do ouvido é enche-lo de 
vapor de água 
A máxima velocidade atingida por um réptil em terra é de 
66km/hora. 
Um dente partido necessita de ser lavado para poder ser 
recolocado no lugar 
O jogo de voleibol foi inventado por William G.Morgan em 1895 
Os selos de via aérea foram pela primeira vez emitidos em 
13 de maio,1918 
O número de rotações de uma máquina de lavar roupa pode 
ir de 500 a 1100 por minuto 
O consumo de sódio aconselhado a um adulto, é de 800 mg por 
dia 
 
Bioquimicamente o colesterol é um álcool ao qual se fixa um ácido 
gordo 
O moinho de vento é contemporâneo do moinho de água 
Uma ervilha não mastigada deixará vestígios nas fezes 
Na Idade média designava-se o sal fino de “sal indiano” 
A primeira mulher operadora de telefone foi Emma Nutt, em 
1878 
Uma embarcação de aço é mais leve do que uma 
embarcação das mesmas dimensões em madeira. 
Gillette é o apelido do inventor da lâmina de barbear. 
A maior pepita de ouro encontrada até hoje pesava cerca de 20 
kg 
O preço mais elevado alguma vez pago por uma orquídea 
foi de 50 contos, em 1906 por Mrs Sanders de Londres. 
Desde o século sétimo antes de Cristo que se faziam 
dentaduras artificiais com dentes de cadáveres e de animais. 
O whisky de milho provém de uma massa de vários cereais, 
sendo dois quintos de aveia  
Em Portugal as emissões de dióxido de enxofre por habitante 
e por ano, atinge os 5 kg. 
É necessário refinar cerca de 45 toneladas de  minério para 
obter uma tonelada de níquel 
A fritura em óleo consiste na criação de uma película de  
glúcidos  coagulados e colorados. 
A flor mais pequena do mundo encontra-se no Japão e 
mede meio milímetro 
O primeiro piano foi construído na Áustria em 1709 
O México tem 38 estados mais um distrito capital, federal 
De todas as “Monas Lisas” existentes apenas uma tem 
autoria atribuída a Leonardo de La Vinci  
A pata dianteira de um texugo é maior do que a traseira 
Uma lata média vazia com tampa é recomendada como 
equipamento de sobrevivência no montanhismo 
As unhas dos dedos dos pés crescem mais rapidamente do 
que as das mãos 
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O Egipto tem apresentado nos últimos anos as taxas 
mundiais mais baixas de suicídio 
O carvalho através das suas folhas num único dia de verão, 
pode perder   até 560 litros de humidade 
A cortina de fogo, para camuflar o andamento de tropas, foi 
inventada em 1923 
Devido às chuvas intensas, caí na terra por hectare, em média, 
cerca de 2,5 kg de nitrogénio  
A primeira mulher a receber uma medalha na Força  Aérea  
mundial  foi  uma  enfermeira  alemã 
A maior prisão do mundo é o de Kharkov na Rússia 
A raposa põe uma pata à frente da outra deixando uma única 
linha de pegadas 
O melhor modo de retirar um insecto do ouvido é enche-lo com 
água tépida 
A máxima velocidade atingida por um réptil em terra é de 
46km/hora 
Um dente partido não poderá ser recolocado no lugar se for 
lavado 
O jogo de badminton foi inventado por William  G.Morgan em 1895 
Os selos de via aérea foram pela primeira vez emitidos em 
13 de maio,1926 
O número de rotações de uma máquina de lavar roupa 
pode ir de 500 a 1100 por minuto 
O consumo de cálcio aconselhado a um adulto, é de 800 mg 
por dia 
Bioquimicamente o colesterol é um ácido gordo 
O moinho de água é anterior ao moinho de vento 
Uma ervilha não mastigada encontrar-se-á inteira nas fezes 
 Na Idade média designava-se o açúcar de “sal indiano” 
A primeira mulher operadora de telefone foi Emma Ball, em 
1878 
Uma embarcação de madeira é mais leve do que uma 
embarcação das mesmas dimensões sem aço. 
 Schik é o apelido do inventor da lâmina de barbear 
A maior pepita de ouro encontrada até hoje pesava cerca de 67 kg 
O preço mais elevado alguma vez pago por uma orquídea 
foi de 500 contos, em 1906 por Mrs Sanders de Londres 
Desde o século sétimo depois de Cristo que se faziam 
dentaduras artificiais com dentes de cadáveres e de animais 
O whisky de milho provém de uma massa de vários cereais, 
sendo dois quintos de milho 
 Em Portugal as emissões de dióxido de enxofre, por habitante 
e por ano, atinge os 33 kg 
 É necessário refinar cerca de 45 toneladas de  minério para 
obter uma tonelada de urânio.   
A fritura em óleo consiste na criação de uma película de 
proteínas coaguladas e caramelização dos glúcidos 
A flor mais pequena do mundo encontra-se no Brasil e 
mede 1milimetro 
O primeiro piano foi construído em Itália em 1709 
O México tem 28 estados mais um distrito capital, federal 
 De todas as “Monas Lisas” existentes apenas duas têm autoria 
atribuída a Leonardo de La Vinci 
A pata traseira de um texugo é maior do que a dianteira 
 Uma caixa de papelão vazia com tampa é recomendada como 
equipamento de sobrevivência no montanhismo 
As unhas dos dedos das mãos crescem mais rapidamente do 
que as dos pés 
As balizas do pólo aquático têm 3 metros de largura 
Uma ratazana pode ter cerca de 70 crias por ano 
O sangue do corpo humano completa um circuito de 23 em 
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As balizas do pólo aquático têm 2 metros de largura 
Uma ratazana pode ter cerca de 50 crias por ano 
O sangue do corpo humano completa um circuito de 23 
em 23 segundos 
As ovelhas têm três vezes mais glóbulos vermelhos do que o 
ser humano 
As cascavéis não dão à luz as suas crias. Elas põem ovos 
 
Para que os soalhos parem de ranger deita-se pó-de-talco 
entre as tábuas 
O soutien só surgiu no inicio do século XX 
A graduação do vinho da Madeira situa-se entre os 20 e 
22 graus 
Para limpar a maioria das nódoas deve-se utilizar água 
morna 
A foca fêmea recusa-se a comer na época de acasalamento 
que vai de Março a Agosto 
O monóxido de carbono não se encontra entre os sete 
principais poluentes da atmosfera 
 A Casa Branca tem mais de 100 quartos 
O benzeno é um diluente que ataca o sistema nervoso e 
pode causar leucemia 
O organismo humano sintetiza metade da quantidade de 
vitamina K necessária 
O primeiro semáforo foi colocado nos EUA e era apenas 
vermelho e verde 
A expressão “peste negra” tem a sua origem no aspecto físico do 
doente, visto que a pele seca e escurece assinalando a morte. 
A baleia azul, pesando cerca de 100 toneladas necessita 
de 40 kg de alimento diário. 
A cerveja fabricada desde A.C. foi gaseificada a partir do século X  
O estado de Massachsetts dos EUA, tem o dobro de 
tamanho da Dinamarca 
A água do corpo humano não tem papel na sua regulação 
térmica 
A bazuca foi desenvolvida pelo exército americano e utilizada 
pela primeira vez em 1922 
As traças têm cerca de 1 centímetro de comprimento 
Uma dona de casa lava em média 2,5 milhões de artigos 
de cozinha na sua vida. 
Numa colher de chá cabem mais de dezoito baratas recém-
nascidas. 
Noah Webster demorou 20 anos a fazer o seu famoso 
dicionário de língua inglesa 
O comprimento total dos vasos sanguíneos do nosso corpo 
perfaz mais de 95 mil km 
As pessoas podem falar sem fazer vibrar as cordas vocais 
O mel contém dois tipos de açúcar: glucose e levulose 
Para fazer uma camisola de caxemira é necessário tosquiar 
10 cabras 
No decurso de um dia normal produzimos mais de 250ml de 
saliva 
Stephen Foster, escritor da letra de canções muito famosas 
morreu com 38 anos pobre e alcoólico 
As unhas das mãos não crescem todas ao mesmo ritmo, 
sendo a do dedo médio a mais rápida 
É da ordem das centenas de milhões o número de 
espermatozóides expelidos durante o orgasmo 
masculino 
As pestanas e os pelos das sobrancelhas têm a duração de 
alguns anos 
Os nossos ossos têm uma força compressora superior à do 
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23 minutos 
O ser humano tem três vezes mais glóbulos vermelhos do que 
a ovelha 
As cascavéis não põem os seus ovos. Elas dão à luz as suas crias. 
 
Para que os soalhos parem de ranger deita-se leite entre as 
tábuas 
O soutien só surgiu no inicio do século XV 
A graduação do vinho da Madeira situa-se entre os 18 e 20 
graus 
Para limpar a maioria das nódoas deve-se utilizar água fria 
A foca macho recusa-se a comer na época de acasalamento 
que vai de Março a Agosto 
O monóxido e dióxido de carbono encontram-se entre os sete 
principais poluentes da atmosfera 
 A Casa Branca tem menos de 100 quartos  
 O benzeno é um diluente que ataca o sistema imunológico e 
pode causar paralisia 
O organismo humano sintetiza quase a totalidade de 
vitamina K necessária 
O primeiro semáforo foi colocado nos EUA e era vermelho, 
branco e verde 
A expressão “peste negra” tem a sua origem na utilização 
da palavra “negra” como significado de “terrível” 
A baleia azul, pesando cerca de 100 t necessita apenas de 4 
t de alimento diário 
A cerveja fabricada desde A.C. foi gaseificada a partir do século XIX  
A Dinamarca tem o dobro de tamanho do estado de 
Massachusetts dos EUA 
A água do corpo humano tem um papel importante na sua 
regulação térmica 
A bazuca foi desenvolvida pelo exército americano e utilizada 
pela primeira vez em 1942 
As traças têm cerca de 6 milímetros de comprimento 
Uma dona de casa lava em média 2,5 milhões de artigos de 
vestir na sua vida. 
 Numa colher de chá cabem mais de 38 baratas recém-
nascidas. 
Noah Webster demorou 40 anos a fazer o seu famoso 
dicionário de língua inglesa 
O comprimento total dos vasos sanguíneos do nosso corpo 
perfaz cerca de 45 mil km 
As pessoas não podem falar sem fazer vibrar as cordas vocais 
O mel contém dois tipos de açúcar: dextrose e levulose 
 Para fazer uma camisola de caxemira é necessário tosquiar 40 
cabras 
No decurso de um dia normal produzimos mais ou menos 
950ml de saliva 
Stephen Foster, escritor da letra de canções muito famosas 
morreu com 42 anos pobre e alcoólico 
As unhas das mãos não crescem todas ao mesmo ritmo, sendo 
a do dedo indicador a mais rápida  
É da ordem das centenas de milhares o número de 
espermatozóides expelidos durante o orgasmo masculino 
As pestanas e os pelos das sobrancelhas têm a duração de 
alguns meses 
Os nossos ossos têm uma força compressora inferior à do 
mármore e betão  
O Japão é o país onde se verificou o maior número de tremores 
de terra 
O ser humano tem cerca de 630 ossos 
Os coreanos têm igual número de glândulas odoríferas na sua 
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mármore e betão 
O Chile é o país onde se verificou o maior número de 
tremores de terra 
O ser humano tem cerca de 630 músculos 
Os coreanos têm menos glândulas odoríferas na sua pele do 
que qualquer outro povo 
A tribo dos zulus na África do Sul tem cerca de 8,35 milhões 
de membros 
A cólera apenas desapareceu da Europa no século XX 
O trigo deve ser cultivado dois anos seguidos no mesmo 
terreno 
 
A pimenta um condimento muitíssimo apreciado passa de 
moda em 1650 
A população do mundo está a aumentar à proporção de 500 
indivíduos por hora 
A quantidade média de água da chuva que caí na terra, por 
segundo, é de 18 toneladas 
O maior terminal de autocarros do mundo é o de Port 
Authority em Chicago 
Alexandre I, Czar da Rússia, foi três vezes vencido por Napoleão 
Na Grécia 20% dos dentistas são do sexo feminino 
O tempo de vida normal de um canário é de 12 anos 
Angola é a quinta potência africana em grandeza territorial 
É a pulga macho que é utilizada para exibição de saltos em 
circos e não a fêmea 
Os caminhos de ferro da Grécia têm uma extensão de cerca 
de 1800 Km 
A aranha tem uma duração média de cerca de dois anos 
A árvore que consome mais de 190 litros de água por dia é a Faia 
A altura média da mulher americana é de 1,65 cm 
De um Cedro médio  pode-se fazer 500 000 lápis 
A maior presa (dente) de elefante registada até hoje tinha 
14,23m 
O pombo tem um tempo de vida superior ao de um 
coelho 
As beringelas, de forma ovóide, têm cor roxa ou branca 
É bem mais fácil ensinar um papagaio macho a falar do que 
uma fêmea 
O bombardeamento mais mortífero de Paris envolveu o dobro 
de mortes das causadas pelo bombardeamento mais 
mortífero de Londres 
Os ratos domésticos atingem velocidades 
aproximadamente de 15 km/hora 
Um bébé em 5 mil, nasce com lábio leporino 
Uma cria de urso ao nascer pesa apenas cerca de 5,5kg  
As bananeiras não são árvores mas sim uma espécie 
de cana 
Os peixes não conseguem permanecer de olhos fechados, 
pelo que não dormem do mesmo modo que os mamíferos 
Dois pregos colocados, um acima do outro, num tronco de 
uma árvore, permanecerão exactamente à mesma distância 
à medida que a arvore cresce 
Os cornos da Camurça apresentam nas extremidades 
uma curvatura em gancho dirigida para traz 
Em vinte doentes de gota, 19 são do sexo masculino 
Luís XVI casou por procuração com Maria Luísa, filha do 
Imperador da Áustria 
O suco da cana do açúcar que serve de base ao açúcar é 
igualmente a base do fabrico do rum 
Carlos Magno foi coroado Imperador do Ocidente, pelo 
Papa, no dia de Natal 
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pele ao de qualquer outro povo  
A tribo dos zulus na África do Sul tem cerca de 8,35 milhares de 
membros 
A cólera apenas desapareceu da Europa no século XIX 
 O trigo não deve ser cultivado dois anos seguidos no mesmo 
terreno 
A pimenta um condimento muitíssimo apreciado passa de moda 
em 1860 
A população do mundo está a aumentar à proporção de 500 
indivíduos por dia 
A quantidade média de água da chuva que caí na terra, por 
hora, é de 18 toneladas 
O maior terminal de autocarros do mundo é o de Port Authority 
em Nova York 
Alexandre I, Czar da Rússia, nunca foi vencido por Napoleão 
Na Grécia 50% dos dentistas são do sexo feminino 
O tempo de vida normal de um canário é de 20 anos 
Angola é a sétima potência africana em grandeza territorial 
É a pulga fêmea que é utilizada para exibição de saltos em 
circos e não a macho 
 Os caminhos de ferro da Bélgica têm uma extensão de cerca 
de 1800 Km 
A aranha tem uma duração média de cerca de dois meses 
A árvore que consome  10 litros de água por dia é a Faia 
 A altura média da mulher americana é de 1,69 cm 
De um Cedro médio pode-se fazer 300 000 lápis 
A maior presa (dente) de elefante registada até hoje tinha 
11,32m. 
O coelho tem um tempo de vida superior ao de um pombo 
As beringelas, de forma ovóide, têm cor roxa ou castanha 
É bem mais fácil ensinar uma papagaio fêmea a falar do que 
um macho 
O bombardeamento mais mortífero de Londres envolveu o 
dobro de mortes das causadas pelo bombardeamento mais 
mortífero de Paris 
Os ratos domésticos atingem velocidades 
aproximadamente de 10 km/hora 
 Um bébé em mil, nasce com lábio leporino 
 Uma cria de urso ao nascer pesa apenas cerca de 3,5kg 
As bananeiras não são árvores mas sim plantas de grandes 
dimensões 
Os peixes não conseguem permanecer de olhos fechados, mas 
do mesmo modo que os mamíferos, dormem 
Dois pregos colocados, um acima do outro, num tronco de uma 
árvore, aumentaram a distância um do outro à medida que a 
arvore cresce 
Os cornos da Camurça apresentam nas extremidades uma 
curvatura em gancho dirigida para a frente 
Em vinte doentes de gota, 11 são do sexo masculino 
 Napoleão casou por procuração com Maria Luísa, filha do 
Imperador da Áustria 
O suco da cana do açúcar que serve de base ao açúcar é 
igualmente a base do fabrico do gim 
Carlos Magno foi coroado Imperador do Ocidente, pelo 
Papa, no dia de Páscoa 
Os chapéus “panamá” são uma indústria do Equador 
 Lord Byron após se ter separado da sua mulher, saiu de 
Inglaterra e nunca mais lá voltou 
Para congelar álcool puro é necessária uma temperatura 
abaixo de 90 graus negativos 
A África tem uma área três vezes superior à da Europa 
Os chitas são mais de 16 milhões e vivem quase todos no Irão 
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Os chapéus “panamá” são uma indústria do México 
Lord Byron após se ter separado da sua mulher, saiu de 
Inglaterra por uns tempos 
Para congelar álcool puro é necessária uma temperatura 
abaixo de 40 graus negativos 
A África tem uma área quatro vezes superior à da Europa 
Os chitas são cerca de 8 milhões e vivem quase todos no 
Irão 
A zona mais profunda do pacífico tem cerca de 11 mil metros 
de profundidade 
O coelho pode ter de 3-12 crias num intervalo de 5-6 semanas 
Se nos colocarmos meio metro acima do nível das águas do 
mar, podemos ver uma distância de cerca de 6 km 
O primeiro sistema de distribuição de águas pelas cidades, 
parece ter sido construído pelos fenícios  
Os escorpiões não são imunes ao seu próprio veneno, pelo 
que se podem suicidar 
A temperatura do lado oculto da lua atinge valores de cerca 
de 50 graus negativos  
A principal condecoração de França é a da Legião de Honra 
Quando a Imperatriz Elizabeth da Rússia, morreu possuía 
150 mil vestidos nos seus armários 
Cada extracção de cortiça tem de respeitar um período 
mínimo de 9 anos 
É possível obter diamantes cristalizando o hidrogénio puro, por 
o submeter a temperaturas muito elevadas e a fortes pressões 
As cascavéis mudam de pele 3-4 vezes num ano 
A maior estrela classificada tem um diâmetro 2000 vezes 
superior ao da terra 
A velocidade máxima que um pombo pode atingir em pleno 
ar, é inferior a 100 km/hora 
Quimicamente o açúcar de milho não é a mesma substancia 
que o açúcar de beterraba ou de cana 
D.Pedro e D.Inês de Castro tiveram três filhos 
O esófago tem 20 cm de comprimento e 2cm diâmetro 
Os poços petrolíferos de Israel produzem anualmente mais 
de 220 mil toneladas de petróleo 
 
Um ex-escravo, George Carver, enriqueceu por ter 
desenvolvido mais de 300 produtos à base de amendoim 
O pescoço das aves tem cerca do dobro das vértebras do 
pescoço de uma girafa 
Em Portugal o voto feminino tornou-se efectivo a partir de 
1901 
A esfinge de Gizé esculpida em plena rocha tem 70 m de 
altura 
O Infante D.Fernando foi o sexto e ultimo filho de D.João I e 
D.Filipa de Lencastre 
Os pontos mais altos e mais baixos dos EUA situam-se no 
mesmo estado - Alasca 
O mar onde se verificam ondas de maior envergadura (cerca 
de 21m) é o Pacífico 
A espécie mais pequena de peixe tem apenas 10mm de 
comprimento nunca ultrapassando os 11mm 
As quatro diferentes modalidades do hóquei diferem no 
terreno e suas dimensões bem como no número de 
jogadores 
Portugal figura entre os cinco primeiros produtores de azeite 
do mundo 
O maior lago do mundo situa-se na América do Norte 
O principal rio da Europa é o Danúbio 
O coração de uma cobra chega a bater 24 horas após se 
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A zona mais profunda do pacífico tem cerca de 9 mil metros de 
profundidade 
O coelho pode ter de 3-12 crias num intervalo de 2-3 meses 
Se nos colocarmos meio metro acima do nível das águas do 
mar, podemos ver uma distância de cerca de 10 km  
O primeiro sistema de distribuição de águas pelas cidades, 
parece ter sido construído pelos Maias. 
Os escorpiões são imunes ao seu próprio veneno, pelo que não 
se podem suicidar 
A temperatura do lado oculto da lua atinge valores abaixo de 
150 graus negativos 
A principal condecoração de França é a da Cruz de Ferro 
Quando a Imperatriz Elizabeth da Áustria, morreu possuía 150 
mil vestidos nos seus armários 
Cada extracção de cortiça tem de respeitar um período mínimo 
de 2 anos 
É possível obter diamantes cristalizando o carbono puro, por o 
submeter a temperaturas muito elevadas e a fortes pressões 
As cascavéis mudam de pele 5-6 vezes num ano  
A maior estrela classificada tem um diâmetro  2000 vezes 
superior ao do sol 
 A velocidade máxima que um pombo pode atingir em pleno ar, 
é superior a 100 km/hora 
Quimicamente o açúcar de milho é a mesma   substancia  que 
o açúcar de beterraba ou de cana 
D.Pedro e D.Inês de Castro tiveram um filho  
O esófago tem 30 cm de comprimento e 3cm de diâmetro 
Os poços petrolíferos de Israel produzem anualmente mais de 
420 mil toneladas de petróleo 
 
Um ex-escravo, George Carver, enriqueceu por ter 
desenvolvido mais de 300 produtos à base de maça 
O pescoço das girafas tem cerca do dobro das vértebras do 
pescoço de uma ave 
Em Portugal o voto feminino tornou-se efectivo a apartir de 
1931 
A esfinge de Gizé esculpida em plena rocha tem 22 m de altura 
O Infante D.Fernando foi o oitavo e ultimo filho de D.João I e 
D.Filipa de Lencastre 
Os pontos mais altos e mais baixos dos EUA situam-se no 
mesmo estado- Califórnia 
O mar onde se verificam ondas de maior envergadura (cerca de 
21 m) é o Atlântico 
A espécie mais pequena de peixe tem apenas 1mm de 
comprimento nunca ultrapassando os 1.5mm 
As quatro diferentes modalidades do hóquei diferem no terreno, 
suas dimensões mas não no número de jogadores 
Portugal figura entre os sete primeiros produtores de azeite do 
mundo 
O maior lago do mundo situa-se na fronteira da Europa e Asia 
O principal rio da Europa é o Reno 
O coração de uma galinha chega a bater 24 horas após se 
ter separado a cabeça do seu corpo 
O plasma representa cerca de 55% do volume total do 
sangue circulante 
O basquetebol foi inventado nos EUA em 1801 
A dinastia Chinesa Chang é anterior à dinastia Chang 
Los Angeles tem um numero de habitantes superior a Nova York 
Existe maior produção de coelhos na Hungria do que na França 
A altura máxima é alcançada no sexo masculino aos 18 anos e 
no feminino aos 16 anos 
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ter separado a cabeça do seu corpo 
O plasma representa cerca de 55% do volume total do 
sangue circulante 
O basquetebol foi inventado em Inglaterra em 1891 
A dinastia Chinesa Ching é anterior à dinastia Ching 
 Los Angeles tem um numero de habitantes inferior a 
NovaYork 
Existe maior produção de coelhos na França do que 
naHungria 
A altura máxima é alcançada no sexo masculino aos 25 anos 
e no feminino aos 18 anos 
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Statement True / False % False % True 
Os macacos fêmea reconhecem as suas crias pela altura e 
peso. F 65,31% 34,69% 
O cantor Frank Sinatra não queria gravar o tema "My Way", 
mas a sua editora forçou-o a fazê-lo. F 63,27% 36,73% 
O nosso cabelo cresce mais rápido durante a manhã do que 
em qualquer outra altura do dia. F 75,51% 24,49% 
A altura do dia em que é mais frequente os patos porem 
ovos é à tarde. 
F 85,71% 14,29% 
O território de Marrocos está dividido em 12 regiões. 
F 48,98% 51,02% 
O maior rio da Europa é o rio Danúbio, com 3 688 km de 
comprimento. 
F 40,82% 59,18% 
A primeira fotografia com cor permanente foi conseguida em 
1900 por um físico escocês. F 53,06% 46,94% 
O Departamento de Estado americano reconhece 201 países 
independentes no Mundo. F 42,86% 57,14% 
São precisos 5 minutos e 40 segundos para a luz do Sol 
chegar à Terra. 
F 63,27% 36,73% 
O eclipse solar total mais longo de que há registo durou 12 
minutos. 
F 44,90% 55,10% 
Por segundo, são recicladas cerca de 350 latas. 
F 42,86% 57,14% 
A cidade de Veneza sustenta-se sobre cerca de 55 
pequenas ilhas. F 67,35% 32,65% 
O Taj Mahal, na Índia, demorou 26 anos a ser construído. F 38,78% 61,22% 
Os limpa pára-brisas foram inventados em 1923.  
F 55,10% 44,90% 
O lugar mais seco da Terra é Saguia el-Hamra, no deserto 
do Sahara. 
F 6,12% 93,88% 
O nome original da cidade de Xangai era Edo. F 57,14% 42,86% 
A força exercida pela dentada de um crocodilo pode chegar 
aos 20 000 pascais. F 36,73% 63,27% 
O planeta Marte gira ao contrário dos outros planetas do 
sistema solar. 
F 85,71% 14,29% 
Desde o início da exploração do espaço, 14 homens já foram 
à lua. 
F 57,14% 42,86% 
Na Croácia acenar a cabeça para cima e para baixo significa 
não. F 59,18% 40,82% 
O cravo da Índia é a especiaria mais cara do mundo. 
F 51,02% 48,98% 
O maior rubi do mundo pesa 5634 gramas. 
F 46,94% 53,06% 
A mais alta barragem da Europa encontra-se na Suíça e tem 
385 metros. 
F 46,94% 53,06% 
A estação de metro mais profunda do mundo é em Moscovo 
e tem 150 metros de profundidade. F 38,78% 61,22% 
A maior biblioteca do Mundo é a Biblioteca Nacional da 
China, em Pequim. 
F 30,61% 69,39% 
O último prisioneiro a deixar Alcatraz foi Alan Wilson. 
F 48,98% 51,02% 
Os ratos podem sobreviver até 40 dias sem comida. 
F 51,02% 48,98% 
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Os postais foram patentados nos Estados Unidos da América 
em 1761. 
F 36,73% 63,27% 
A pele é o maior órgão humano, ocupando uma superfície de 
cerca de 3 m2. 
F 36,73% 63,27% 
O tecido de uma bola de basebol é cosido com 90 pontos. 
F 32,65% 67,35% 
O maior glaciar da Europa é o Vatnajökull, na Islândia. 
V 38,78% 61,22% 
O avião boeing 747-400 tem capacidade para transportar 
416 passageiros em 3 classes. V 30,61% 69,39% 
O estado do Alasca é o maior estado dos EUA, cobrindo uma 
área de 1 717 854 km2. V 34,69% 65,31% 
O primeiro campeão dos Jogos Olímpicos da era moderna foi 
James B. Connolly. V 51,02% 48,98% 
Mozart era o mais novo de 7 irmãos. 
V 40,82% 59,18% 
A tenista Steffi Graf anunciou a sua retirada do desporto no 
dia 13 de Agosto de 1999. V 40,82% 59,18% 
A primeira caneta esferográfica foi inventada na década de 
1930 por um jornalista húngaro. V 65,31% 34,69% 
Os inventores do primeiro balão tripulado foram os irmãos 
Joseph e Jaques Montgolfier. V 32,65% 67,35% 
O nome da bebida Pepsi tem origem no ingrediente pepsin. 
V 67,35% 32,65% 
Os primeiros 3 países a terem televisão foram a Inglaterra, 
os Estados Unidos e a Alemanha. V 12,24% 87,76% 
Uma cana de bambu pode crescer 100 cm em 24 horas. 
V 71,43% 28,57% 
O corpo humano tem cerca de 100 000 km de veias. 
V 40,82% 59,18% 
Os dentes dos roedores crescem continuamente até ao final 
de vida do animal. V 46,94% 53,06% 
O tempo de vida de uma pestana é aproximadamente 150 
dias. 
V 57,14% 42,86% 
A língua de uma baleia azul pesa mais do que um elefante. V 53,06% 46,94% 
O Central Park, em Nova Iorque, tem quase duas vezes o 
tamanho do Mónaco. V 44,90% 55,10% 
Os pássaros têm cerca de 175 músculos diferentes. 
V 55,10% 44,90% 
Existem cerca de 6000 espécies de borboletas nas florestas 
tropicais da América do Sul. V 16,33% 83,67% 
A medalha do Prémio Nobel da Paz tem 3 homens com as 
mãos pousadas nos ombros uns dos outros. V 59,18% 40,82% 
Um gato tem 32 músculos em cada orelha. 
V 59,18% 40,82% 
A maior árvore do mundo é uma sequóia que mede 115,56 
metros. 
V 16,33% 83,67% 
O batimento cardíaco pode subir 30% durante um bocejo. V 57,14% 42,86% 
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Um piscar de olhos dura entre 300 e 400 milissegundos. 
V 24,49% 75,51% 
A construção da Casa Branca foi iniciada em 1792 e estava 
pronta para habitar em 1800. V 44,90% 55,10% 
O sangue das aranhas é transparente. 
V 69,39% 30,61% 
Um rinoceronte pode viver até 50 anos. 
V 18,37% 81,63% 
A guerra mais curta da história foi entre Zanzibar e a 
Inglaterra e durou cerca de 40 minutos. V 61,22% 38,78% 
Um feto começa a desenvolver os dedos das mãos às 8 
semanas de gestação. 
V 42,86% 57,14% 
É ilegal vender ou possuir pastilha elástica em Singapura 
desde 1992. 
V 65,31% 34,69% 
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Appendix B: Pre-testes of Similarity of Meaning of Original – Paraphrased Statements 
 
 We construed paraphrases of the 52 statements validated as neutral by Garcia-
Marques (1999; previous appendix), half in their true version, and half in their false version 
(randomly selected). The resulting 52 pairs of original-paraphrased statements were divided in 
two groups, with an equal number of true and false pairs of statements (13 true and 13 false). 
These two versions of the pre-test were then evaluated by 20 university students each. 
Participants were asked to indicate for each pair of statements how similar their 
meaning was. Participants gave their answers on 7-point a rating scale, anchored in 1- The 
phrases don’t have the same meaning, and 7- The phrases have the same meaning. 
To include as material in the experiments, we selected the 42 (21 factually true and 21 
factually false) pairs that were evaluated as having the greater meaning similarity (see the 
table below). Overall mean similarity of the selected pairs was Msimilarity = 6.21, SD = 1.37).  
After this validation of the material, we construed the paraphrases of the remaining 
statements validated by Garcia-Marques (1999). That is, for the pre-test we selected 26 of the 
statements in their true version (and other 26 in their false version), and after validating the 
material we applied the same changes to the false (or true) versions of those statements. This 
procedure guarantees that the true and the false versions of the paraphrases kept the same 
equivalence as the original true and false versions of the statements. 
 
Table 1. Means associated with each pre-tested pair.  In bold - statements selected for the experiments. 
Original Paraphrase 
True 
/ 
False 
M SD 
 
CI 
L.L-U.L 
São necessários 20 dias para que uma 
mosca doméstica seja bisavó. 
Até que uma mosca doméstica tenha bisnetos 
são precisos 20 dias. T 6,9 0,31 [6,77;7,03] 
A flor mais pequena do mundo encontra-se 
no Brasil e mede 1 milimetro. 
No Brasil encontramos uma flor com 1 
milímetro, a menor do mundo. F 6,85 0,37 [6,69;7,01] 
D. Pedro e D. Inês de Castro tiveram três 
filhos. 
Três filhos resultaram da relação entre D. Inês 
de Castro e D. Pedro. T 6,85 0,37 [6,70;7,01] 
Para congelar álcool puro é necessária uma 
temperatura de cerca de 90 graus negativos. 
Para solidificar álcool puro são precisas 
temperaturas na ordem dos 90 graus abaixo 
de zero. 
F 6,75 0,55 [6,51;6,99] 
O coelho pode ter entre 3 e 12 crias num 
intervalo de 2 a 3 meses. 
Num período de 2 a 3 meses um coelho pode 
ter de 3 até 12 filhos. F 6,65 0,81 [6,29;7,01] 
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O basquetebol foi inventado nos EUA em 
1891. 
Foi em 1891 nos EUA que foi criado o 
basquetebol. T 6,65 0,67 [6,36;6,94] 
O primeiro piano foi construído em Itália em 
1709. 
Em Itália, no ano de 1709, construiu-se o 
primeiro piano. F 6,6 0,82 [6,24;6,96] 
A maior distância a que uma bola de 
basebol foi lançada é cerca de 130 metros. 
130 metros é o record de distância percorrida 
por uma bola de basebol depois de ser 
lançada. 
F 6,6 0,82 [6,24;6,96] 
Uma dona de casa lava na sua vida em 
média 2,5 milhões de artigos de vestir. (2 
milhoes e meio) 
Uma média de 2,5 milhões de peças de roupa  
são lavados por uma dona de casa durante a 
sua vida. 
F 6,55 1,00 [6,11;6.99] 
As unhas dos dedos das mãos crescem 
mais rapidamente que as dos pés. 
Em comparação com as unhas das mãos, as 
dos pés crescem mais lentamente. F 6,55 1,00 [6,11;6.99] 
O número de rotações de uma máquina de 
lavar roupa pode ir de 500 a 1100 por 
minuto. 
A cada 1 minuto uma máquina de lavar roupa 
pode dar entre 500 a 1100 rotações. T 6,55 1,28 [5,99;7,11] 
A primeira bandeira da Confederação nos 
EUA designava-se "Antiga Glória". 
"Antiga Glória" foi o nome dado à primeira 
bandeira dos Estados Confederados dos EUA. F 6,5 0,89 [6,11;6,89] 
O presidente John Taylor dos EUA adoptou 
14 crianças. 
O presidente Norte Americano John Taylor 
teve 14 filhos adotivos. T 6,5 1,00 [6,06;6,94] 
É da ordem das centenas de milhares o 
número de espermatozóides expelidos 
durante o orgasmo masculino. 
Quando um homem atinge o clímax sexual, 
ejacula centenas de milhares de 
espermatozoides. 
F 6,45 0,89 [6,06;6,84] 
O sangue do corpo humano completa um 
circuito de 23 em 23 segundos. 
A cada 23 segundos completa-se um  novo 
ciclo da circulação do sangue  no corpo 
humano. 
T 6,45 1,47 [5,81;7,09] 
Uma cria de urso ao nascer pesa apenas 
cerca de 5,5kg. 
Perto de 5,5 kg é o peso de um filhote de urso 
quando nasce. T 6,45 1,15 [5,95;6,95] 
O maior lago do mundo situa-se na América 
do Norte. 
É em território norte-americano que se 
encontra o lago de maior dimensão do 
mundo. 
T 6,45 1,32 [5,87;7,03] 
O pombo tem um tempo de vida superior ao 
de um coelho. Um coelho vive menos tempo que um pombo. T 6,45 1,32 [5,87;7,03] 
A cólera apenas desapareceu da Europa no 
século XIX. 
Só no século XIX é que a cólera foi erradicada 
do continente europeu. F 6,4 1,31 [5,82;6.98] 
Uma mão direita e esquerda juntas eram o 
símbolo da amizade para os romanos. 
A figura que representava a amizade para o 
povo romano era a mão esquerda e a direita 
unidas. 
F 6,35 1,23 [5,81;6,89] 
Lord Byron após se ter separado da sua 
mulher, saíu de Inglaterra e nunca mais lá 
voltou. 
Depois da separação entre Lord Byron e a sua 
esposa, o poeta ausentou-se de Inglaterra 
para sempre. 
F 6,35 1,23 [5,81;6,89] 
A máxima velocidade atingida por um réptil 
em terra é de 46km/hora. (por) 
A rapidez máxima de um réptil em terra é 
46km/hora. F 6,3 1,49 [5,65;6,95] 
Os crocodilos dormem de olhos abertos. Os crocodilos não fecham as pálpebras quando dormem. F 6,15 1,23 [5,61;6,69] 
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A altura média da mulher americana é de 
1,69 metros. (um metro e 69 cm) 
Em média uma mulher natural dos EUA mede 
1,69 m. F 6,15 1,63 [5,44;6,86] 
A dinastia Chinesa Ching é anterior à 
dinastia Chang. 
Os imperadores chineses da linhagem Chang 
reinaram depois dos imperadores da linhagem 
Ching. 
F 6,15 1,76 [5,38;6,92] 
Uma joaninha recém-nascida é amarela e 
vermelha. 
Quando nascem, as Joaninhas são 
encarnadas e amarelas. T 6,15 1,50 [5,49;6.81] 
A expressão "peste negra" tem a sua 
origem no aspecto físico do doente, visto 
que a pele seca e escurece assinalando a 
morte. 
O aspecto ressequido e escuro com que fica a 
epiderme dos doentes indicando a morte é o 
que está por trás do nome "peste negra". 
T 6,1 1,55 [5,42;6,78] 
A infecção com maior prevalência no 
mundo é a malária. 
A malária é a doença infecciosa mais 
predominante no mundo. T 6 1,84 [5,20;6,80] 
As traças têm cerca de 1 centímetro de 
comprimento. 
O tamanho das traças é de aproximadamente 
1 centimetro. T 6 1,62 [5,29;6,71] 
O gelado de cone surgiu nos EUA em 1924. Foi em 1924 na América que surgiu o gelado de cone. F 5,95 1,64 [5,23;6,67] 
As beringelas, de forma ovóide, têm cor 
roxa ou branca. 
AS beringelas de formato oval podem ter roxo 
ou branco como sua cor. T 5,95 1,76 [5,18;6,72] 
O plasma representa cerca de 45% do 
volume total do sangue circulante. 
Aproximadamente 45% do sangue que circula 
no nosso corpo é plasma. F 5,9 2,00 [5,02;6,78] 
Carlos Magno foi coroado pelo papa no dia 
de Páscoa Imperador do Ocidente. 
Foi no domingo de pascoa que o Papa corou 
Carlos Magno Imperador do Ocidente. F 5,9 1,94 [5,05;6,75] 
A graduação do vinho da Madeira situa-se 
entre os 20 e 22 graus. 
O vinho da Madeira varia entre 20 e 22 graus 
de teor alcoólico. T 5,85 2,06 [4.95;6,75] 
O primeiro semáforo foi colocado nos EUA 
e era apenas vermelho e verde. 
Os EUA apresentaram o primeiro sinal de 
trânsito luminoso, que tinha apenas luz verde 
e vermelha. 
T 5,85 1,90 [5,02;6,68] 
O coração de uma cobra chega a bater 24 
horas após se ter separado a cabeça do seu 
corpo. 
Mesmo um dia depois de se cortar a cabeça a 
uma cobra o seu coração pode continuar a 
bater. 
T 5,75 1,83 [4,95;6,55] 
A baleia azul, pesando cerca de 100 
toneladas, necessita de  40kg de alimento 
diário. 
Diariamente, uma baleia azul com 100 
toneladas ingere  aproximadamente 40 kg de 
comida. 
T 5,75 1,59 [5,06;6,44] 
As balizas do polo aquático têm 2 metros de 
largura. 
A distância entre os postes de uma baliza de 
polo aquático é de 2 metros. F 5,65 2,28 [4,65;6,65] 
Os cornos da Camurça apresentam nas 
extremidades uma curvatura em gancho 
dirigida para trás. 
As Camurças têm chifres com forma de curva 
virada para trás nas pontas. T 5,65 1,53 [4,98;6,32] 
O Egipto tem apresentado nos últimos anos 
as taxas mundiais mais baixas de suicídio. 
É no Egipto que se tem encontrado 
recentemente o menor rácio de suicídio por 
habitante. 
F 5,55 1,85 [4,74;6,36] 
Napoleão casou por procuração com Maria 
Luísa, filha do imperador da Áustria. 
O casamento de Napoleão e Maria Luísa, filha do 
imperador Austríaco, aconteceu através de 
procuradores. 
F 5,4 2,11 [4,47;6,32] 
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O primeiro cão-guia para cegos foi apresentado 
a um cego em 1948. 
A primeira vez que um deficiente visual teve 
contacto com um cão-guia  foi em 1948. F 5,25 2,20 [4,29;6,21] 
Uma ervilha não mastigada deixa vestígios 
nas fezes. 
Se uma ervilha for engolida inteira, os seus 
resquícios serão detectados nos 
excrementos. 
T 5,2 2,33 [4,18;6,22] 
O preço mais elevado alguma vez pago por 
uma orquídea foi de 250 euros, em 1906. 
Em 1906 o preço de uma orquídea atingiu o 
recorde de 250 euros. T 4,9 2,53 [3,79;6.01 
A Faia é uma árvore que consome cerca de 10 
litros de água por dia. 
A árvore que bebe diariamente à volta de 10 litros 
de água é a Faia. F 4,75 2,59 [3,61;5,89] 
Nenhum lugar na terra está livre de 
tempestades eléctricas. 
Todos os locais da terra estão sujeitos às 
tempestades com raios. T 4,75 2,15 [3,81;5,69] 
Os selos de via aérea foram pela primeira vez 
emitidos em 13 de Maio de 1918. 
Foi a 13 de Maio de 1918 que se iniciou a 
circulação dos selos de correio aéreo. T 4,65 2,39 [3,60:5,70] 
Os ratos domésticos atingem velocidades 
aproximadamente de 15 km/hora. 
Os ratos domésticos conseguem a rapidez de 15 
km / hora. T 4,6 2,19 [3,64;5,56] 
O organismo humano sintetiza metade da 
quantidade de vitamina K necessária. 
Os órgãos do corpo humano conseguem fabricar 
metade da vitamina K que é precisa. T 4,4 2,33 [3,38;5,42] 
A estátua do Cristo Rei tem 38m de altura. A altitude do monumento  Cristo Rei é de 38 m. F 4,2 2,80 [1,23;2,97] 
A fritura em óleo consiste na criação de uma 
película de glúcidos coagolados e colorados. 
A fritura a óleo consiste na produção de uma 
camada sólida de glúcidos colorados. T 3,85 2,13 [2,91;4,79] 
O primeiro de desenhos animados é inglês. Em Inglaterra foi feita a primeira película de animação. F 3,8 2,69 [2,62;4,98] 	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Appendix C: Instructions of the Experiments in Empirical Article 1 
 
Exposure phase (experiments 1 and 2) 
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Filler task (evaluation of images; Experiments 1 and 2 
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Examples of images presented in the filler task (Experiments 1 and 2) 
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Learning phase (Experiments 1 and 2) 
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Test Phase (Experiment 2) 
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Recognition test (Experiment 2) 
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Appendix D: Instructions of the Experiment in Empirical Article 2 
 
Exposure phase (interest ratings) 
INSTRUÇÕES 
 Na investigação em Psicologia é frequentemente necessário conceber situações  mais 
ou menos artificiais que nos permitam garantir a presença de uma ou outra concretização das 
variáveis em estudo. Para tal a própria definição da situação bem como o material que a 
compõe necessita de ser cuidadosamente testado antes de ser incorporado num estudo. A este 
conjunto de estudos preliminares que nos garantem a validade das manipulações realizadas, 
designamos de pré-testes. 
Pré-teste: Grau de interesse percebido 
Neste pré-teste a sua tarefa é a de ouvir um conjunto de 30 frases curtas.  
Cada uma destas frases, pode ser verdadeira ou falsa, e refere-se ao que podemos 
designar de “uma curiosidade” relativa a um conjunto de temas diversos. Gostaríamos de 
saber se, em sua opinião, se trata de uma frase cujo conteúdo é muito interessante, apenas 
interessante, pouco interessante ou mesmo nada interessante.  
Para o efeito pedimos-lhe que assinale a sua resposta numa escala de 7 pontos que vai 
desde Nada interessante a Muitíssimo interessante. 
Numa gravação você irá ouvir frases do tipo “A maior cidade a sul do  equador é Buenos Aires 
na Argentina”   ou  então  “Um cubo de gelo não aumenta o nível da àgua de um copo à medida  que derrete” 
Assim, se considerar que, saber qual é a maior cidade a sul do equador é muitíssimo 
interessante deverá fazer um circulo em torno do número 7. Caso considere que lhe interessa 
apenas moderadamente o conhecimento relativo ao gelo, deverá assinalar o meio da escala, 
isto é o número 4. Quanto mais desinteressante achar o tema menor o número quer deverá 
atribuir à frase, e inversamente, quanto mais interessante maior deverá ser o número 
assinalado. 
        1-------2--------3--------4--------5---------6--------7 
 Nada interessante     Muitíssimo interessante  
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A folha que se segue a estas instruções, apresenta um conjunto de escalas onde deverá 
assinalar com um circulo o número que melhor representa a sua opinião relativamente ao 
grau de interesse que lhe suscita este tipo de curiosidade. 
 
 As frases vão-lhe ser apresentadas oralmente, por uma gravação.  
Cada frase será lida com o ritmo de uma frase por cada 10 segundos, pelo que o seu 
julgamento terá de ser relativamente rápido, não havendo muito tempo para pensar na 
melhor resposta.  Assim: 
- Oiça cada frase e logo que possível assinale um número. Caso a frase seguinte surja antes de 
você conseguir assinalar a sua resposta, marque rapidamente o número 4 de forma a conseguir 
realizar a tarefa para a frase que está naquele momento a ser proferida.  Não interrompa  sob 
qualquer pretexto a audição da gravação. 
- De inicio, haverá uma certa dificuldade em adequar o seu ritmo de resposta  ao ritmo com 
que as frases são proferidas, no entanto tal adequação é usualmente alcançada na 3º ou 4º  
frase. Assim as primeiras 4 frases da gravação  são consideradas de Ensaio. 
- O ritmo de apresentação das frases não será interrompido surgindo as frases do verdadeiro 
pre-teste em sequência as do ensaio. Pelo que é melhor  pensar que existe apenas uma lista 
que será lida toda ao mesmo ritmo. Fique, no entanto descansado com  algum descontrolo que 
poderá sentir nas primeiras frases. E já sabe, se tiver algum problema com alguma das outras 
frases marque o número 4 e centre de imediato toda a sua atenção na frase que está a ser 
proferida naquele momento. 
Vire a folha e  prepare-se para ouvir atentamente a gravação  de 30 frases. 	  
  
Truth ratings phase 	  
Pré-teste: Grau de validade percebido 	  
 Uma das manipulações que pretendemos fazer no estudo que tem por suporte este 
pré-teste diz respeito à veracidade ou falsidade das frases que apresentamos aos sujeitos. 
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Acontece que a totalidade de conhecimentos que temos relativamente à realidade 
em que vivemos atinge proporções tais, que nunca a conseguiríamos inventariar. Mesmo 
quando, aparentemente desconheçamos pormenores dessa realidade, o conjunto de 
conhecimentos que possuímos  permitem-nos  acreditar ou duvidar de afirmações feitas 
sobre esta.  
 Assim, se nos disserem que o primeiro ministro da defesa chinês se chamava João 
Vasques, tendemos a considerar esta afirmação como falsa, mesmo desconhecendo na 
totalidade o nome que ocupou tal cargo. Se nos disserem que a primeira língua europeia 
com que os povos do sul de África contactaram foi o português tendemos a atribuir-lhe 
elevada credibilidade.  
 Necessitamos de saber como são percebidas as frases que seleccionamos para o 
nosso estudo relativamente à sua veracidade ou falsidade. Assim apresentar-lhe-emos de 
seguida por escrito, neste caderno de folhas, um conjunto de afirmações  metade 
verdadeiras  e metade falsas. Leia cada frase com atenção e diga-nos com que confiança 
considera que essa afirmação é verdadeira ou falsa. Faça um circulo em torno do número 
que melhor representa a sua resposta, tendo em conta a seguinte escala: 
 
 
1...............2.................3....................4.................5.......................6.....................7 
 
De certeza        
Falso 
Provavelment
e  
Falso 
Possivelment
e 
Falso 
    Incerto 
 
Possivelmente 
Verdadeiro 
Provavelmente 
Verdadeiro  
De certeza 
Verdadeiro 
  
  
É importante que realize esta tarefa pela ordem com que as frases lhe são apresentadas 
e a um ritmo mais ou menos idêntico ao utilizado na tarefa anterior. Isto é, não pare para 
pensar muito sobre o assunto, dê-nos a sua opinião espontânea. 
 
Vire a folha para dar inicio à tarefa. 
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Appendix E: Instructions of the Experiments in Empirical Article 3 
 
Exposure phase (interest ratings; Experiments 1 and 2) 
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Truth ratings phase (Experiments 1 and 2) 
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Recognition test (Experiment 2) 
Same-session condition 
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1-week delay condition 
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Appendix F: Statistics of the Experiments in Empirical Article 1 
 
Experiment 1 
 Learning phase. 
Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed) and fluency source (repetition 
vs. color contrast) 	  Table	  1	  
Anova	  (2	  x	  2),	  discrimination	  ability	  (d’)	  as	  dependent	  measure	  	  
  SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model 9,630a 3 3,210 10,723 ,000 ,263 
Intercept 800,678 1 800,678 2674,712 ,000 ,967 
Learning 6,231 1 6,231 20,815 ,000 ,188 
Fluency 3,194 1 3,194 10,669 ,002 ,106 
Learnin * Fluency 1,197 1 1,197 4,000 ,049 ,043 
Error 26,942 90 ,299    
Total 901,587 94     
Corrected Total 36,572 93     
a. R Squared = ,263 (Adjusted R Squared = ,239) 
 
 
 
Table	  2	  
Anova	  (2	  x	  2),	  criterion	  (C)	  as	  dependent	  measure	  	  
  SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model ,568a 3 ,189 4,249 ,007 ,124 
Intercept ,314 1 ,314 7,041 ,009 ,073 
Learning ,151 1 ,151 3,395 ,069 ,036 
Fluency ,188 1 ,188 4,209 ,043 ,045 
Learning * Fluency ,317 1 ,317 7,108 ,009 ,073 
Error 4,013 90 ,045    
Total 4,803 94     
Corrected Total 4,582 93     
a. R Squared = ,124 (Adjusted R Squared = ,095) 
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Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed), fluency source (repetition vs. color 
contrast), and fluency level (high vs. low) 
 
Table 3 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), fluency level as repeated measure. Response times (RTs) as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning 13899874,966 1 13899874,966 15,075 ,000 ,143 
Fluency 6064348,027 1 6064348,027 6,577 ,012 ,068 
Learning * Fluency 297954,576 1 297954,576 ,323 ,571 ,004 
Error 82983334,700 90 922037,052    
F.Level 2689061,637 1 2689061,637 57,882 ,000 ,391 
F.Level * Learning 829914,291 1 829914,291 17,864 ,000 ,166 
F.Level * Fluency 1872893,544 1 1872893,544 40,314 ,000 ,309 
F.Level * Learning * Fluency 127190,957 1 127190,957 2,738 ,101 ,030 
Error (F.Level) 4181157,388 90 46457,304    
 
Experiment 2 
Learning phase. 
Effect of learning condition (classic vs. reversed) 
Table 4 
T-tests, difference between means, d’ and C as dependent measures (analysed separately) 
 
        CI 95% 
  Mean Difference t df p LL UL 
d’ -,262122 -1,371 45 ,177 -,647204 ,122960 
C ,032380 ,416 45 ,679 -,124301 ,189061 
       
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed), and fluency level (high vs. low) 
Table 5 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2), fluency level as repeated measure. RTs as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning 881079,129 1 881079,129 1,283 ,263 ,028 
Error 30906510,915 45 686811,354    
F.Level 134356,355 1 134356,355 1,215 ,276 ,026 
F.Level * Learning 1994421,892 1 1994421,892 18,033 ,000 ,286 
Error (F.Level) 4976838,498 45 110596,411    
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Test Phase 
Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed), Repetition (old vs. new), and color 
contrast (high vs. low) 
Table 6 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), fluency level as repeated measure. C as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning 4,453 1 4,453 7,590 ,008 ,144 
Error 26,399 45 ,587    
Repetition 6,572 1 6,572 37,782 ,000 ,456 
Repetition * Learning ,975 1 ,975 5,607 ,022 ,111 
Error (Repetition) 7,827 45 ,174    
C.Contrast  ,002 1 ,002 ,010 ,921 ,000 
C.Contrast * Learning 1,692 1 1,692 10,159 ,003 ,184 
Error (C.Contrast) 7,495 45 ,167    
Repetition * C.Contrast ,005 1 ,005 ,046 ,831 ,001 
Repetition * C.Contrast * Learning ,058 1 ,058 ,535 ,468 ,012 
       
 
Table 7 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), fluency level as repeated measure. d’ as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning ,009 1 ,009 ,027 ,869 ,001 
Error 14,794 45 ,329    
Repetition ,148 1 ,148 ,560 ,458 ,012 
Repetition * Learning ,210 1 ,210 ,792 ,378 ,017 
Error (Repetition) 11,909 45 ,265    
C.Contrast  ,080 1 ,080 ,312 ,579 ,007 
C.Contrast * Learning ,093 1 ,093 ,364 ,549 ,008 
Error (C.Contrast) 11,497 45 ,255    
Repetition * C.Contrast 1,141 1 1,141 3,514 ,067 ,072 
Repetition * C.Contrast * Learning ,552 1 ,552 1,700 ,199 ,036 
       
 
Table 8 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), fluency level as repeated measure. RTs as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning 1052326,429 1 1052326,429 ,270 ,606 ,006 
Error 175067265,242 45 3890383,672    
 
   
   
167 
Repetition 22554638,504 1 22554638,504 87,075 ,000 ,659 
Repetition * Learning 49,823 1 49,823 ,000 ,989 ,000 
Error (Repetition) 11656132,424 45 259025,165    
C.Contrast  3706786,769 1 3706786,769 15,451 ,000 ,256 
C.Contrast * Learning 108884,531 1 108884,531 ,454 ,504 ,010 
Error (C.Contrast) 10795925,482 45 239909,455    
Repetition * C.Contrast 161338,025 1 161338,025 ,838 ,365 ,018 
Repetition * C.Contrast * 
Learning 
251806,848 1 251806,848 1,307 ,259 ,028 
       
 
 
Recognition test 
Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed) and type of item (old vs. “new” from 
the test phase vs. new) 
Table 9 
Mixed Anova (2 x 3), type of item as repeated measures. Proportion of “old” responses as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning ,001 1 ,001 ,013 ,909 ,000 
Error 3,584 45 ,080    
Type.Item 12,539 2 6,269 97,687 ,000 ,685 
Type.Item * Learning ,186 2 ,093 1,450 ,240 ,031 
Error (Type.Item) 5,776 90 ,064    
       
 
 
Conditional analysis 
Effects of learning condition (classic vs. reversed) and perceived recognition status 
(“old” vs. “new”) 
Table 10 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2), perceived recognition status as repeated measures. Proportion of “True” responses as 
dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning ,081 1 ,081 1,760 ,191 ,038 
Error 2,083 45 ,046    
Type.Item ,834 1 ,834 16,943 ,000 ,274 
Type.Item * Learning ,080 1 ,080 1,625 ,209 ,035 
Error (Type.Item) 2,214 45 ,049    
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Appendix G: Statistics of the Experiment in Empirical Article 2 
 
Effects of type of old statement (original vs. contradictory), judgment session (same-
session vs. 1-week delay), and repetition (old vs. new) 
 
Table 1 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), repetition as repeated measure. truth ratings as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
T.Old 5,833 1 5,833 14,717 ,000 ,214 
Session 1,592 1 1,592 4,018 ,050 ,069 
T.Old * Session 11,652 1 11,652 29,401 ,000 ,353 
Error 21,401 54 ,396    
Repetition  ,093 1 ,093 ,272 ,604 ,005 
Repetition * T.Old 3,148 1 3,148 9,196 ,004 ,146 
Repetition * Session 1,811 1 1,811 5,291 ,025 ,089 
Repetition * T.Old * Session 4,576 1 4,576 13,366 ,001 ,198 
Error (Repetition) 18,486 54 ,342    
       
 
 
 
Table 9 
Mixed Anova (2 x 3), type of item as repeated measures. Proportion of “old” responses as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Learning ,001 1 ,001 ,013 ,909 ,000 
Error 3,584 45 ,080    
Type.Item 12,539 2 6,269 97,687 ,000 ,685 
Type.Item * Learning ,186 2 ,093 1,450 ,240 ,031 
Error (Type.Item) 5,776 90 ,064    
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Appendix H: Statistics of the Experiments in Empirical Article 3 
 
Experiment 1 
Effects of type of old statement (original vs. paraphrase), judgment session (same-
session vs. 1-week delay), and repetition (old vs. new) 
 
Table 1 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), repetition as repeated measure. Truth ratings as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
T.Old ,087 1 ,087 ,158 ,692 ,002 
Session 1,271 1 1,271 2,317 ,131 ,022 
T.Old * Session 1,427 1 1,427 2,601 ,110 ,025 
Error 55,421 101 ,549    
Repetition  31,542 1 31,542 105,535 ,000 ,511 
Repetition * T.Old ,053 1 ,053 ,176 ,675 ,002 
Repetition * Session 4,126 1 4,126 13,806 ,000 ,120 
Repetition * T.Old * Session ,167 1 ,167 ,560 ,456 ,006 
Error (Repetition) 30,187 101 ,299    
       
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Effects of type of statement (original vs. paraphrase vs. contradictory vs. contradictory 
paraphrase vs. new), and judgment session (same-session vs. 1-week delay) 
 
Table 2 
Mixed Anova (5 x 2), type of statement as repeated measures. Truth ratings as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Session ,084 1 ,084 ,107 ,745 ,003 
Error 30,531 39 ,783    
Type.Statement 43,649 4 10,912 31,483 ,000 ,447 
Type.Statement * Session 12,939 4 3,235 9,332 ,000 ,193 
Error (Type.Item) 54,070 156 ,347    
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Recognition test 
Effects of type of statement (paraphrase vs. contradictory vs. contradictory paraphrase 
vs. new), and judgment session (same-session vs. 1-week delay) 
 
Table 3 
Mixed Anova (4 x 2), type of statement as repeated measures. d’ (discrimination of old-new statements) as 
dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Session 13,636 1 13,636 15,127 ,000 ,279 
Error 35,154 39 ,901    
Type.Statement 78,918 3 26,306 76,163 ,000 ,661 
Type.Statement * Session 6,908 3 2,303 6,667 ,000 ,146 
Error (Type.Item) 40,411 117 ,345    
       
 
 
 
Conditional analysis 
Perceived “old” statements: Effects of type of statement (original vs. paraphrase vs. 
contradictory vs. contradictory paraphrase), and judgment session (same-session vs. 1-
week delay) 
Table 3 
Mixed Anova (4 x 2), type of statement as repeated measures. Truth ratings as dependent measures 
 
  SS Df MS F p ηp2 
Session ,082 1 ,082 ,063 ,804 ,002 
Error 49,950 38 1,314    
Type.Statement 18,105 3 6,035 7,209 ,000 ,159 
Type.Statement * Session 3,037 3 1,012 1,209 ,310 ,031 
Error (Type.Item) 95,429 114 ,837    
       
 
 
 
